1980
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HUMAN VALUES
— Working together to Create a World System of Societies Based on Human Dignity and Social Justice —

Date: Wednesday, October 1 ~ Sunday, October 5, 1980
Place: University of Tsukuba
Sponsors: University of the United Nations
University of Tsukuba
National Institute for Research Advancement
The Leisure Development Center
With the Support of: The Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Japan
The Ministry of Education, Science and Culture, Japan
The Economic Planning Agency, Japan
The Japan Association for the International Exposition, Tsukuba, 1985
World Federation for Mental Health
Japan Professional Bicycle Racing Association
Foundation for Advancement of International Science

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FOREWORD

The 1980 International Conference on Human Values was held at the University of Tsukuba, sponsored by the United Nations University, the National Institute for Research Advancement, the University of Tsukuba, and the Leisure Development Center. It convened about 250 scholars both in Japan and from abroad. It aimed to comprehend in a positive manner — and to help find ways to coordinate — the conflicts in human values which people now confront.

This conference proceedings was edited and published in 1981 by the Secretariat of the 1980 International Conference on Human Values.
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A GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE CONFERENCE

Since the beginning of this century human society has made remarkable progress, particularly in the startling advances of science. On the whole, society has become more affluent, and the environment surrounding mankind has undergone striking changes. Nevertheless, modern society has reached the limits of diversity and complexity and is faced with a multitude of unsolved problems.

The alienation of man from his labor in industrial society, the North-South confrontation, discord between developed and developing countries, division of roles between men and women, friction between the young and the aged, religious issues, the collapse of the family system, scientific advances and environmental problems — wherever one looks, these contradictions have given birth to a great amount of discord.

The International Conference on Human Values approached this situation, not from the point of view of established scientific disciplines, but from the point of view of values. With the data from last year's "Survey in Thirteen Countries on Human Values" as a base, the Conference was a part of the continuing efforts to develop a desirable life-style for mankind as we enter the 21st Century and to create a new system of values.

People from all parts of the world met in four symposia and twelve workshops to discuss the creation of "a world system of societies based on human dignity and social justice."
# Program Agenda

## Wednesday, October 1

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Place: University Hall

## Thursday, October 2

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OPENING SPEECH

Kazuo Okochi
Professor Emeritus & Former President
University of Tokyo

My assignment was to give the opening speech but I would like to have it considered as my greetings to you in inaugurating this Conference.

As the President of the Leisure Development Center, Mr. Sahashi, has just told us, the questions of human values today are a cause of much friction and confrontation in Japan. I surmise it is so internationally as well. I am therefore delighted that the present international conference is being held upon these subjects which are of primary importance to the future of mankind.

This Conference has been jointly sponsored by the United Nations University, the University of Tsukuba, the National Institute for Research Advancement, and the Leisure Development Center. The many outstanding scholars and students who have joined us not only from Japan but from many foreign countries will, I am sure, be contributing a great deal to the depth and significance of our discussions and deliberations.

We are starting this Conference today, and until the 5th of October I sincerely hope that our deliberations and dialogues will be effective and fruitful. However, the question of values or value concepts or views cannot be fully discussed, nor any conclusions reached, in one or two international conferences, let alone in a few workshops. I think our purpose is rather to take the time and trouble to find out each in his way, where the causes of conflict, of confrontation, and of misunderstanding are.

On the question of values, or value concepts, Max Weber once said years ago that the values of one man are as a rule a source of conflict to another man; that the true state of values was to be at once one man's God and another man's Demon. Would it be right for us to accept this way of thinking in dealing with the question of human values? As we move toward the 21st Century, shall we continue to oppose each other, each nation with his own particular value system and value concept? Or, may we hope that the differences will be gradually reconciled through mutual communication and endeavors? As we move towards the 21st Century, would it be desirable, not only domestically but also internationally, to have the diverse values converged or integrated under one value system? Or would such be undesirable? Would it be better to give each value system its place and look for harmonious coexistence? These are some of the questions we shall have to try to answer.

Turning our eyes domestically to Japan, we find that among the whirl of many conflicting and opposing value concepts, one of the most serious is the problem concerning energy, as reflecting the peculiar economic character-istic of Japan. In our country, which for example does not produce a single drop of crude oil, this question of energy is of the utmost importance as it can control the very livelihood of the whole 120 million Japanese people in the 21st Century. And yet, the Japanese as a whole do not seem to be vitally aware of the graveness of the situation.

While we are definitely under such an energy crisis, we still seem to be living day to day, as though the international state of the oil market were the same as before the 1973 crisis. Experts and journalists are constantly warning us about the crucial state of our energy outlook, and yet, the fact is that the people in general do not seem to be quite aware of this, and seem to be going on with their lives as though the crude oil market were still a buyer's market.

Or again, those who give some thought to the matter theorize that in a country like Japan, poor in energy sources, and given that the supply of crude oil from abroad and the importation of coal as energy sources are limited, the only way out is to consider peaceful use of nuclear energy. With this view, many Japanese electric power companies, etc., are going forward with nuclear power plants. However, the pros and cons for nuclear utilization are presently in a state of head-on collision, and nothing like a consensus is in sight.

Japan, or the Japanese, who are the only country and people that have suffered the destructive effects of nuclear power, are still deep down inside allergic to nuclear power in general. Nuclear power itself has two faces: one that of Satan, and the other the makings of a godsend for mankind.

No mutual agreement has been reached within the country on this controversial issue, and I suppose it is much the same in other countries too. However, for us, as the only country which has actually suffered the ravages of the nuclear bomb, it is particularly difficult to reconcile the different value concepts, and frankly, I cannot say that the government seems to be doing its utmost to facilitate a consensus.

Another serious problem that Japan is faced with is that of the advancing age structure of the population: the problem of an old-aged society. Of course there are many West European countries where more and more of the population is getting older, but the particularity of Japan is that our society is aging at a very quick rate. Looking into the next thirty years or so into the 21st Century, of the Japanese population, those over 60 years of age will probably be doubled or increase by two and a half times. On the other hand, men and women between 20 and 60,
who are the central work force of our nation, will in the
next thirty years increase by a mere ten percent. When we
consider this very ill-balanced future composition of the
Japanese population, we find again that no understanding
has been reached between the present more senior mem-
bers, i.e., those nearer old age, and the younger generation
as to how we should cope with the future increase in the
number of aged people. There is no common factor be-
tween the value concept regarding an aging society held
by the seniors and the younger people's basic ideas on the
changing formation of the population.

As aged people begin to occupy a greater share of the
population, the problems of who should look after the
aged and how far, of how much of the trouble should be
met by the younger generation, whether that is possible,
and whether they will be willing to do so, are questions
which I feel must be settled at all costs between the
differing generations; and yet, hardly any exchange of
ideas on the value concepts regarding these subjects has
been carried out. Many public opinion surveys have been
made and their results made public, but I cannot but feel
that a real battle of ideas between the younger and elder
generations on the subject of the aging society has yet to
be held.

Another aspect of the same problem is the nature of
old age. Since the War, new drugs and medicine have been
developed at an amazing rate. More and more of the latest
physics are being imported into Japan. During the thirty
years after the War, the art of clinical medicine has ad-
tended tremendously, and there are a great many very
skilled doctors in Japan. But as to whether the Japanese
have as a result gained happiness, that is not necessarily
the case. Before the War, the average life span was only
50 years in Japan, and during this short time we bore
many children, and many of these children died, and by
the time we were 50 we had more or less reached the
end of the candle of life. Such was the life of the Japa-
nese before the War. Today, as a result of the afore-
said astonishing advance and development in medical
science, I would not say all but many of the old aged
people who formerly would have passed away years ago
are still living. Still living, but I doubt if living a happy
life.

In the olden days when the Japanese were shorter-
lived, those who survived to a ripe old age were felicitated
and revered by the whole nation, and they led a happy old
life. However today, the aged generation, or the old-
gagers-to-be of twenty or thirty years later, are large in
number, comparatively healthy, but not necessarily
happy, and obliged to live a long and dull old age amid
the squabbles and tension with the other members of their
family. This tendency will be getting stronger. And from
the medical side, there is the question of the doctor
himself’s sense of medical ethics, his own value concept
on this subject. Between the two, it must be said that the
aged people of Japan are living a longer life, but at the
same time, to use a different expression, are not allowed
to die. Many of the aged in Japan are considering, rather,
how they might manage to die peacefully and happily.

I think these are issues of utmost importance, especial-
ly in Japan, being questions of differing value concepts or
friction between the generations, and that they require
serious consideration.

Another thing particular to Japan is that we have, as
you know, in the past twenty years or so seen an amazing
growth in our economy, so much so as to be called an
Economic Power. As a result the larger Japanese enter-
prises have made much profit, and although the methods
might not have always been strictly correct, the wages of
Japanese laborers went up, the standard of living of the
Japanese populace rose, and in a way, modernization
proceeded. However, as to whether a continued progress
in the industry and economy along these lines will be
good for the future of the Japanese people, nobody can
say, nor has there been enough discussion, in my opinion,
on the subject.

According to a government survey, more than 90% of
the Japanese, including both white- and blue-collar
workers, today consider themselves quite middle class.
I am not sure what is exactly meant by “middle class,”
but so stated the opinion surveys. No doubt, the Japanese'
way of life has thus much improved and, even if only on
the surface, has been modernized. On the other hand, the
Japanese as a whole do not seem to have a proper perspec-
tive nor awareness of what the future might bring us. I
feel that there is too strong a feeling of complacency with
the present state.

After economic growth comes, as you all know only
too well, the problems of environmental pollution and its
evils. But other than this, another feature which is begin-
ingen to be perceived is the common use of computers in
the production plants and in the offices. As we move to-
ward the 21st Century, utilization of micro-computers,
of robots in the production lines, and even the appearance
of machine-manned factories will increase and its blows
will be felt especially strongly in the secondary industries.
At the same time, the everyday life of the Japanese is
being more and more uniformly standardized, and yet, we
do not seem to stop and think on what an unhappy sort
of thing such a life would be.

Long time ago, André Gide wrote an account of his
travels in Stalinist Russia. Describing his visit to the home
of a Russian laborer, he reported that a seemingly great
number of laborers' homes were standing impressively in a
row, but that all the houses were built after the same
model, with the door in the same place, with the same
number of rooms in the same places, with the same-sized
portrait of Stalin with his same big moustache hanging in
the same fashion on the same wall of the same room. Gide
proclaimed that it was not the way for human beings to
live, but similar things are presently actually occurring in
Japan.

We might call it the standardization of life; or the
"instant" life (like coffee); or the direct connection of life
with the automatic vending machine. In Japan today, this
situation has spread, not only into the urban districts, but
right into the agricultural rural areas as well. This, to-
gether with the computers and remote control facilities
and robots in the factories and offices, and with the shifting
to machine-manned factories and what not, is creating
a sort of estrangement of man, an alienation of human nature. Yet again, I cannot but deeply feel that little debate has been carried out on the subject and that our feelings of future crisis are disconcertingly weak. I think a great confrontation of value concepts about this should be waged among the Japanese. And if we could learn of the state of things in other countries, of their troubles, and of how they surmounted them, we might be just lucky enough to benefit from them and learn to reflect on our own doings.

One final problem I would like to take up is rather one of an international nature. International organizations such as the I.L.O. and the O.E.C.D. are criticizing and denouncing us that we Japanese are working too much these days. The annual working hours of the American, West German, French, and English laborers are approximately 1,700 hours, whereas that of the Japanese are about 2,100 hours — a difference of 300 to 400 hours. This has been reported in the White Paper of the Japanese Ministry of Labor as well. And so, everybody is saying that the Japanese work too hard, but as to what exactly it means, neither an exchange of views on an international basis, nor an inquiry into the very core of its underlying value concepts have really been attempted.

The Japanese have a history of having been obliged to work long hours in order to make a living, as we were poor, or because the standard of living was low, or the wages were low. And it has been explained that from a long tradition of such a life style, the Japanese have gotten used to the idea that it was rather desirable to work long hours.

At the same time, another thing that has occurred to me is that the value concept of working has not been the same in Western society and Japan, and still isn’t today. As my speciality is in the field of economics, I have for example read over and over again the English economist Adam Smith’s *Wealth of Nations*. In it I find that he takes the view that work is toil and trouble to man... that if possible this toil should be avoided. If avoidance were difficult, then the shorter the time spent in such work distressing to mankind, the better. Or if one should lay the burden of this painful work which ought to be done by oneself on someone else’s shoulders, as that would be forcing the pain on someone else, so one should pay wages in return. In other words, it is a wages theory, to pay money in compensation for the toil and trouble. Such was the values and basic way of thought of the economists from the latter half of the 18th Century to the 19th Century, with England leading the way.

We in the East, in Japan, need to reflect on whether we have ever entertained such a value concept; whether, because we had been a poor nation for such a long time, we may conclude simply that we have become a people who naturally do not think anything of long working hours, who work with pleasure. I feel that at the bottom, there is a difference in the value concept of work in the East and West.

There have always been such traditional expressions in Japanese as, “to work even unto grudging a moment’s leisure,” “to work without even closing the eyes at night,” or a little stylishly, “off to work with the morning stars, and back from work in company with the moon.” They were used to express the life of mankind, and we have indeed in a way come down the ages acknowledging them to be virtues. If we visit today the mountain regions of Shinshu, Nagano Prefecture, we can see the moon reflected in every little block of paddy field tilled along the hillside, right to the mountain tops. Or if we go to Wajima on the Noto Peninsula, we find again thousands of tiny rice paddies.

These may indeed be manifestations of the poverty of the Japanese, but at the same time, seem to reveal a different way of thought, a different set of values on work from that held by Western society. We should not overlook the fact that deep inside us from long ago, there lies a human concept that man isn’t man unless he works. In international conferences on work, I feel that a thorough exchange of views looking right in the face of these differences, are of the utmost importance, but unfortunately, so far there does not seem to be any indications of such debates having been held.

I could go on giving an endless number of such examples, but at this International Conference on Human Values, I am told that experts and specialists in the line will be putting their heads together to discuss these basic and significant subjects in the various workshops. If the fruits of the workshops could solve the miscellaneous doubts, queries and uncertainties drifting about in my mind, nothing could give me greater pleasure. I sincerely hope that this Conference will be rich in such harvest, or at least that the first steps toward it will be taken. And with this prayer I would like to end my address. Thank you.
First, let me thank you for inviting me to deliver the keynote address this morning. It is a great honour. It is also a great challenge. It is a great challenge in two different ways. First, because clearly I cannot pretend to speak with the authority of the many experts who are gathered here today. All I can do in the short time at my disposal is to suggest —very tentatively, and with diffidence —some of the general considerations or, you might say, the historical background we should have in mind in our subsequent sessions, some of the points, perhaps, which may be worth further, more detailed consideration.

Secondly, it is a great challenge because the age in which we live is obviously an age of change, an age of transition, in which the future to say the very least is obscure. Of course all ages are ages of transition, the world never stands still. But it is also true that at some periods change occurs by slow degrees within well-established parameters and it is then relatively easy to foresee the course of development in a broad outline. Other periods are periods of upheaval, periods of turmoil when the sign-posts, the milestones along the road are overthrown, when in fact it is difficult to know even approximately where we are going.

My first point, the first point I should wish to put to you today, is that the present age fits more into the second than into the first of these two categories. We live in a world which is fluid and unstable, we are in the midst of a transition from one world order to another world order, or perhaps, and that I think is something we have to bear in mind, to a world without any order, to a world of disorder and anarchy.

The practical conclusion I would draw, is that we should beware of any straight-line extrapolation from the present into the future, as though we have only to see how things have been happening in the last 20 years, to see how they will happen. That was very common in the 1960s, it will simply not do in the 1980s. We have to allow for the unexpected, for the unforeseen, for the accidental, for the unpredictable. For me at least, in the present state of the world, futurology is a perilous undertaking which is more likely to mislead than to provide us with reliable and trustworthy guidance.

Let me try first to sketch briefly the historical background, that is to say, to pinpoint the current situation, the stage we have reached, the starting point, if you like, for any glimpse into the future. The subject obviously is vast and I can only pick out what seem to me to be some of the salient considerations. They are at once political, economic, and cultural, and although we here are concerned essentially with the cultural aspects, that is to say with human values, we cannot ignore the political and economic factors because the changing economic and political situation inevitably has a major cultural impact. That is to say, it affects how people think, what their expectations are and what are their aspirations.

From a political point of view, it seems to me that the greatest change of the 20th century has been the end of Empire. Look back to 1900, look back even to 1914, and you will have the impression that European imperialism is advancing invincibly, is bringing the whole world within its fold. In 1980 the European Empires for all practical purposes, have disappeared. The emancipation of Asia and of Africa is virtually complete. Speaking here in Japan, let me interject that the agent of this great transformation was Japan; that is to say, it was the Japanese advance into Southeast Asia in 1941 that dealt the deathblow to European imperialisms.

More important, from our point of view today, the change was not simply a political change. The advancing European imperialisms at the beginning of this century carried with them European standards, European values, an implicit assumption in the superiority of European civilization, a confident belief that the world would be shaped in the Western mould to a Western pattern.

In 1980, none of these assumptions can be accepted without question. That is my second point and I think it is an important point which we should bear in mind throughout this Conference. Any discussion of human values which assumes the universality of Western standards and ideals or even of Western modes of life and habits, is, so it would seem to me, in conflict with the current historical trend.

After the end of the Second World War it looked as though the European preponderance had simply been transferred to the two Super Powers, the United States of America and the Soviet Union. The world was still a world dominated perhaps more than ever by Western, though now of course, North American standards. This was the so-called age of bi-polarity. It lasted perhaps until the beginning of the 1970s, though by that time the dominant position of the Super Powers was visibly cracking.

We do not need to follow the stages. What happened
was that the bi-polar world was superseded by a multi-polar or a polycentric world. The Soviet Union was challenged by China; the formation of the European Economic Community placed Western Europe, which for 15 years had been to all intents and purposes an American satellite, on a basis of equality with the United States. The extraordinary progress of Japan was making it into the world’s third, great economic power.

This denoted a similar shift in Asia. By 1969, the year in which Nixon became President of the United States, the period was over when the United States could call the tune for the rest of the world. The most dramatic evidence of that was the decision to withdraw from Vietnam. But already in 1971, when Nixon made his notorious abrupt overture to Peking without notifying Tokyo, already then, Japanese policy which so long had been subordinated to American interests, began to follow an independent line.

The previous twenty years, the twenty years between 1950 and 1970, had seen a process which, without much exaggeration, can be called the Americanization of the World. Of course it had begun earlier. Actually, the phrase ‘The Americanization of the World’ was coined by an English journalist, W.T. Stead, as early as 1902. But never was this process more rapid than during the twenty years after the end of the Second World War. And the reason was not merely political, that is to say, it was not merely the United States’ political preponderance outside the Communist bloc, but it was also economic.

The war which began in Europe in 1939, had devastated the economies of the European countries in addition to those of the Soviet Union and Japan. On the other hand, United States productivity increased fourfold between 1940 and 1945. At the same time, it amassed huge stocks of gold. After 1945 the American dollar reigned supreme. American goods, particularly American consumer goods, flooded the world. American corporations set up in foreign countries, in Europe, and in Asia, taking over or displacing local businesses in Great Britain, in France, in Germany, and indeed throughout the so-called free world. American motorcars were built in Germany; Coca-Cola became ubiquitous. And with American business — inevitably because that was what it was selling — came the American way of life.

And then at the end of the 1960s, the pendulum began to swing back in the opposite direction. American motorcars were no longer competitive with Japanese motorcars, or even with French or Italian motorcars. Fundamentally, the American economy was over-stretched as a result of its military and political commitments. The result, in 1971, was the beginning of American deficits, and eventually the devaluation of the dollar. For some 35 years, there had been what was called a ‘dollar gap.’ Now, after 1971, there was a ‘dollar glut.’

This flood of dollars, which was fueled by the colossal American deficits and outpourings for political and military purposes, also stoked the fires of worldwide inflation. So also, of course, in 1973 did the sudden rise in oil prices. At the same time, the surge of productivity which had been the mark of the 1950s and 1960s — though, in retrospect, I think it was really a natural consequence of the pent-up demand of the war years — reached its peak and the world passed into the era of so-called ‘stagflation,’ that is to say, of strong inflationary pressures combined with stagnant productivity.

The result of this was the end of the dream of permanently increasing affluence which had been the accepted creed between 1955 and 1965. In most parts of the world including the United States, real wages, that is spending power, have actually decreased in the past five years, and as we all know, unemployment has reached its highest levels since the 1930s in all of the industrialized countries, even including Japan.

As for the under-developed countries, the countries of the third world, their plight is probably worse now than it was thirty years ago. Certainly, in spite of the demand for a new international economic order, the gap between the rich nations and the poor nations, instead of closing, is getting wider, and even the few Third World countries, such as Brazil, which were held up for some years as examples of the success of capitalist development, are also in the throes of dire economic crisis.

What is obvious in any case is that an age of prosperity and affluence has given way to a period of stagnation, a period of slow growth and recession. And no one knows the way out.

It would be surprising if this great change in the economic climate had not produced a strong sense of disillusion with the ideology of the immediate postwar decades. This is the third point on which I would like to insist. Obviously the years of affluence, the expectation of a continuous rise in the standard of living, the promise which the economic experts held out of permanent growth, had very marked effects on people’s individual values. Now they are faced, particularly the millions of unemployed, but also the generation of school leavers, who, if things stay as they are, may never be employed at all, with the discrepancy between promise and performance. We should not be surprised in those circumstances if they reject the ideology of growth and the system of values associated with it.

But even if growth could be restored, and I do not think even the most optimistic economists believe that it can ever be restored to the quite abnormal scale of the 1950s, there is also the question whether continually expanding production, ever greater output, more and more consumption, is a viable policy in the long run, or even in the short run of the remaining years of the 20th century. Does it not mean, people are now asking themselves, that we shall leave to our successors in the 21st century — far more numerous, of course, than we are — in a depleted universe, short of all the essential resources to keep industrial society moving?

I do not want to enter into the much debated controversy about the limits of growth. Obviously I do not have the time to do so. It is sufficient to say that only 30 years ago no one even raised the question. It was simply assumed that resources were unlimited. Today that is certainly not the case. The limits of growth may be more elastic than the pessimists maintain. But no one pretends
that they do not exist. There is a much quoted statement by the well known Nobel Prize winner, Vasily Leontief, which bears quoting again. Leontief has calculated that at the present rate of consumption we shall use up more of the world’s resources during the last quarter of the 20th century than were consumed during the whole previous history of mankind on earth. And that I think in itself is a chastening thought. But if we wish to maintain or secure growth at the rate of 4 per cent a year worldwide — and that is a figure which is thought to be necessary just to maintain employment at its present unsatisfactory level for a growing world population — then we shall have to use even more. And many if not most of those resources are irreplaceable resources.

These facts, and I think they are facts, have obvious economic implications; but today that is not what I want to talk about. From the point of view of this conference, more important, I think far more important, is the doubt they cast on the ethic of a consumer society. What we have to consider, in other words, what people in fact already are considering, is whether we can any longer afford conspicuous waste, built-in obsolescence. And yet precisely this, to make things, to use things, to destroy things, to throw things away, and then to replace them — often articles of no lasting value, often articles of no value whatever — is the standard to which we have become accustomed, and furthermore the standard which we are encouraged and exhorted by all the devices of advertising, propaganda, television and the rest, to make our own. Not merely social standing and success, but also happiness and satisfaction are measured by material acquisitions. The criterion held out before us is the number of motorcars, television sets, refrigerators, washing machines, etc., we possess, but not only the number: it must also be the latest model, the newest, most fashionable type, the most recent introduction...

What we have to consider at this conference, I would like to suggest, — and that really is the fourth point I would like to put before you this morning — is the validity of this consumer culture as a model for the 21st century. I will not hide my own view that its prevalence has perverted human values. What, to take but one example, but a glaring example, could be more perverted, in a society which is polluting the very air we breathe. In Malaysia alone, not a country about which people know a great deal except Malaysians, no fewer than 50 major rivers are so polluted by industrial and chemical waste that no fish life can survive. And anyone who knows anything about oceanography (and I happen to know a little through a connection with a World Atlas of the Oceans which is in an advanced state of preparation) knows that the state of the seas is not much better than the state of the rivers. And yet life, all life including human life, depends in the end on the supply of clean water.

Pollution of the environment has already made the world uninhabitable for numerous animal species. If it continues unchecked and continues uncontrolled, it will not be long before this is so for mankind as well. And that is why people are increasingly asking where the march of industrial society and the values imbedded in the industrial society are leading us.

The last time I was in Japan the agitation over Narita Airport was at its height. It had two characteristics, I think both of them significant for our discussion at this conference. First, it was a protest, essentially a conservative protest, against the blighting of the Japanese countryside and the sacrifice of the Japanese farmers to the spread of industrialization and urbanization in which few people any longer wholeheartedly believe. Second, for the students who were in the vanguard, it was a revolutionary protest against a hedonistic Americanized society in which they had no wish to participate. What they were rejecting was the single-minded pursuit of growth for its own sake, not only because no one any longer believes that permanent or continuous growth is possible but also because of a growing awareness of what it destroys. Maybe at the moment that is true only of a minority; maybe only a small minority is involved. But it seems to me that the rejection of an Americanized Japan, with all its vulgarities and its concentration on material values, is a mark of our times.

What have I been saying so far? In sum, I think that we are witnessing a revulsion against the values and against a way of life that was dominant for 25 years after 1945. Most of the images of reality formed at that time have suddenly become obsolete without so far a new image of reality arising to take their place. In particular our faith in the potentialities of technical progress, a faith which was so characteristic of the 1950s and the 1960s, our belief in its ability to solve human problems, has been badly
would scarcely have arisen. The attractions of a Western life style — of rising wages, of a motorcar, central heating or constant hot water and all the other appurtenances of an affluent society — outweighed all other considerations.

Today it seems to me that our scale of value is changing. Of course, no one wishes to surrender the tangible gains of the last generation; that would be ridiculous. But people today are more concerned with the quality of life than simply with acquiring more and more, and perhaps also they are increasingly aware of the value of their traditional culture. In Japan in particular, so it would seem to me, the shock of Nixon's diplomatic revolution in 1971, when he turned to China without even consulting Tokyo, opened a new phase of questioning, questioning not merely of Japan's political alignment since 1950, but also, and I think far more significantly, a questioning of its cultural assumptions. What we have seen in this country in roughly the last ten years, if I am not mistaken, is a conflict — perhaps I should say an incipient conflict — between traditionalism and modernism, in other words between Japan's Asian cultural inheritance and the values of Western industrial society.

No doubt it is an unresolved conflict. But what I want to suggest — it is really the fifth point I would put to you — is that conflict which is going on all over the world — in Africa as well as in Asia, but also in the heart of Western industrial society, in England, in France, in Switzerland, in Belgium, even in the United States of America. Everywhere minority peoples, Welsh, Flemings, Basques, Provençals, Chicanos in the United States, and others, are struggling to assert their indigenous cultural identity. And in my view, the reawakening of long suppressed cultures and sub-cultures, the Kurds in Iraq and Iran, for example, the tribesmen of Baluchistan in Pakistan, the Nagas in India, each with its own traditional system of values, its own sense of human dignity, is one of the most significant features of our time. Certainly, it is a fact which we ought to take into account in any discussion of human values.

That is why, and I hope you will allow me to say this with diffidence and with a good deal of hesitation, I would like to say a few words now about the document which has been prepared in advance as a basis for our discussion at this conference. I refer, of course, to the comparative survey of 13 countries which we have all read and studied. It is a remarkable document; it is an invaluable piece of work, and I know it may seem ungrateful, perhaps even impolite, to raise questions about it. I do so reluctantly, but I think it is important to do so if our deliberations are going to reach useful conclusions. Briefly, I will put it this way, I hope very sincerely that our work will not be restricted by or restricted to these findings. I could spend a lot of time discussing them in detail. I will not do so. All detail apart, I will try to confine myself to a few of what seem to me to be the essential points.

The first and most obvious, I think, is the selectivity of the survey. That is to say, of the 13 countries surveyed, only five by any stretch of the imagination can be classed as Third World or developing countries. And even those are in no way typical. So, we are dealing with a sample which leaves out the vast majority of mankind and the vast majority's scale of human values.

Furthermore, of those five countries, the survey of three including two of the largest, India and Brazil, is limited to the urban areas, leaving out the vast population scattered throughout the land. No wonder, I think, that the results are sometimes surprising. For example, we are told that three quarters of Brazilians, 70 percent of Indians, among those surveyed regard themselves as middle-class. Only one third of English people regard themselves as middle-class, which seems to me to be an absurdity when one thinks of the penurious villagers, the ryot of India and the starving oppressed peasantry of Brazil, where according to the World Bank, some 18 million people are subsisting somehow or another on an income of less than 75 United States dollars a year.

But even confining ourselves to the urban areas, did the surveyors, I wonder, visit and take into account the slums, shall we say, of Calcutta, where people die on the streets like flies, or the dreadful shanty towns on the outskirts of Rio de Janeiro or São Paulo? So, I am suggesting — I do so as I say hesitantly, but I think it is important — that the figures, the statistics, may not always be representative, that we should take them with, if we like, a pinch of salt.

And finally, leaving out much else, it seems to me, and I may be wrong there and you may disagree, that the standards adopted for the survey, the questions asked — notably the list of appurtenances, of goods possessed, and so forth — reflect essentially a Western, perhaps more specifically a North American, scale of values which I think we can say, taking the world as whole, only a small minority of the world's inhabitants would endorse. So it seems to me, if I may put it like that, that the people who carried out the survey seem to be the prisoners of their own assumptions. And the question we have to ask ourselves is whether those are likely to be the assumptions about human values which will govern in the 21st century. I think not, and I hope that what I have said will have indicated to you some of the reasons why.

First of all, the political factor, which I touched on briefly at the beginning. If the American preponderance is crumbling, if we are moving into a multipolar, polycentric world, then we must expect the rise of new centres not only of power but of influence. I am no soothsayer, and I am certainly not going to predict the shape of things to come. But there is not much doubt, I think, over a period, say of fifty years, that we shall see a new world balance in which Asia and Africa, the Third World generally, the part of the world actually where the bulk of the world's resources are concentrated, will play a much larger role. This change already has been foreshadowed in the rise of the oil-producing countries. It has also been foreshadowed in the Iranian revolution, which I think is significant above all else, because of its systematic propagation of Islamic values in place of Western values. The Iranian revolution should be a warning, if anything can be a warning to us, not to base our prescriptions for the future on the performance, on the permanence, and on the
invincible advance of Western standards.

Americans used to think, some Americans still think, that American values would set a pattern for the rest of the world, that the values which Americans regard as virtues would become universal values. That is the illusion of all imperialisms, the illusion of the Persians, the Romans, the Chinese, the British. In fact, of course, these values perish and wither with the empires that impose them. And what I suggest to you, this is my sixth point, is that is what is happening today to American values, that with the decline of American Imperialism, the role of American values is diminishing. The values of trustfulness, drive, initiative, the work ethic, are losing their potency. That is what is happening to American values today.

Second, and this perhaps is more paradoxical, it seems to me that doubt is creeping in not merely whether what is good for Americans or is thought to be good for Americans is good for the rest of the world, but also whether it is good for Americans either. That is another reason why I am just a little concerned about the survey which has been prepared for us. It is not merely that in my view it pays too little attention to the values of the vast bulk of mankind. Africa, for example, is completely left out, though African values as Ali Mazrui recently pointed out in his Reith lectures on the British Broadcasting Corporation network, certainly are not Western values. To this criticism, it may be replied that we are not concerned here with the fierce tribesmen of Baluchistan, with Egyptian fellaheen, with the villagers of India, but we are concerned with the industrialized countries. But even in the industrialized countries, the scale of values is rapidly changing under the impact of economic and ecological pressures. It is not only, as the report very correctly states, that attachment to goods, in other words, that the belief that happiness can be measured in terms of material possessions, is ceasing to dominate in the United States and in most of the Western countries. More fundamentally, I think, the whole work ethic, the drive to strive harder, to increase productivity, to earn more, to pile up wealth, is under attack, partly, as I have indicated, for economic reasons, but still more because of its deleterious effects on human relations.

One result of this is its disrupting influence on family life. And that brings me to the last of the points I would like to make about the statistics which have been prepared for us. You can see that they have stimulated me at least to try to think. And my point is this. Over 90 per cent of the people interviewed, who said that they felt happy, and yet at the same time each case roughly 90 per cent of the people interviewed, who said that they felt happy, and yet at the same time 50 per cent in the United States, 60 per cent in Canada, 75 per cent in Australia, said that they felt that life was empty. What I suggest is that happiness is their hope, their desire, their wish, but that emptiness is the reality.

It seems to me that emptiness, a life without content, work without satisfaction, amusement which palls, is the current malaise. Perhaps it is the curse of industrial society, but certainly it is destructive of human values. Consider, for example (I won't bother you once again with the statistics because you can look them up yourselves in the survey), how few people according to the survey give any serious thought to their relations with their neighbours. And yet, this surely is an essential feature of any healthy society.

I am perfectly aware that there are no straightforward answers to the questions I have raised. The survey points out quite correctly that the aspirations and values of people in the Third World and even of people in Japan are very different from those of people in the West. That, I think, is only to be expected. People enjoying a high standard of living may be sceptical about the value of more material possessions. People living as millions of Pakistanis and Indians and Africans live, with inadequate roads, no running water, no sewage, no electricity, naturally take a very different point of view. Perhaps theoretically it is possible to live a good life under such conditions, like the early Christian hermits in the Egyptian deserts. But I think most of us agree that there are certain basic necessities without which life is not much more than a bare struggle, and it surely is a reflection on our civilization which certainly can provide these necessities that so large a proportion of the world population is condemned to live and die in a state of penury and deprivation.

I am not sure, really, whether it's even good to talk about human values until that wrong has been righted. In any case, I hope nothing I have said suggests that I think we can dispense with the benefits of science and technology. On the contrary, in the world as constituted today, they are indispensable. But it is vitally important to make sure that they are used for the right purposes—that is, to satisfy basic human needs—and are not frittered away on unnecessary and frivolous luxuries. Science and technology, as I have often said in the past, are neutral. It depends on us whether they are used to enhance or to destroy human values, and at present it seems to me we are not doing too well.

It would be absurd in what is after all only a very general introductory talk if I were to attempt to draw conclusions. All I have really been trying to do is to provide a stimulus, even if, as I expect may be the case, it is a stimulus to dissent and contradiction. If in the end I have one suggestion to make, I think it is this: that we can dispense with the benefits of science and technology. On the contrary, in the world as constituted today, they are indispensable. But it is vitally important to make sure that they are used for the right purposes—that is, to satisfy basic human needs—and are not frittered away on unnecessary and frivolous luxuries. Science and technology, as I have often said in the past, are neutral. It depends on us whether they are used to enhance or to destroy human values, and at present it seems to me we are not doing too well.

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The first requirement, it seems to me, is for us to examine and reassess these assumptions in the light of present conditions. Otherwise, they may have a negative effect on our efforts to discover a set of values acceptable to peoples everywhere, peoples with very different cultural backgrounds and very different inherited ethical standards. What we have to expect, someone said recently, in a world which is going to be, and is, very different from the world of the 1980s in all its external preconditions and human attitudes, is a new paradigm shift — a paradigm shift which require from the West and from the other industrialized countries in Asia and elsewhere, from Japan, from Australia, from Brazil, a degree of cultural humility which has certainly not always been evident in the past. It requires a readiness to show understanding for the human value of others, and to be ready to be influenced by other peoples' values, and it requires a willingness to help to shape and build a balanced international culture in which people of all colours and creeds in all parts of the world can participate on the basis of equality. I hope, in the sessions that follow, we shall make that or something like it out guideline; in which case I am sure that this conference will be crowned with success.
VALUES & SOCIAL MATRIX

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I

May I begin my presentation by pointing out a few spectacular but usually unnoticed facts in the world.

Christianity originated from the periphery of Asia. It came to India about one century before it went to Europe in any significant way. But while it soon caught fire in Europe, it achieved very little following in Asia. By 1949, after at least three centuries of intensive Western missionary efforts (the last 100 years with the help of military and economic penetration), less than one percent of Chinese were even nominally Christian. In Japan, in spite of the optimistic forecasts of Jesuit missionaries such as St. Francis Xavier, the number of converts to Christianity was even smaller and has remained so after World War II. When Prime Minister Hatoyama took office in 1954, he went to worship at the great Ise Shrine. Asked by Western reporters why he, a Christian, did this, he replied, "It is something Japanese." This calls to mind the fact that, in the early 30's, when Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek became a Methodist, Western missionaries, especially Methodist ones, were jubilant. Judging by European experiences in which quite a few kings successfully forced the Lutheran, Anglican, or Catholic faith on their subjects when they themselves separately embraced these creeds, Westerners thought it a matter of short time before most Chinese would turn Methodist or at least Christian. They were, of course, disappointed.

A second spectacular fact is that today all the world's missionaries and missionary movements are of Western origin. The Jews had been prevented from proselytizing by their minority status everywhere since the sacking of the Second Temple. In many European countries they would be punishable by death, until a century or two ago, for proselytization. The Moslems, with their theory of Jihad (Holy War of Conquest), also regard proselytization as essential to their faith. But Islamic fervor for proselytization seems to be codeterminant with Arab political and military fortune in the non-Arab world. Their proselytizing efforts were not unlike those of Japanese who used to force Shintoism on the people of Manchuria, Taiwan, and the Caroline Islands before World War II when these populations were under Japanese military or colonial rule. Once that rule was gone, the Japanese have been far more interested in exporting automobiles, cameras, and ships than saving foreign souls. Only the proselytizing efforts of the Christian West have been most aggressive, sustained and global in scope. And, Portuguese and Belgian missionaries have not been less diligent and ubiquitous since World War II than their American and British counterparts.

On the other hand, even when the Chinese Empire extended far and wide under Han, T'ang and Ming, no Chinese court had ever attempted to spread Confucianism or any other Chinese belief or ethics system, and few, if any, individual Chinese ever received a call from above to do the same.

In fact, the evidence points to the contrary. In 730 AD, during the T'ang Dynasty, a Tibetan king and son-in-law of the emperor asked for various Chinese classics and histories. The request was refused. When the request was refused a second time, and after the death of his Chinese queen, the Tibetan ruler invaded China with a force of four hundred thousand. During the same dynasty, some 3,000 Chinese Buddhist monks went on foot in small groups to India, not to spread the wisdom of any Chinese holy man, but to learn and to bring back to China the true teachings of Buddha in their original form. One of these pilgrims, Hsuan Tsang, and his three disciples were later the central characters of a Chinese fantasy, Hsi You Chi, (The Western Journey), of which there are Japanese and other translations.

A third spectacular fact is the differing manifestations of Buddhism, which reached Japan via China and Korea. The majority of Chinese worshipped some Buddhist deities at one time or another, and Chinese built temples and pagodas everywhere. But the Chinese never had the idea of congregation as in the West. The Chinese simply did not “belong” to any temple. Instead the Chinese approach to gods is like the American approach to supermarkets. They will go to Jewel stores for meat, Safeway stores for produce, and Dominic's stores for something else — all depending upon which one has the better products or prices. And just as Americans do not classify themselves as Jewellists, Safewayans and Dominicans, most Chinese are not known as Confucians, Buddhists or Taoists.

In a way, the Japanese are as polytheistic as the Chinese; they worship many gods and spirits; they deify human beings such as General Nogi in Nogi Shrine in Tokyo or Anjin and Hime in Dojoji in Wakayama. But instead of going to many different religious supermarkets, the Japanese confine themselves largely to two chain stores: Shinto and Buddhist. And they practice the
institution of *danka*, i.e., congregation, but a congregation of households, not individual members as in the West.

The late Dr. Hu Shih, an eminent Chinese philosopher, wrote in his autobiography that when he was growing up the sign “No Monks and Priests” was always prominently posted on the gate to his family home. There was nothing peculiar about Dr. Hu’s parents. That same sign was on the gates to many, many Chinese homes everywhere. Buddhism played no real part in Chinese life except for funerals and for disasters such as cholera epidemics. It came therefore as a shock to me, when I first stayed in Japan in 1964–65, to find quite a few photos of family get-togethers with obosan (monks) in them.

The Chinese-Japanese contrast in Buddhism does not stop with the matter of the congregation. Zen Buddhism is known in China as Ch’an Chung, and it went to Japan as such; but when Prof. Derk Bodde of the University of Pennsylvania read the first version of my book *Americans and Chinese*, one of the corrections he suggested was to change my spelling of Ch’an into Zen. Why? The Western world knows this variety of Buddhism far better through its Japanese version than its Chinese counterpart. Today the world knows the name of Daisetz Suzuki, but no single Chinese savant of the subject has reached comparable fame. Zen has flourished in Japan so much more than in China, that, whereas it remained but a concern for a few learned clergy and lay scholars in China before 1949, it is even incorporated as part of the initial training of young executives in many modern business corporations in today’s Japan.

A final fact that I will point out concerns the behavior and influence of rulers in different societies. King Asoka of India, after conversion to Buddhism, ordered edicts engraved on stone all over his domain for “missionizing” his subjects. Chinese emperors, though some of them were devout Buddhists, including one who went to great trouble and expense and against the advice of his chief minister to bring a small fragment of Buddha’s bones to China, never made any move to spread the faith among their subjects. Instead, the founder of the Han dynasty had his own ancestral temples erected in every province of the empire and tried to make the people do homage to his forebears:

“From his death in 195 B.C., to 40 B.C., every deceased emperor had his temples in the capital city provinces. From the third emperor to the eighth, each erected his temples during his lifetime. By about the middle of the first century, A.D., there were 176 imperial temples and 30 temples for empresses and crown princes throughout the empire, which required 24,455 Victuals and Sacrifices annually, 45,129 temple guards, and a government staff of 12,147 in charge of sacrificial ceremonies and music.”

In spite of the fact that Chinese emperors called themselves Sons of Heaven and such obvious desire on the part of the rulers to deify themselves and their ancestors, such temples among the people were abolished about 40 B.C. After that, each dynasty established its own clan temple to which all successors to the throne were attached after their demise. Hence forward, the clan temple of each dynasty was the object of the exclusive ritual concern of its own imperial descendants, exactly as the ancestral temple of each clan among the common people was the exclusive concern of that clan’s descendants and of no one else. The Chinese emperors never succeeded in making their subjects worship them or their imperial ancestors in contrast to the Japanese who worship Amaterasu at Ise as a matter of course.

**II**

Why do such great differences develop when the same religious creed goes from one society to another?

To answer this question, I must briefly outline my ideas on how human beings live their lives. Please think of three terms arranged vertically one above another. At the top is Cultural Heritage. Next below comes Social Organization. At the bottom we have Individual Behavior. There should be one set of arrows going down from Cultural Heritage to Social Organization and from the latter to Individual Behavior.

The Cultural Heritage of each society consists of all that has come down from the past and is still practised, written down, or remembered. It consists of ideas, ethical systems and religious teachings, scientific or empirical theories, artifacts such as the Great Wall, the wheel, jet planes, the atom bomb, and all the technology that is necessary for their construction and operation. It also consists of all elements of exogenous origin. Thus, tea is part of the Cultural Heritage of Japan as Christianity is that of the United States and Britain.

Social Organization consists of networks of human relationships and the way the human beings in them relate or are expected to relate to each other. Family, clan, village, tribes, as well as schools, labor unions, Ku Klux Klan and churches are all examples.

Except perhaps for very rare exceptions, every individual is born with potential, but no predetermined pattern of behavior. He acquires particular patterns of behavior nurtured, guided, and encouraged by his social organization. The process by which the individual is gradually initiated as an acceptable and functioning member of his society is known as socialization and enculturation. What needs to be underlined here is that the cultural heritage of every society contains far more than what its social organization normally transmits to its members. It censors what gets to them, especially the new ones. Thus, although Jesus enjoins his followers to “turn the other cheek,” no Christian societies I know of have ever taught that way of responding to adversaries. And although the monumental works of Joseph Needham on *Science and Civilization in China* drew all of its primary sources from Chinese writings, most born and raised, and who completed college, in China, including myself, were largely ignorant of those writings. The Chinese social organization, even under Western impact, did not pay attention to them and encourage its youth to study them. This, despite China’s desire at the time to imitate the West or Japan as a way out of her century of weakness and humiliation.

In each society the social organization selects, rearranges, or warps the contents of its cultural heritage whether of indigenous or exogenous origin. However,
contrary to the notion of any Age of Reason, I find that rationality occupies only a minor position in human life for individuals and is especially absent in groups. Instead I think what powerfully guides human actions as individuals, and but especially in groups, are non-rational (as distinguished from irrational) factors, whether in business or politics, in race relations or a gasoline crises, in buying a home or joining a club, in finding a mate or treating parents. To elucidate this, we need to go to the two kinds of glues which link human beings together.

III

In physical terms, we all know household paste which is made by heating a mixture of flour and water. Two materials stuck together by household paste can be separated easily by soaking in water. We also know Elmer's Glue or epoxy. That is the stuff advertised as being able to glue anything to anything. It is so strong that it can join diving boards together. Two materials once joined together by it cannot be separated without mutual destruction.

Elmer's Glue is comparable to what drew Romeo and Juliet together. When one dies, the other has to go. And household paste is comparable to what brought The Mid-night Cowboy in the movie by that name and any of his women together for a little while. I submit that the two kinds of glue, namely Elmer's Glue and household paste, in social life are, respectively, affect and role. The first is feeling while the second, usefulness. Role is calculable and is what we often buy and sell; but affect is far less exact — and is what we claim money cannot buy.

We know role in terms of skilled or unskilled labor, white collar or blue collar, dentists and diamond cutters, housekeepers and politicians, and many others. As each society has grown in complexity, the number and variety of roles have grown with it. In fact, role differentiation is the major concomitant of the growth in societal complexity. For example, in today's conditions, each candidate for national office in the United States is supported by an army of experts including speech writers, public relations men, technicians, and foot soldiers beyond the imagination of small town politicians of yesteryear. Giant corporations in Japan and elsewhere often have more diversified personnel and more workers and specialists on their payrolls than many small member states of the United Nations.

On the other hand, while our roles have evolved in number and proficiency with the complexity of the industrial society, our affect has not. Mankind still has the same kind of feelings as his ancestors who lived two or three thousand (probably more) years ago: love, hate, rage, despair, endurance, hope, anxiety, forbearance, loyalty, betrayal, and so forth. The list is not long and many of the terms used to describe them are similar to each other, or even partially or wholly subsumable under each other. This is why great literature (fiction, poetry) and great art (painting, sculpture), the universal conveyors of affect everywhere, tend to survive the ages. We moderns feel the same agony and joy and the same loyalty and duplicity as the ancients. We can relive our lives through what they have written and they, too, were they alive today, would have been able to discuss with us our problems with our children, parents, friends and enemies, employers and employees, sweethearts and spouses.

By contrast, old books of science and technology are useless to us except as curiosities or material for histories of science and technology. Not only the ancients, but our fathers and even our older brothers would have found catching up with our present generation's developments in science and technology impossible or extremely arduous.

Role and affect are not isolated from each other. Except for extremes such as the case of Romeo and Juliet or parents and their babies, role and affect usually overlap in human relationships. But there is no doubt that whenever there is a choice, affect determines what we choose to do, how well we do it, and how truly we enjoy the fruit of what we do. For how a people feel about themselves, about each other, and about the world around them cannot but determine the priorities in the way they conduct themselves, relate to each other and to the world around them.

Many systems of values are known throughout human history, but such systems will be of importance as driving and guiding forces among any living people only if they are interwoven with that people’s pattern of affect. Otherwise, systems of human values, no matter how rational, lofty, or well thought out, will remain dead artifacts, just as the stone tools archaeologists uncover from prehistoric sites. They will adorn the halls of museums but they will have no bearing on how any living people conduct their business, politics, or interpersonal relations. It is affect which makes human values real and endure. It is affect which led the organizers of this very conference to give participants to last night’s festivity of cocktails, speeches, and delicious food each a bento to take home as they left the dining hall, no less than the reason for General Nogi to commit harakiri upon Emperor Meiji’s demise.

From the evidence at our disposal, role changes in some societies have been enormous since the dawn of human history, but changes in affect in all societies have been minor if at all. In the Western world today we have more theories about affect than did the ancients, but not more substance or variety of affect itself. What we need to realize is that resistance to change, technical or otherwise, in each society comes not from role but from affect. The more affect is invested in a role activity, the more that role activity will resist change.

However, although Western scholars never seem to hesitate to declare what they find and feel as universal, the affect which links and repels Western men and persists among them is not the same as that which links and repels men in the rest of the world and persists among them. The same machines tend to have the same requirements whoever their builders or operators. The same plants tend to grow the same way in the hands of either Japanese or American gardeners. I have observed that even dogs, regardless how far some groups have interfered with their breeding, behave with certain regularity the world over. But human beings with diverse cultural heritages and social organizations live, work, enjoy, struggle and die in
drastically different ways and for very diverse reasons.

I will not detail the spectacular differences between Western novels, drama and art on the one hand and their Chinese counterparts on the other. I have done that elsewhere.\(^2\) I will explicate my view here by pointing out one outstanding psychological characteristic of Western and American novels and drama: the satisfaction of individualist ambitions without reference to social consequences. There are characters in search of identity such as Holden Caulfield in *Catcher in the Rye*, characters who go it alone to prove themselves by conquest such as Captain Ahab in *Moby Dick* or the “Old Man” in *The Old Man and The Sea* or characters who strive to be something they can never be such as Herzog in *Herzog*. There are other manifestations such as *On the Road* or *Papillon*, but they can mostly be subsumed under the categories already named.

How different are these new novels from those of old? Writers about the West and especially the USA often are impressed by how much and how rapidly changes have occurred. But an examination of three of the most classical of Western epics, *Iliad*, *Agamemnon* and *Odyssey*, and their great popularity inside and out of the American schools make it clear that the more the novels change, the more they express the same Western pattern of affect.

What was the central concern of these ancient epics? A woman named Helen was seduced. Not her husband but her husband’s brother was determined to secure her return by destroying the culprit and his people. He gathered together an armada of many ships with some 200,000 men. To secure the necessary wind, he threw his eldest daughter into the sea. By his distant campaign, he indeed destroyed Troy in spite of many problems in his own ranks, but upon his return he was murdered by his wife and her lover. Odysseus nearly did not make it home. The effects of the expedition were so disastrous that the Chinese simply do not have novels built on characters who roam from one place to another having sexual experiences, stealing cars, conning people but with no other purpose in life than self-gratification. Even in *Chin P'ing Mei* (Golden Lotus), which is sometimes known as a pornographic novel, the villainous character Hai Men Ch'ing suffered from premature death due to his sexual excesses and escapades and the book concluded with the reward of a son to his long-suffering but virtuous wife. The Chinese writers have been so oblivious to individual adventures and triumphs that even the hero in *Ching Hua Yuan*, the Chinese equivalent of *Gulliver’s Travels*, went through the many bizarre travel experiences with his brother-in-law and a friend.

And this Chinese concern with the individual’s place in the group, the need for collectivity, the consequences of the individual’s actions on the collectivity has been a central theme of the art and literature that have proliferated in China since 1949. The main difference is that the concern in pre-Communist China for family, clan, filial piety to parents, and loyalty to particular emperors has now been replaced by how all Chinese can join hands for the commune, Socialism, and the nation as a whole to catch up with the industrially advanced societies of the West.

IV

Such differences between Chinese and Western art and literature are not idle curiosities produced by the fertile imagination of artists and writers. They are inherent in Chinese-Western contrasts in behavior. For example, being concerned with the group and the individual’s place in it, the Chinese never developed the ideal of freedom and equality. The Chinese individual has never been free to go wherever he pleases, to do whatever satisfies his senses. There have been no Chinese explorers in the Western mode — the few such as Chang Ch’ien and Pan Chao and Su Wu were imperial emissaries. There is not a single Chinese Marco Polo.

If I ask this distinguished gathering the question, as I have done often elsewhere, which group of people is the largest in the world, most of you will undoubtedly say the Chinese. And you will be wrong. For the largest racial group in the world is the Europeans, not the Chinese. The population of Europe today is somewhat in excess of 500,000,000. But the population of the two Americas alone, which are mostly White, is in excess of that figure. When we add to this the populations of Australia, New Zealand, the South African Union, and elsewhere, we get well over a billion people spread out in all corners of the earth. There are more Europeans outside of their original home than within it.

On the other hand, there are today as always far more Chinese in their original homeland than outside it. This is why you get the impression that the Chinese outrank every other group in numbers. They have stayed together and at home. All the Chinese in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and elsewhere come to less than two percent of the Chinese in China today. The Chinese, as they increased in numbers over the centuries, have simply expanded in concentric circles, never leaving their home base, in contrast to Europeans who, even before their increases made expansion necessary, moved out by land and sea, for freedom or adventure, in all directions. The Chinese have always been centripetal, in contrast to the centrifugal nature of the Europeans. Furthermore, even the Whites in Europe and the Americas are sharply separated by national, ethnic, religious, and other barriers. This, again in contrast to the Chinese, who in spite of their diverse dialects and regional strifes, have not allowed such differences to escalate, so that the Chinese history has been characterized by far longer periods of political unity than those of disunity. Centripetality means continuity with the past. There simply were no Chinese authors and revolutionaries such as Thomas Paine who would say, “We have today the power to begin the world over again.”

This was why Christianity could not spread in China
and why there have been no Chinese missionaries for Confucius or Christ, or Chinese explorers who looked at the Himalaya and said, "I have to conquer it because it is there." In fact, the Chinese never used the term "conquest" for mountain climbing, river damming, or desert crossing. Instead they "enjoyed" it or "suffered" from it.

This is why Buddhism (or any other creed except ancestor worship) never became part of the Chinese life the way Christianity and Islam are respectively important for the West and the Middle East. This was why all powerful Chinese emperors did not try to "missionize" their subjects and could not even get them to worship at the temples for imperial ancestors. Each Chinese family venerated and provided for its own forebears, which actions needed no theological support. As for the other gods, they were strictly outside helpers, suppliers, or advisors like craftsmen, green grocers, doctors, or counsellors.

V

You may say this analysis gives us a reasonable contrast between China and the West. What about the case of Japan? The Japanese society is, of course, different from the Chinese, but compared with the West and in terms of human relatedness, the two Asian neighbors have far more in common with each other than with their Euro-American counterparts.

Compared with Western fiction, Chinese fiction has been correctly described by one Chinese scholar as being in a state of "psychological poverty." But when we put Chinese fiction side by side with Japanese fiction, we cannot help but note that Japanese interest in psychic matters is much higher. Take for this purpose Tales of Genji, or The Tale of Ise, or The Tale of Heike, or any of the many diaries such as The Pillow Book, The Tosa Diary, or even Hōjōki (The Story of My Hut), and contrast them with Chinese products such as The Dream of Red Chamber, The Romance of the Three Kingdoms, or All Men Are Brothers (another translation, Water Margin). While the Chinese books confine themselves almost exclusively to what the characters do, their Japanese counterparts deal with what the characters do and think and feel. In fact, compared with Chinese famous diaries, the Japanese gave us a galaxy of psychologically rich diaries mostly by females. The typical Japanese concepts of aesthetics such as "aware," "sabi," "shibui" and even "yugen" are rarely discussed by Chinese masters.

The greater Japanese emphasis on thinking, but especially on feeling, also expresses itself in the popularity of poetry and in the Japanese invention of the 17 syllable haiku. Poetry in China was until very recent years a pastime of the literati, a tiny minority, but poetry in Japan enjoys a much wider popular interest, including low-born farmers and craftsmen. There was nothing in China even remotely resembling the popular Japanese custom of New Year's Day poetry competition before the Emperor and his consort.

However, after all this is said it cannot be denied that Japanese literature, like its Chinese counterpart, deals not with individuals each free, or fighting to be free, to go his/her own way, but with men and women motivated by duties and responsibilities and honors as members of groups. In this the essential message of the all-time popular Chūshin Gura or "Forty Seven Ronin" remains alive today as yesterday. But the same concern with position, with what other people will say, or with being laughed at not only by men and women of influence but also by one's servants is even evident in the case of Genji, in Genji Monogatari. Genji was truly a playboy, but he was a Japanese playboy, full of concerns for the social consequences of his action, not an American playboy, mindful only of his own pleasures and pains. Does the following description of Genji's worries after the sudden and unexpected death of Yugao, one of his paramours, leave any doubt in this matter?

Why had fate seen fit to treat him thus? He felt that it must be as a punishment for all the strange and forbidden amours into which in these last years he had despite himself been drawn, that now this unheard of horror had befallen him. And such things, though one may keep them secret for a time, always come out in the end. He minded most that the Emperor would be certain to discover sooner or later about this and all his other affairs. Then there was the general scandal. Everyone would know. The very gutter boys would make merr
er over him. Never, never must he do such things again, or his reputation would utterly collapse...

In a different way Matsuo Basho's feelings before he began his long pleasure travel were not unlike Genji's after the disaster of Yugao. Both patterns are unknown in any Western literature in comparable circumstances. Basho described his most despondent feelings in Oku no Hosomichi (Small Roads of Oku), as he bade his friends farewell who accompanied him in a boat part of the way. He regretted that he had to leave them all. He shed tears. He was anxious to see places he heard so much about, but he worried about getting old in the process and not being able to return.

I have not known any Western writer who expressed himself or herself that way. On the contrary I have more than once heard from Westerners that the best thing about owning a yacht was the departure, when one drew away from all those envious eyes ashore.

As to art, one single illustration will suffice to make my point clear. One ancient Chinese masterpiece entitled "Ch'ing Ming Shang Ho" ("Easter Day on the River") is about one and one half feet high and over twenty feet long. It features official parades, story tellers' tents, acrobatic shows, shops with customers, children playing their own games and a variety of other activities found in any grand temple fair. There is no central theme. The activities simply follow one another as a matter of happenstance. This work was so famous that quite a few imitations are found in private collections and museums of art. A modern work comparable to it in length and composition is "Huan Ho Wan Li Tu" ("Ten Thousand Li of the Yellow River") by Chang Ta-ch'ien, a well known painter in Taiwan and Latin America. Chang's painting features one wave after another just as the activities on the river bank in its ancient counterpart.

Both of the Chinese paintings resemble the famous Japanese work called "Forty-seven Stages of Tokaido" by
Hiroshige, except for one difference. The two Chinese works have no erotic suggestions, even in disguise, in contrast to the Japanese masterpiece, in which the erotic content cannot be more evident.

However, although the value of the group predominates over the individual, the important group for the Japanese individual is not the kinship network or village of origin, as it was in China, but the 郷 (for rural areas) and the 町 (for urban districts). It is not possible within the time I have to explain these in detail, which I have done elsewhere. Briefly, while the Chinese family and the clan are groups where both entrance and exit are involuntary (one is born into both and one cannot reject either easily), the Japanese 郷 and 町 are ones where entrance is voluntary but exit is not. The Japanese kinship network has far less depth and is far less binding on the individual than its Chinese counterpart, but the Japanese 郷 and especially 町 have no Chinese counterparts at all.

Japanese and knowledgeable foreigners alike tend usually to think of 町 only in connection with such things as flower arrangement, Kabuki and other theatrical arts, even calligraphy, but what in fact permeates Japanese society is the 町 principle. It operates even in groups not known as 町, such as modern universities and temples and shrines. This was why Zen Buddhism, and other sects of that religion, became so much more important to the Japanese life and so much more well organized and propagated by Japanese followers, than among the Chinese who gave them to Japan.

The spirit and organization of 町 are at the root of Japanese approach to their rejection of Christianity and their lack of interest in proselytizing non-Japanese. In fact, like the Chinese, most Japanese also were loathe even to emigrate to Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan when these were Japanese colonies. And the centrifugal tendency of the Japanese is undeniable even today in spite of her economic and technological powers. For example, the Japanese population outside of Japan is still only a fraction of the Japanese population in Japan. Another thing, while Chinese and other students abroad usually desire a degree in a foreign university, a majority of Japanese students who go to the United States of America only do so for the experience not the higher degree. For in contrast to the situation in China, Japanese degrees are more valued in Japanese government, universities, and business and industry than foreign degrees. The structure and content of 町 make it inevitable for most Japanese to feel more comfortable at home in Japanese surroundings and among Japanese superiors and subordinates than otherwise.

This to me is the secret of Japanese success in the post-World War II world. And from what we know about the relative permanence of affect vis-a-vis role this picture is unlikely to change among a majority of Japanese, in spite of incidences of rebellion in particular 町, such as the current (1980) case in Soka Gakkai, in which a former lawyer of the organization has exposed its alleged irregularities and corruptions.
and many conferences such as this one. The branches of
the cultural tree are, therefore, constantly bending toward
each other.

VII

The value patterns among a people cannot even be
rapidly changed by a revolutionary government with
centralized powers to get things done. This is why China
since 1949 has had so many ups and downs. Confucius
was gone a long time ago, and the Confucian classics have
not been a part of Chinese school curriculum since 1911.
But, Confucius had to be criticized in the 70's just as he
was attacked in the May 4th Movement of 1919 led by
Dr. Hu Shih.

For while the role skills can be taught in schools, work-
shops, seminars, universities, and institutes, affective pat-
tterns are acquired in the family, in the early years of each
individual's life. That was why Uchimura Kanzo, though
already an exceptionally devout and energetic Christian in
his native Japan, decided to quit his studies in a New
England theological seminary because, he said, what was
taught there would not fit him “for fields otherwise
circumstanced than that country (USA).”

But the case of the Italian priest Giuseppe Castiglione
(1688–1766) is even more illuminating. He went to China
at age 27 and spent the rest of his life (51 more years) in
China as court painter under Emperor K'an Hsi. His
Chinese paintings are excellent, but they are not quite
Chinese. For one thing, Castiglione gave his birds, trees
and flowers a three-dimensional quality usually absent in
Chinese art. Maybe he was asked to do so and the editor
of a Taipei anthology of his works says that Castiglione
had “many imitators at the time.” But his style made no
lasting impression on Chinese painting as a whole. More
likely he did it in his way because, in spite of his extended
residence in China and exposure to things Chinese, he still
could not feel about these things the way his Chinese con-
temporaries did.

VIII

Though the evidence is ample showing that societies
with dissimilar social matrices have so far tended to
escalate rather than diminish their differences, no one can
be sure that what has occurred up to now must continue
in the future. I for one make no pretension to prophesy.
I may also have missed some essentials that other men
and women more learned than I know about. Perhaps we can
at least take several steps in seeking a more universally
workable system of values for Century XXI.

First, we need to search more energetically the areas in
which peoples with unlike social matrices can cooperate
beyond such matters as postal services and aviation.
Former President Carter's call for human rights across
societal boundaries has not been a signal success, because
we do not yet have an universally acceptable standard of
human rights. But should we not persevere in finding such a
standard?

Second, we need newer approaches to investigate the
nature of parent-child, sibling, and husband-wife relations-
ships than what we have been accustomed to. Such
relationships are the fundamental arena in which the
affective patterns of each society originate, are nurtured,
and transmitted from generation to generation. In this
quest we must go beyond the Freudian paradigm rooted
in Western individualism. We must ask, for example, why
child abuse is so prevalent in an American society where
human rights and worship of youth are upheld higher as
human values than in most other societies of the world?

Third, we need to give more serious thought to and do
more cross-cultural research on how different patterns of
affect influence role selection, role performance, and role
enjoyment, (in the same way chemists have analyzed the
attribute of different elements and come to their period-
ical table). For example, why are the Chinese so oblivi-
ous to dogs so that their government can order their elimi-
nation in cities with relative ease, while the Americans are
so devoted to them that no American official can ever
hope to be elected to or stay in office if he dares to
suggest anything remotely resembling it?

Fourth, we need bravely and impartially to examine
existing systems of values to ascertain which elements
in which ones are more universally workable toward
greater peace and happiness among all mankind, not
merely the chosen few. For example, however beautiful it
sounds on paper, Christianity, or any other monotheistic
creed has not brought peace even among adherents of the
same monotheistic creeds. Can we honestly expect to
achieve peace on earth and goodwill toward all men by
continuing to promote such creeds?

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(2) Francis L.K. Hsu, Americans and Chinese: Purpose and
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(3) Murasaki Shikibu, Genji Monogatari (Tales of Genji).
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(5) Godwin C. Chu and Francis L.K. Hsu (eds.), Moving A
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I would like to make some observations on liberty, equality, fraternity, and the world today.

Liberty, Equality, Fraternity: such was the motto or guiding principle of the French Revolution which opened the door to the "Modern Ages." What has become of this concept in the world today? As you know, people are beginning to have doubts about the "modern ages," but this phenomenon is conspicuous only in the developed countries which have, as it were, succeeded in industrialization, and can hardly be observed among the developing nations which are aiming at modern development. And also, as Prof. Isaacs stated the other day, even a dictator would not dare to openly deny liberty, equality and fraternity. So, one may say that these three conceptions are still very much alive today.

Nevertheless, there may be some who will have doubts as to whether it should be taken up at this conference on human values; whether, though notions, they may be called "values". I, however, believe that they are indeed human values, the basic values of the world today. I would refrain from deliberating over definitions in front of such learned friends here, but I do not consider values to be the "property of some outside body which realizes our desires" (Sosuke Mita). On the contrary, I would take a more teleological, cosmological view, and would agree rather with Shumpei Ueyama's definition that "values are notions which, when our bodies are faced with alternatives necessary for survival, act as the standard of selection. In the contemporary world where mankind is at a crisis, when we cannot look on objectively at values but must ourselves take the initiative to realize human values, this definition appears to me particularly appropriate. Furthermore, physicist Satoshi Watanabe's remark that, "Values are something which leads life on from the front and not (as in causation) something which supports life from the rear," seems to encourage us. Therefore, I would like to consider liberty, equality and fraternity as human values, and look into their position in the world today.

I wonder if I am right in thinking that the notion of liberty originated in the West, but there does not seem to have been a word corresponding to Western liberty in Japanese or Chinese history. An antigovernment movement called the "Liberty and Democratic Rights Movement" occurred in Japan under the influence of Rousseau at the beginning of the Meiji Era, but until then, freedom and liberty were used only in a negative, detrimental sense, e.g., to act and speak freely meaning selfishly and willfully. Prof. Barraclough mentioned in his address that Western expansionism had entered the evacuation stage. So it has indeed, and I consider it a very good thing, but this is occurring only in the conscious political level. In the unconscious cultural levels, Western value systems are still firmly holding ground. A good example of it is the fact that the majority of Japanese women's magazines and popular magazines are given Western names. I am not, by any means, saying that values which have come from across the seas are not good; I think rather that the word freedom as it is known in contemporary Japan is of Western origin.

The word liberty originated as the antonym of slavery. That is, liberty was a word used to describe the man who was neither a slave nor a prisoner. (Incidentally, the reason why the notion of liberty was not strong in Japan seems to be because we have always been a tribal society, and because slavery, if it existed, had never been very rigorous.) The notion of liberty became strong after slavery was abolished, and yet when, as in France just before the Revolution, the privileged classes were still all powerful and when the newly-rising bourgeoisie began to demand it. I believe that liberty originally did not exist in a rural community, but that it was a value born among the urban bourgeois. In a country like Japan where the town of Sakai was the only free city, it was impossible for the cries for liberty to be strong. Today, when one considers that the world all over is moving towards urbanization, the value "liberty" will no doubt become more and more manifest.

Then what is liberty? In a common political sense, it is sometimes used as the opposite of socialism. Everything which is not under socialism is called liberal, no matter what dictatorial rule may be taking place, nor how much the lives of the people are made light of. However, I would like to put this kind of usage of the word aside for the time being.

Liberty is the property of the free man who is not subjected to any restraints. By restraints, physical and physiological restraints are of course included, but some maintain instinctive desires, passion and strong emotions which blind and carry one away, should also be excluded in...
order to become free. They consider that liberty is to make decisions, not from any external causes, but solely by strength of inner reason. The opinion of Western scholars are mostly philosophical and ideological, which boil down to inner freedom based on self control, in the style of Kant. But this, I feel, has nothing to do with the problems of the world today. Is it not the liberty to do what one wants to do, and to not do what one does not want to do, the sort of freedom that is now keenly solicited all over the world? If one were to cite from a Western philosopher, I think Hobbes' words, "Actions are born of the will of the actors," come nearest the point.

Although I do not wholly agree with that, the liberty which is sought today is closely connected with the quest for happiness. And the quest for happiness is indeed one of the characteristics of modern Western society — another reason for supposing that the notion of liberty is of Western origin. There are several kinds of happiness, including of course inner, spiritual, and ideological happiness; but I feel that the sort of happiness the majority of people are seeking today is material happiness. A typical characteristic of it today is that it is not happiness in the shape of liberty "from," but of liberty "towards" — i.e., it is not the liberty to maintain or get away from something, but the liberty to obtain, to acquire. Buddhism teaches nirvana, or complete enlightenment, to extricate oneself from the harassing worldly passions of actual life, and one may call this a "from" type of liberty. However, what moves the world today is a more mundane liberty — i.e., for prosperity, and to fulfill one's desires.

Another characteristic of this liberty of Western origin is that the one to realize this value is considered to be the individual. It is the philosophy of individualism. For the time when the ideas of freedom spread was also the age when Europeans were advancing to all parts of the world, invading and obtaining great material wealth. Europe was rich and each individual was gaining more and more freedom to act and to become rich — just as Walter Prescott Webb stated in his "Great Frontier."

However, the demand for liberty in the Third World is, though strong, not necessarily one for individual freedom but rather for the liberty of the people, of the whole nation. Though some in the developed countries sneer at such a phenomenon, it should be understood that seeking the happiness of only a handful of individuals would not in such countries connect with the happiness of the whole. In the case of Japan too about a hundred years ago, we at first strove as a backward country for the liberty and independence of the nation and people. Liberty of the individual was realized much later, I would say, after World War II.

Every nation, every individual, should realize their liberty, but there is another value which opposes and clashes with liberty: equality.

III

Whereas the notion of liberty may be considered to Western origin, equality seems to be rather of Asian origin. At least, one may note that the words for equality existed in the East since long ago. The RigVeda quotes, "That all the people eat of the same food, and drink of the same drink"; and in Japan too, Genpaku Sugita in the Tokugawa Era said, "From the highest emperor and shogun to the lowest soldier, farmer, craftsman and merchant, criminal and beggar, all are human beings." These correspond to "Bond or free, man or woman, Christ is all and in all" of the New Testament. Many similar quotations can be found in the East.

Incidentally, I was very interested to note that in the recent international survey on values, the OECD statistics revealed that in countries such as France, West Germany, and the United States, where the gap between the rich and the poor is great, the majority supported liberalism, whereas in Japan where the said gap is small, more than 70% of the people upheld equality. This may be owing to our traditional way of thinking to "make little of poverty, but much of inequality."

Two sorts of equality may be considered: égalité formelle and égalité réelle, i.e., formal equality and practical equality.

By formal equality, I mean that any man may equally reach for a managerial post, honor, and status. This corresponds to the "equality of rights" mentioned in the 1789 Declaration of Human Rights of the French Revolution: "Man is born and bred free, and equal in rights."

However, no matter how much such rights may be acknowledged, if there are people who cannot enjoy material happiness then that is not equality. What counts is practical equality. When Ancient Greek lawgiver Solon said, "Equality is liabilities, a cancellation of debts," he wished to point out that even formal equality may be forfeited because of poverty.

And what is the state of equality in the world today? Formal equality is confirmed today by the United Nations' World Declaration of Human Rights, and by national constitutions etc., but for practical equality, matters are in a very grave condition. Inequality exists not only within the nation, but also internationally — where it may be said to be in a hopeless state.

First I would like to take up the problem of literacy. Did you know that as many as 800 million people on this earth are still illiterate? Seventy percent of the African people and 60% of those in Asia are unable to read or write. No matter how loudly the right of equality may be professed, it is impossible to live on an equal basis with other peoples of the world if one is unable to read. UNESCO is taking an active part in the movement against illiteracy, and although I do not think it will be easily accomplished, it is not without hope. And unless illiteracy is eradicated, equality cannot be realized.

An inequality even greater than that in letters is that of food. I am not talking of tastes, of preferences for rich or simple foods, but of food on a more vital level. Americans and Canadians take approximately 10,000 original calories per day, West Europeans 7,500 original calories, Japanese 4,000, people in the Middle East 3,800, Africans 2,900, and Asians 2,600. The significant part of this is the fact that if everybody in the world ate as much as the Americans, the world production of food would be most
definitely insufficient to meet the demands. Equality at the highest level is, therefore, out of the question; and as the peoples of the advanced countries would never accept reducing the gratification level of their desires, it follows that equality as regards food is no longer possible.

Every year approximately one million people in the world are dying of starvation. (Figures are by French, Nobel Prize winner Dr. Kestler.) The average life span in Africa is less than 50 years; in 19 countries it is lower still and less than 40 years. We must at the same time bear in mind the distribution of the population in the world. In 1970, of the total world population, 31.5% lived in the rich, advanced areas and 68.5% in the poorer, under-developed areas. By the year 2,000 it is estimated that 22.5% will live in the advanced and 77.5% in the underdeveloped areas.

It is often noted that liberty and equality are conflicting ideas. Liberty was originally the property of the privileged, and one is apt to think that liberty could not exist unless there were some disparity, some unevenness. It is thought, thus, that if the world or society or group were to realize ideal and thorough equality with everything levelled to a plain and the people all homogenized like so many atoms, that in such a controlled society there would no longer be any freedom, but a fascist world. However, in the world today as a whole, this is mere desk theory, and there is no fear whatsoever that the whole world might turn fascist.

If one leaves one's library and theory and goes out into the larger cities of Europe, one notices at once the many foreign laborors. They have come to Europe from Asia and Africa to do the heavy and dirty work in lieu of the Europeans. They are mainly Algerians in France, Turks in Germany, Indians and Pakistanis in England, but there are also people from the poorer parts of Europe such as Italy, the Iberian Peninsula, and Yugoslavia. And the French, Germans and English no longer engage in hardly any physical labor. One would almost be tempted to call it the new slave system of Europe, but of course they are not slaves. They are not forced into it by money. They have come to Europe from many foreign laborors. They have come to Europe from the West and East is characteristically manifested in the fact that though there is a Christian Socialism, a Buddhist Socialism never came into being. Even if we tried today to aim at a future world exactly in the style of the Buddhist doctrines, unless practical ways were disclosed of overcoming our desires for money and possessions and the inequalities of the actual world, it would only be crying for utopia.

The fact that the Scandinavian countries have succeeded in ousting poverty is a joyous achievement in the history of mankind, but what does that signify to the poverty stricken of India? Fundamentally, the inequality between nations and peoples needs to be redressed, but this is not something that can be effected by short-term aid or loans. It is at such moments that we are forced to admit the mighty force of history, and history is basically an unjust thing.

Within a single cultural sphere, history may be replaced by the word tradition. In India there is a strong tradition of discriminating the people, the most obvious one being the caste system.

In such a country did Mahatma Gandhi declare, "I not only wish to realize fraternity and equality among human beings, but also wish to do so among all living things and among all animals which crawl on the earth."

This is cosmic absolute equality — but quite ineffectual in real life. It is the same in the case of Buddhism too. By considering man and other animals on the same plane, they are making the formation of the idea of human equality impossible. I would however like to interpret the above words not as an irrational incongruity but as a fervent prayer from the desperate state under the caste system.

The Buddhist equality is expressed as "Mountains, rivers, plants, and trees, all enter Nirvana." That is, all living creatures of the mountains and the rivers are equal in that they all have the making of a Buddha. However, that is saying they all equally become Buddha in the next world, and it does not mean equality in the right to pursue happiness in the present world. I maintain that equality of rights is after all an idea or value which originated in the West. I feel that the difference between the East and West is characteristically manifested in the fact that though there is a Christian Socialism, a Buddhist Socialism never came into being. Even if we tried today to aim at a future world exactly in the style of the Buddhist doctrines, unless practical ways were disclosed of overcoming our desires for money and possessions and the inequalities of the actual world, it would only be crying for utopia.

IV

Although liberty and equality were values concerned not only with the nation and the people but also with the individual, fraternity is a value regarding the group only. However, the group must not be one within the same nation or the same race. Fraternity is not patriotism. It is rather in opposition and contradictory to it. Fraternity must surpass national boundaries. It is a universal sort of thing and a notion which the Japanese clustered in the island country were rather short of. It is in line with the Stoic's human universality theory, or theory of universal brotherhood. The words of the New Testament which I mentioned previously, that "Bond or free, man or woman, Christ is all and in all," is a demonstration of the fraternity between equal beings. However today, a fraternity among only Christians smells too strongly of antagonism against Moslems and Buddhists and appears poor in its aspect of love for mankind and of universal brotherhood.
It is the same with such ideological systems as Communism. They lack in universal love for mankind. The kind of fraternity that is required today must surpass differences in nation, race, and ideology, and be one of world citizens supported by love for humanity.

Then, is such a notion of fraternity satisfactorily realized today? Unfortunately, no. Why? Aristotle named three factors necessary to realize fraternity: first, spontaneity; second, reciprocity; and third, realizability.

First of all, feelings of spontaneity seem to have weakened. For when fraternity was advocated at the time of the French Revolution, it was a doctrine puissant in its way. When Cloots gathered the revolutionary internationalists of the world and walked into the revolution headquarters, the mutual objects of fraternity were, at most, Europeans not much different from themselves, and thus fraternity was something easy to feel and realize. Today, with the development in transport facilities one is able to go to the four corners of the world easily in next to no time. But the people one meets there are quite different from oneself — not only physically but also in thought, sentiment, and political ways, making it difficult to consider them one's comrades. And, as I said before, the people of the world being placed under very unequal conditions, the second factor of reciprocity, the possibility of give and take, seems hard to realize.

However, I am certain that this value of fraternity will revive and be required once again. For Aristotle argued that an enemy was necessary for fraternity, and this enemy is here, right in front of us. Needless to say, it is the ultimate World War, symbolized by the atomic bomb, and the resultant extermination of mankind. There is plenty of ground to suppose that fraternity will be fortified as we find ourselves all to be in the same boat to share the same fate. By aiming at the common goal of peace, fraternity should become a value stronger than either liberty or equality. It is just that in the actual world, fraternity has not much away at the moment because we are not yet fully aware of the existence and strength of the enemy, or rather, there are too many factors to obstruct our feeling keenly the danger.

I have discussed what may be called the basic values of modern society, i.e., liberty, equality, and fraternity, and their significance in the world today. I have also stated that these three values are faced with many difficulties. However, I do not by any means mean to deny these values nor do I agree with the current trend in the world of thought to look down on the enlightenment philosophy centered on the three values.

If we look closely, we will see that enlightenment is the guiding principle in the doings not only of the United Nations, but also of the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., and many other countries of the world. To this, some may say that that is only in principle and cite the caste system in India, racial segregation in America, and control of the freedom of speech in the Soviet Union. That is all too true. We must always look straight in the face of realities, and the realization of the three values is not exception.

The values of liberty, equality, and fraternity are not fully actualized today, nor do I imagine them easy to realize. History in its wide sense, is making this difficult to accomplish. However, if we consider the destiny and dignity of mankind to be of importance, we must learn to gradually control history.
Fellow guests of this conference, I feel greatly complimented at being asked to share in this discussion. As you have already heard this morning, the subject is wide and huge and can be approached in so many ways and along so many different dimensions and cover so much of human experience, that one wonders how it can be brought into any coherent focus. Indeed, I am afraid it will defy any such effort. On the other hand, here we are in Japan, land of the economic miracle. Maybe a values-miracle can happen here too. There can be no doubt that the issues raised here are quite central to our existence and the existence of our children and grandchildren.

I went to some trouble, in the interest of clarity, to put down on paper what I thought I could best contribute to this discussion, and with your permission, I will read it.

To enter upon the subject of “human values” is to stumble at the first step over obstacles of definition. As we all know, all cultures, all traditions of art and learning and religion are filled with the varieties of ways in which “human values” have been defined, used, and understood by different peoples in different times and circumstances. They are usually rooted in beginnings in which the many tribes of people saw themselves as the whole of humankind, their truth the only truth, their values universal. Only a few people are left here and there who still do not know that there are different peoples out there in the world beyond them, but there are a great many — indeed, a great majority of us all — who still think their truth is the only truth, their values the ones by which the worth of all other human beings is to be measured. Since the beginning, much of what we call history has consisted of the encounters between and among different tribes and their differing sets of values. The result over the centuries has been a blending at some point in time, leaving imprints of their influence, some superficial, some deep. Over time, some common practices were accepted to meet expanding common needs — ways to tell time, to navigate, to exchange mail and goods — and some principles of a higher order, like the “law of the sea” which included the principle that all were committed to come to the aid of all who needed it, and perhaps most ancient of all, the principle of diplomatic immunity, needed to assure minimal contact between tribes of people at their outer edges of hostility or apartness. Most recently, a broad set of such universal values or principles was nominally endorsed by virtually all governments in the world in the UN Charter and covenants, embodying principles of governance and human rights largely derived from the ideas generated by the Western European Enlightenment of two centuries ago. To some extent, these values or principles — modern, secular, egalitarian, humane — continue to be widely professed, claimed as nominal goals even by those who in practice remain regressive, theocratic, authoritarian, and inhumane. Popular sovereignty is claimed as the goal of brutal tyrannies; political freedoms of speech, assembly, and the security and autonomy of the individual, are transmuted into their opposite. In real life over most of the globe, it is not these professed common principles but practiced tribal differences that remain paramount and dominant. “Human values” continue, for virtually all practical purposes, to be tribal values. This — as much as modernization, industrialization, communication — is what gives shape to human affairs everywhere on earth as we come to the end of the 20th Century. It is to this paradoxical condition that I address myself, offering one perspective to the discussion of what might lie ahead for “human values” as we approach the 21st.

Most of what we call our “values” comes to us in holdings that we acquire first at birth. They appear out of the ready-made set of endowments and identifications that every individual shares with others by the chance of the family and group into which he or she is born at that particular time in that particular place.

There is first the new baby’s body itself, the shared physical characteristics of the group acquired through the parental genes — skin color, hair texture, basic body structure, facial features. No audience anywhere, certainly not in Japan, needs to be told what compelling values come attached to what we are physically and what we
look like, the body that comes to us through the long process of selection, through what Rene Dubos has called "the biological remembrance of things past," plus whatever else — we continue to argue about how much else — comes through the parental membranes to give each person the original shape of his or her unique self.

But even as it draws its first breath, hears its first sound, feels its first touch, the new infant begins to be endowed with everything else that awaits it in that complex way into the making of the individual ego identity. It is quite a stock of endowments.

As an extension of the individual's physical characteristics, there is the birthplace itself. The increased mobility of people in modern times has altered the relative weight of this place in the minds of many. But for most people still, the nature of that place, its shape and its lore, will have much to do with shaping the outlook and the way of life that the new child begins to share from its first day. The baby acquires names, an individual name, a family name, a group name, a heavily-laden symbol in the language through which he will discover the world. Upon arrival, he is already a product of the history and origins of which he becomes the newest heir. He involuntarily acquires the religion of his family and group and the nationality — in whatever form — that his people hold.

These legacies, with all their clustering values — beliefs, mores, ethics, aesthetics, and other assorted attributes — come to the child carrying the immense weight of the whole past as his family has received it. Before he has barely any consciousness at all, they shape the reality of his existence and are made part of him. They become the stuff of the conditioning of his childhood years, the making and filling of his mind and spirit as he enters youth, adulthood, maturity. They exist in him not separately but in a cluster of elements entwined and inseparable in close and intimate relation to one another.

This cluster, moreover, is not a fixed sculpted object made up of unchangeable pieces. For all but a very few people on earth now, it is a live thing, changing its shape and condition and size under all kinds of changing circumstances. The new member of the group comes not only into his inheritance of the past but also into all the transforming conditions of the present: the status that comes with these legacies, his family's relative wealth or poverty, its position in the group to which it belongs, and that group's position relative to other groups in its environment — in short, all the impinging social and economic conditions with all their inward and outward effects on the individual's personality and the making of his life. Of these, the most decisive are the political conditions in which the group identity is held, the measure of power or powerlessness attached to it. How dominant or how dominated is the group to which the individual belongs? How static or how changing is this condition, and how, then, is he going to be able to see and bear himself in relation to others? This is the cardinal question and it is essentially the question of the nature of the prevailing politics of the situation, the push and pull for power among groups producing change in the relative positions of all who share the given scene.

Such, in all their primordial and dynamic strength, are the holdings that make up the basic group identity, these are the sources of our values and how we hold them. How they are seen and celebrated by their holders has provided the substance and form of most of what we know as history, mythology, folklore, art, literature, religious beliefs, customs, and practices. How the holdings of others are seen and dealt with has provided most of the unending grimmess of the we-they confrontation in human experience. This duality is the prime mark of how our group identities function in all our affairs. From the beginnings until now, they have served us well, enhancing or justifying our individual lives. From the beginnings until now, they have also produced the fear and hatred of others who differ from us and the collisions and the massively murderous violence to which these differences have led during all of human history. This dual quality of the group substance of our lives — simultaneously life-enhancing and life-destroying — has always been, still is, and, as far as one can see now, will remain a central theme in the human story.

As I have tried to show elsewhere at greater length,* all that I have said here about group identity is subject to many variations and complexities and most especially where group identity becomes involved in the process of political change. This has always been true, but is all the more so now in our own time when the world has become like a single jammed tenement filled with all the tribal kinds mixing, jostling, tearing at each other, fighting for living room for themselves and for what they value.

Each case, one finds, develops its own shapes, its own dynamics, its own peculiar intensities. There is not much about the study of the interaction of the elements of basic group identity and political change that can be reduced to single formulas or be symmetrically arranged. The various elements show up in different relationship to one another and with quite different specific gravities in the cluster as a whole. Skin color and physical characteristics may be at the heart of the group identity cluster of the black American but only at the margins in the case of the blacker African in his own society where the core of his identity may lie in his particular tribal affiliation. History and origins can appear as the most powerfully positive centerpiece, say, for the Chinese, with his Great Past, and as the most crushingly negative centerpiece for the ex-Untouchable in India or his

counterpart in Japan who wants to blot out his past altogether. In Ulster it is being “Catholic” or “Protestant,” in Lebanon being this or that variety of “Christian” or “Muslim” — with the mix of history and religion that gives these identities their content — that governs the terms on which people in those countries are going to live or die. The common holding of Islam and fear of the Hindus thrust East Bengal into a nation with the Punjabis, Pathans, Sindis, and other Muslim people’s of India’s west: geography, physical differences, language, and history parted them a generation later in one of our current history’s bloodier amputations.

But varied as such particulars can be, I believe it can be said that in all cases, the function of basic group identity has to do most crucially with two key ingredients in every individual’s personality and life experience: his sense of belongingness and the quality of his self-esteem. These come defined in many ways and the needs they serve are met in many degrees of plus-ness and minus-ness in different cases, depending on the pecking orders within the group and in relation to other groups, but in all cases shaping thereby much of the behavior of all the individuals involved.

How these elements of group identity appear in the Japanese example has, like all cases, its familiar and its unique aspects. There is the notably high value placed by Japanese on their physical homogeneity which gets reflected in their attitudes about skin color and the way Japanese society has dealt with children of mixed-race. That has taken place in recent years about the issues of reflected in their attitudes about skin color and the way unique aspects. There is the notably high value placed Chinese ideas, language, and arts that was undertaken in the seventh century under the leadership of Prince Shotoku, providing the main underpinning and the style of so much of Japanese culture as it developed thereafter; wakon yosai, “Japanese spirit and Western skill/learning/knowledge,” applies to what happened in the Meiji period after 1868, when Japan, with that same remarkable deliberateness and enterprise, began its massive borrowing and absorption of Western modes and styles in industrial and all other new technologies, including the military, and embarked on the process of Westernization that transformed the country and the society and brought Japan as a major actor onto the stage of modern world history. It is clear enough what wakon and yosai was and is: the question that keeps rising and demanding some new answer becomes: What is wakon? What is the “Japanese spirit” that shaped these historic experiences?

To this question, one recurring answer among many is that wakon is the borrowing itself, or more specifically the capacity to borrow, the style of borrowing, not just the adoption but the adaptation of what is borrowed. “This is the essence of the Japanese uniqueness” explained Dr. Takeo Doi, noted psychoanalyst and author of one of the best-known of the great number of books on Japanesees that began filling Japanese bookshelves in the early 1970s. “We became connoisseurs of world civilization. We borrow, we like it, we get self-esteem from it. We retain our own spirit in hiding in what we borrow something latent of our own.” In the same exchange, Kazuko Tsurumi said: “We speak of Chinese civilization, not civilization. We speak of Chinese civilization, Indian civilization but of Japanese culture. We are uncertain of ourselves. But we are also very proud, proud of our sensitivity to new things. The Chinese are not sensitive, not curious. We really are, and we are proud of it.” In these conversations, the search for the essence of Japanesees became a game of metaphors: was wakon like an onion, each savory layer peeling away, ending finally in nothing, or like an artichoke, each leaf with its taste of substance, all pulled away and disclosing finally, under a bristling protective cover, a soft, strong, hidden heart all its own?...

In the ongoing effort to resolve the elements of their past and the needs of their present, Japanese at many different levels are asking themselves: If it be true that the wakon, or Japanese uniqueness, is the capacity to borrow judiciously and adapt distinctively from other cultures, and that the history of the Japanese nation over time has been created by its use of ancient Chinese arts and modern Western technologies, then what now? Having sampled in spectacular fashion the blind alleys of cultures, and that the history of the Japanese nation after; wakon yosai, learning/knowledge, was and is; the question becomes: What is wakon? What is the “Japanese spirit” that shaped these historic experiences?

An individual belongs to his basic group in the deepest
and most literal sense that here he is not alone. Not to be alone is what most human beings value over all else. He is not only not alone, but here, as long as he chooses to remain in and of it, he cannot be denied or rejected. It is an identity the individual might in some cases want to conceal, abandon, or change, but it is the identity that no one can take away from him. It is home in the sense that our poet Robert Frost described it, the place where, when you have got to go there, they have got to take you in. Or in this age of massive migrations, for great numbers who have been transported across great physical and cultural distances, it is the ark they carry with them, the temple of whatever rules one's forbears lived by, the "tradition" or "morality" or whatever form of creed or belief in a given set of answers to the unanswerables.

Wrapped into this affiliation also is the matter of esteem and self-esteem: how individuals are seen by others, how they see themselves. Some individuals can get sufficient self-esteem out of the stuff of their individual personalities alone. More people have to depend on their group associations to supply what their individualities may fall short in providing. Most need all they can get from all possible sources. In traditional or stable societies this kind of assured self-acceptance derived from the common group identity provides an element of satisfaction and an acceptance of the common lot along with one's own. All, including the master groups at the top and the lowest at the bottom accept as they are told they are and accept the belief system that fixes the conditions of their lives. In all its degrees, the master-subject, higher-lower, superior-inferior relationship has been based on this kind of acceptance. In our own time and our own world setting, such frozen pecking orders have been breaking up and falling apart during the last several generations. It is precisely the need for a higher, or at least an equal order of self-esteem, the need to acquire it, to feel it, to assert it that has in our own time upset all such order and become one of the major drives behind all our politics. The drive to assert or re-assert group pride and status — self-esteem — is what led to the wars between rival powers and fueled the nationalist movements that broke down the rule of the empires. It stoked the national and racial chauvinisms that played such decisive roles in the Russian and Chinese revolutions and their aftermaths. It generated the power that broke the system of white supremacy in the United States. Here is where we find the points at which group identity and politics meet. Here, where it becomes a matter of struggle for power, of contending groups, contending needs, contending sets of values, is where the line between the life-enhancing pluses and the life-destroying minuses disappears and here is where our history is for the most part made.

We have been talking about the "values" of physical characteristics, name and language, history and origins, religion, and nationality. This is the stuff of which group identities are made and group identities have become, more than ever before, the stuff of which politics is made, world politics, national politics, local politics, everywhere on earth. We are, and have been for all the lifetimes of this century, caught up in a succession of wars and revolutions bringing about a massive rearrangement of power systems, of the ways and institutions by which people and states are ruled. As a result, almost everywhere, massive displacements are taking place. The relative position of virtually every people on earth has been shifting in some way in relation to others. All the lights, angles, shadows, and reflections by which people see themselves or are seen by others have moved or are moving. All postures and styles of behaviors, all ideas, all values, are in some way ceasing to be what they were and more or less convulsively becoming something else. This process pervades all our societies;

— the postcolonial, made up of a hundred new states with populations made up for the most part of mutually hostile tribes — racial, religious, linguistic, regional, national — each one seeking some power for its own nationhood in the vacuums created by the departure of the colonial masters;

— the post-imperial, from which the internally magnetic force of world power has gone and in which long-submerged divisions are resurfacing and giving new life to old centrifugal impulses, as in Britain, Canada, Spain, France, Belgium, Holland, and in which, also, large migrations of ex-colonial subjects are creating whole new complexes of problems turning on issues of race and culture;

— the post-revolutionary, in Russia and Communist eastern Europe and to a significant extent also in China, where old nationalities of peoples neither die nor fade away and exert constant pressure on the centralized totalitarian politics of their Communist regimes;

— the post-illusionary, in the United States, where the end of the white supremacy system in the world forced an end to its American counterpart and thrust the American society into its great ongoing effort to bring its practiced ways more into line with its professed ethos, to become more of what it always claimed it was.

In one form or another, this process of breakup and rearrangement of old pecking orders is now going on in all our societies and is transforming all our politics. Out of the breakup of old power systems or the fragility of new ones comes the onset of chronic turmoil and instability, collisions of interest and values within, between, and among groups caught up in this great swirl of change. One effect is the weakening of all norms, the spread of a paralyzing normlessness, especially among the young born into this pervasive confusion. Out of this turmoil come the fears that surround us and the increasingly desperate yearning for security. For great masses of people this means trying to get back to a condition of life in which their needs are met, to get behind walls that enclose them once more, if only in their minds, in a place where they can feel they belong and where, grouped with their own kind, they can regain some measure of what feels like emotional and physical safety. Hence the lunge for tribal turfs, for national separateness, no matter how feeble or fragile the sovereignty it provides. Hence also the swelling power of surviving and reviving tradi-
tional religions in their most orthodox forms.

What we have recently seen in Iran and elsewhere — as we had already seen in India, Pakistan, Lebanon, Ulster, in the Arab-Israeli conflict — provided still further examples of how religion can serve as the mobilizing focus in a political conflict that obviously involves many other elements. Such is similarly the case where we read of tribal collisions in Africa, language conflicts in Africa, India, Belgium, Canada, of deep historically rooted antagonisms, as between, for example, China and Russia, China and Vietnam, Vietnam and Cambodia, Poland and Russia, and currently, Iraq and Iran which give the past such a powerful, even dominant influence on contemporary political behavior; or when we deal, as all must now deal every day of our lives in every place, with the issues of politics in which the key words — values — are nation, nationalism, nationality.

These matters press upon us in every sphere and at every level. They are entwined with all the “hard” or “large” affairs of power struggle: geography, resources (especially energy), distribution of wealth, numbers, relative military power, relative economic capacity and leverage. They are at the core of all the “soft” or “small” matters of immediate experience of all kinds of human beings affected by changing political and economic pecking orders in old and new states on all the continents. They are part of all current tension and conflict between groups and states on every scene, from the great intercontinental arenas of the superpowers to all the more obscure, murky clearings in the world jungle where people in all their varieties are locked in more or less mutually murderous struggles for status, place, primacy.

This is hardly a new condition, indeed it is depressing-ly old. Far from dissolving under the impacts of modernization, as intellectuals of the Enlightenment thought it would, this state of affairs, this built-in no-brotherhood of man persists. It remains a seemingly iradicable part of the human condition. But as we approach the 21st Century, it is compounded by paradox: a world globalized by science and technology is fragmented into its many different human parts clashing with each other not less but more fiercely than ever before. “Progress” has meant mainly that these battles take place now not on dim and distant, darkling plains but appear brightly lit on all our television screens. There are no deserts, no islands, no rain forests, far enough away to keep these collisions isolated from international politics, no distances any more to keep between them and the rest of everyone else everywhere else.

“Progress” has also turned the power struggle at the global level into a standoff between the superpowers — super-tribes, if you will — a standoff maintained by a balance of terror based on nuclear weapons. A world polity that would eliminate this is simply not in sight. On the contrary, the standoff itself is being shaken at the moment by the notion, being toyed with by both sides, of a “winnable” nuclear war. The danger of the ultimate use of nuclear weapons remains the overwhelming fact of life-or-death in our time. To this extent, the superpowers hold the fate of the planet in their hands. But, paradoxically again, this does not give them the power to control what happens meanwhile in all its many separate parts. One effect of the great swirl of change among all peoples is that military force alone can no longer determine political outcomes as it once could. Short of nuclear collision, the Great Power confrontation becomes for the most part a scramble for influence on postcolonial regimes capable at best — from the Great Power point of view — of becoming expensive, unreliable, prickly, unpredictable, and worst of all, usually ineffectual clients. Indeed, the ultimate irony could be that with nuclear proliferation, the finger that eventually pulls a nuclear trigger may not belong to any super-tribal Russian or American but to some mini-tribal warrior somewhere who will fire off the super-weapon to serve some mini-goals — values — of his own.

Meanwhile, this same “progress” has made these myriads of smaller or lesser or even mini-conflicts more lethal than ever before, thanks to the supply of ever-more advanced weapons from eager would-be sponsors to would-be clients. Bloody as this kind of history has always been, its current chapter is bloodier still. Given the greater numbers of people, the unprecedented spread and scope of these collisions, the greater death-dealing capacity provided by the genie of modern technology, the mutual massacring has been taking place on a grander scale than ever. Picking up in the immediate aftermath of the great bloodlettings of World War II and the Holocaust — the largest single and most cold-blooded ethnic slaughter of them all — the new “body counts” have run swiftly beyond counting.

It makes a somber catalog from which one can only cite a few examples: mutual massacring of Hindus and Muslims in the partition of India, followed by three wars between Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan, with Hindu-Muslim killings recurring at intervals, as again this past summer; the slaughtering of East Pakistani Muslims by West Pakistani Muslims in what finally became the new state of Bangladesh, with sequels of tension and killings of Bengali Hindus who fled into neighboring Hindu Assam and tribal Tripura, in India, and of Bengali Muslims, pushing into tribal territory in Bangladesh’s own Chittagong area and in neighboring Burma; tribal civil wars in Nigeria, the Congo, Chad, Sudan; four wars between Arabs and Israelis; Indonesians killing Papuans in New Guinea and currently slaughtering Timorese in Timor; Tutis and Hutus slaughtering each other in Burundi and Ruanda; Idi Amin’s regime in Uganda slaughtering hundreds of thousands of tribal foes to remain in power; Malays killing Chinese in Malaysia; Chinese killing Tibetans in Tibet; Catholics and Protestants in Ulster; Christians and Muslims in Lebanon, now becoming a four-sided affair involving rival Christians and rival Sunni and Shiite Muslims; Buddhist Sinhalese and Hindu Tamils in Sri Lanka; Sunni Muslims and Alevi (Shiite) in Turkey; Sunni Muslims and rival Muslim sects in Pakistan; Turks and Greeks in Cyprus; Kurds and Iranians and Kurds and Iraqis; Ethiopians and Eritreans; Ethiopians and Somalis; Arabs and Berbers in Algeria; Arabs and black Africans in Zanzibar; Chad and Sudan;
Christians and Muslims in the Philippines; Cambodians, Meos, and Vietnamese in Indochina; Portuguese and their colonial tribal peoples in Angola and Mozambique, with the separate tribes entering into war with each other after the Portuguese collapse; the black-white civil war in Rhodesia, finally to become Zimbabwe; and white killings of black protesters in South Africa. To these must be added the Vietnamese and Chinese refugees from Vietnam pushed back out to drown at sea in their leaking boats by Malay Muslims who at the same time were welcoming the 70,000 or so tribally-related Muslim refugees who fled the war in the southern Philippines and came seeking refuge in Sabah, etc., etc., etc.

One attempt to count the “ethnic/cultural fatalities” in such clashes between 1945 and 1967 came up with an estimated total of 7,480,000 deaths. By now, late 1980, this total must certainly be somewhere between 15,000,000 and 20,000,000, and we are still counting. New additions appear regularly in any week’s budget of news. As we move down the list from cases of open warfare or large-scale massacres to ethnic/cultural conflicts marked by sporadic rioting, killings, bombing or other terrorist acts, it swells from many scores to many hundreds. If we add all the situations where tension and strain exists between and among groups with potential for violence, the number could hardly be guessed. In this category, we have to include every country in which a changing political order is trying to strike new balances among contending tribal, racial, linguistic, religious, or national groups. This now means virtually every country on every continent, in the 50-odd, “old” states and the 100-odd, “new” states of the world.

This brings us back to that great paradox with which we have to learn to live, the paradox of ever more globalizing power and technology in a world of ever more fragmenting politics. At some point these mounting quantities become changing qualities. Even if we are fortunate and they do not lead to any “big” eruption any time soon, the “small” eruptions that keep taking place produce big changes in the political landscapes where they occur and thereby, to whatever calculable or incalculable extent, alter the political topography of their regions and of the world. The new shape of world politics is made out of the sums of all these evolving, multiplying parts.

These sums, one must say again, are made not only of the computable, “hard” stuff — power, geography, resources, etc. — but also of the “soft” stuff of what happens to people, how their needs, impulses, states of mind, in short their values, do or do not get translated into behavior and political action. These include all the values that come from and bear on the complexities of group identity, belongingness, self-esteem, and autonomy. These are elements that no one yet knows how to program into any computer. They are becoming sums no one can add up. Still, in one degree or another, differing vastly in particulars from place to place, they are the substance of politics everywhere, playing a role in the revising, reshaping, remarking of every changing society, every political system. There is no formula for order in the way we can think about this inherently disorderly process. It is ongoing and open-ended, and in most cases no one can be sure what way stations lie ahead, much less what destination.

What, then, can we say about the prospects for the coming century? History tells us for the most part that the problem of diverse populations has usually been “solved” politically by the imposition of pecking orders by some group or groups on others and that these are maintained by varying measures of physical, psychological, and cultural force. A good part of the human story has to do with the making, breaking, and remaking of such orders in all their shifting varieties and combinations. Thus were the empires, ancient and modern, and all the many different political mechanisms they devised along the way to ensure the control of the dominant over the dominated groups, e.g., the nationality policy of the Hapsburgs, the millet system under the Ottomans, the system of indirect rule and, in their last imperial last years, the communal electorates created in India by the British, etc. But we do not seem likely to find in the past any models for a system that would be more humane, just, equitable in its distribution of political power. The fields of political theory are not much greener. Modern Western European and American political theory was and still is largely rooted in ideas that came to us from the Greeks through the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. It became a body of thought that assumed that what was meant to emerge from the primeval ooze was some kind of universal man, that backward and ignorant human tribalism would give way to advancing knowledge and reason and that all duly enlightened human beings would join together to assure the commonweal.

This belief, an article of faith for democratic idealists, became dogma for Marxist socialists. But as we all know, this is not how it worked out, either for democratic idealists or Marxist socialists. The national state became the Western world’s maximum extension and refinement of tribalism. It proved to be the “end of the road” as far as any commonweal went, whether capitalist weal or socialist weal. The dream of universal man drifted away in visions of a commonwealth of man, a “world government” or of “world federalism” and came no closer to creation than a League of Nations, a UN, mirrors of the real world, not instruments for changing it. On the socialist side, the vision of a proletarian international brotherhood became an unstable cabal of tyrannical national-Communist states. The world of states remained a jungle, while within each national state, the old tribal ways survived, flourished, and remain alive and well to this day. They thrive on all political diets, capitalist/socialist/mixed or Communist/authoritarian. Pecking orders continue to gover, not only on the basis of wealth and class but also by categories of race, region, religion, language, origin, nationality, or varied combinations thereof. The values we attach to our many colors, creeds, and national origins do not yield to the values of any higher shared human order of things or accommodation.
of differences. Instead they continue to fragment and confront each other more and more in ever more separate and hostile ways. Some of the loftiest spirits and best minds of many generations have struggled to see how it might be otherwise, but the "nation" and the holding of "nationality" — serving as mantle for all the other seemingly irrepressible conflict-producing differences among human beings — have continued to best them, century after century. Despite much eloquent doctrine and earnest aspiration and even occasional examples by a few, all men continue not to be brothers, even in a time when some minimum measure of brotherliness, like it or not, seems to have become a requirement for the common survival.

Political theory has, until very recently, resolutely looked away from all this, staying on levels of abstraction that could remain least disturbed by the actualities. Communist theory on "the national question" turned out to have no serious connection with the facts of Communist centralized power. Leading works by American political scientists in the 1950s and 1960s on the subject of nation-building in the post-colonial countries scarcely ever mentioned, much less considered, the problems created by the crowded and contentious diversity of their populations. They simply assumed that what they called "modernization" would take care of all that. In so-called social science literature generally, the term "group" has been muddied into a blur that until quite recently avoided making any distinction between the nature of primary ties linking people and all the many secondary groupings in which they also move. The term "plural" or "pluralism," often employed in this general area, has remained, like all significant terms describing these relationships (e.g., race, tribe, nation), vague or so variously defined that its usage confuses rather than clarifies.

The current flow — already nearly a flood, at least in America — of new literature on this subject reflects the new "ethnic consciousness" in many ways. Most of this literature is devoted to particular groups that have been at the lower ends of our various pecking orders in the past. It celebrates their new self-assertion and seeks to bolster the creation of new self-esteem. This is to the good, for the most part, as far much of it goes. Unfortunately, however, "ethnic consciousness" is not exactly the stuff of respect for others, much less of brotherly love, even among the brothers themselves. It is not the stuff of humane coexistence with those who are different in the critical values attached to physical characteristics, language, history and origins, religion, and nationality. What is most useful in some of this new writing is not where it advances any new "theory" about how to handle these differences but where it begins to look more closely at the reality of what is going on all around us. This can at least help us to see more clearly where the new thresholds are in this matter of political change and racial/ethnic diversity.

Starting points for such an effort are on all sides, especially in those countries that give us a chance to compare developments on this score along different cultural and political dimensions, say, as in Nigeria, India, Malaysia, China, Canada, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, the United States. What new pluralisms, what new pecking orders are being created? And most critically of all for our future, how do these patterns bear on the character of political institutions? How do they bear on the survival of democratic politics, now so largely confined to the North Atlantic region, Japan, and a few other spots in the world, versus the further spread of authoritarian political control systems which now govern everywhere else? There are not likely to be clear answers to such questions coming along any time soon, but the questions themselves are sure to become more familiar and more pressing.

The course of things will depend most heavily, I believe, on what happens to our politics in the coming decades. The cardinal question remains the nature of the power we create to rule ourselves and govern our relationships with others. The survival and spread of authoritarian political systems will bring with it the repositioning of new sets of pecking orders, suppressing, submerging, exploiting all forms of dissent and differences that do not serve the interests of the groups that hold power. The survival and spread of democratic political systems will at least enable our societies to go on seeking better outcomes. Most critically, I believe, this will depend on what happens to the values of democratic politics in the United States.

During these recent decades when so many societies in the world have been coming apart in the centrifuge of retribalizing politics, the American society has been struggling to integrate itself, to see if it can finally begin in reality to assure to all its citizens the equal rights under the law and equality of opportunity which they have always in theory enjoyed. We are engaged in trying to see whether the common holdings of a shared American group identity can provide the setting in which different kinds of people can coexist with some decent respect and acceptance instead of tearing each other limb from limb. We are trying to see, in short, whether we can finally create a one that will preserve our many. And we are many — Americans are among the most diverse peoples in the world. Our key problem is to try to see to it that what we hold in common outweighs what we hold separately, with the shared values of all assuring the freedom and security of any who wish to pursue particular values of their own in the varied private domains of the open society.

It is this model of the democratic open society that we counterpose to the assorted models of closed and closing societies that now rule in most of the world. The model of inclusiveness and shared rights with accommodation of differences of race, origin, religion, is the model we counterpose to the deeply-bloodied, we-they tribal fragmentations and national conflicts that are now tearing the globe into so many pieces at a time when it needs more than anything else to exist as some kind of tolerably functioning whole.

Many things, obviously — issues of power, economics, and the use of the new technologies produced by life-
creating as well as life-destroying science — will govern what kind of America will exist in what kind of world in the decades to come. But the issue of open versus closed societies, democratic versus authoritarian politics, lies imbedded in the Great Power struggles in which we are all in some degree engaged and by which we are all affected. If American behavior in this power struggle is to have more for its object than sheer brute survival, it has to be based on the maintenance of the democratic, open society that Americans are still struggling to create. We are still a long way from succeeding in this enterprise — indeed, there is no guarantee that we will succeed — but it has to be one of the more hopeful facts of life that these values are not just American values but are values professed or sought by everyone everywhere who continues to look to the future rather than the past for some human betterment. They appear and re-appear after decades of submergence in totalitarian regimes — we have seen something of this happen again recently in Poland where the power of nationalism and religion runs so strongly, at the same time, in Russia where democratic dissidents keep offering their lonely challenges to the regime, and in country after country, notably just now Nigeria, where a self-conscious effort is being made to apply some of the features of the American political system to the task of dealing with that country's deep and war-torn diversities. The least that can be said about the American achievement, limited, qualified, flawed, and bedeviled as it might now be, is that it has moved further toward realizing democratic goals than any other society has managed to do.

The question is where it will go from here. In these years of turmoil and change, all our democratic professions have come under acute and aggravated challenge, and there is much more of it to come. The way the American society deals with this challenge will decide what kind of society we will become. It will be this struggle and its outcomes — the fate of the "soft" quality of American life, American values — that will, along with all the "hard" stuff of our size, strength, and resources, shape the American position in the world. The shape of much of the rest of the world's politics will be influenced in a critical measure by the example of what we make of ours.
Ladies and gentlemen. Like my predecessors at this podium, I would like to begin by expressing my very sincere appreciation of the privilege of being invited to join you in this conference. And I would also like to echo Prof. Barraclough in taking the liberty of treating this as a tribute to my country. But the puzzle is, I am not quite sure to which country I should attribute it — to Scotland, in which I had the major part of my education and professional work, or to India, the country of my birth, where I happen to be working just now. So let me attribute it to them both.

Evolutionary theory has taught us how the myriad species of creatures which inhabit this planet have developed their diverse forms, and their multiple innate behavioural patterns. The clue to all this diversity is simply survival value. Many genetic mutations occur which are either harmful or irrelevant to the survival of the species, and these are discarded. But in the course of time, certain other mutations have shown very positive value, and these have tended to persist and to multiply in successive generations.

This is the typical slow process of the genetic modification of physical traits. In recent years, however, evolutionary geneticists have shown us that the most rapidly moving changes in human behaviour have been due to changes not in our physical but in our psycho-social inheritance. Ideas, values, and learned patterns of behaviour also form part of the legacy of past experience of our species. And these too are associated with a greater or a lesser degree of survival value. Mammals, and especially humans, show behavioural plasticity, as well as genetically programmed behavioural patterns. As the anthropologist, Derek Freeman has put it; “viewed in evolutionary perspective, human behaviour is a phylogenetic adaptation, a way of completing the differentiation of the central nervous and related systems in greater detail and more adaptively than can be accomplished by gene encoding alone. And it is this evolutionary innovation which has made possible the adaptive radiation which we observe in the diverse cultures of man.”

For a number of decades, at the beginning of this century, leading anthropologists, such as Boas and Kroeber, claimed that man belonged to the only species in which learning played a significant role in the transmission of new behaviour. In more recent times, ethologists have demonstrated that this is not the case. The Japanese ethologists, Kawai and Itani and Nishimura, have made notable contributions in this field by showing that innovations in behaviour could be initiated by a single monkey in a colony of macaque monkeys observed over many years. And such innovations could quite quickly become adopted by a large percentage of the tribe.

They demonstrated that innovations in behaviour spread more rapidly if they were initiated by a high status member of the tribe. But it should be mentioned that the first recorded event of this type happened in September 1953 when a young female macaque monkey of relatively low status in that tribe, a monkey designated F-111, was seen to wash sand off a piece of sweet potato and then eat it. This is something no monkey had been observed to do before. Within three months, three others of the tribe were imitating her behaviour, and ten years later, 75 per cent of the whole troop had incorporated this item into their behavioural repertoire. Perhaps some day a monument will be erected in honour of Miss F-111. Certainly, the incident reminds us of the old saying: “Never underestimate the power of a woman.”

It appears that certain innovations in primate behaviour have owed their discovery to two drives which homo sapiens shares with the other primates, namely curiosity and play. These drives facilitate the discovery of new, useful forms of behaviour. They also contribute to man’s tireless search for explanatory and regulatory concepts, usually first expressed in the terms of legends and myths. These myths incorporate not only man’s imperfect understanding of the physical world, but also the successive stages of the development of his systems of values.

At first, Man’s values are chiefly concerned with the selfish interests of the individual and the close kinship group. But as societies become more complex and human knowledge increases, the values themselves become more generalized.

By an interesting paradox, some of the most hard-headed rationalist philosophers of the late twentieth century, such as Weddington, Bronowski, Monod and Popper, have been reiterating the key importance of values in the advancement of human understanding. As Monod put it in one of his last publications: “Clearly, as everyone since Hume’s day and before it has known, values cannot possibly be derived from any sort of objective knowledge. But if you think about it a bit more, you find that in fact objective knowledge cannot exist — cannot begin to exist
— unless there is an active choice of values to begin with.”

I am indebted to Professor Freeman for having brought this quotation to my attention, and also for his own comments upon it when he wrote: “In other words, the supreme value is not knowledge, but choice itself. We know that genetic evolution proceeds by means of mutation and natural selection... I would propose that the homologous processes in the cases of cultural evolution are acts of imagination and choice.”

Thanks to man’s development of symbolic modes of communication, in spoken and much later in written language (spoken language became part of the human repertoire a little over 40 thousand years ago, and the earliest known written language is about 4 thousand years ago), man has become a predominantly cultural animal, although still there are limits to his acquisition and transmission of learned behaviour, limits set by the phylogenetically evolved capabilities of his neurological endocrine systems.

For a long time, anthropologists, who have been accustomed to studying isolated, often preliterate societies, were impressed by the seeming immutability of these society’s value systems. But closer examination, especially when carried out in situations of culture contact, showed that all societies have a potential for modification of their traditional values, and that in some circumstances this modification can occur very rapidly.

The occurrence of life-threatening dangers has often been an accelerating factor in species modification, and such factors are now becoming apparent not only in particular societies and regions of the earth, but on a global scale. Today, we are confronted by threats to the survival of our species as a whole. This is also an epoch in which, more than ever before in human history, mankind is evolving a global material culture in the form of artefacts, such as transistor radios, television, new potent medications which are being used, though not yet manufactured all over the world; and these artefacts in turn are promoting the creation of a global culture of shared ideas, shared expectations, and also of shared impatience when these expectations are not fulfilled.

The material conditions for a new world culture are then already coming into being. But there are major economic, political, and social obstacles to be overcome before such a culture can be established peacefully and constructively for the benefit of all mankind and not simply for a small minority group.

We are concerned in this conference especially with value systems and their modification. In my paper, I am going to discuss contrasting value systems in two particular Western and Eastern settings. One is the West Coast of Scotland, where most of my relatives are enconced, and the other a small country village in Northern India. I plan to describe some elements in these value systems which seem both to convey survival value and to contribute towards changes in social behaviour, which will be essential for the establishment of a future new world order on a harmonious base.

As a preface to these observations, and reflections on this theme, perhaps I should share with you the fact that I have been an exile from my two cultures of origin for the majority of the years of my life. My ancestry is Scottish and Presbyterian, and that implies a tradition of puritanism, conscientiousness, thrift, hard work, and also (they tell me) a certain lack of humour and light-heartedness. But by the accident of birth, I spent the first nine years of my life in northern India, talking Hindi much more than English and with Indian children as my regular playmates. My parents were missionaries. So, from them and their fellow-Christians, both Indian and European, I learned the teachings of their faith together with the niceties of Scottish middle-class behaviour of fifty years ago. At the same time, while playing with Indian children coming from a medley of castes and while visiting their homes, I picked up some of the beliefs and observances of their Hindu culture as effortlessly as I was picking up their language.

Many years later, in 1950 to 1952, I came back to northern India as an anthropologist to spend two years living in villages in Rajasthan. When I did so, not only did that by now forgotten language of my childhood suddenly come to life again rather as grass sprouts on dry plains when the rainy season begins, but I found myself recognizing as familiar all sorts of little details of daily life which I had forgotten. From the way the villagers tied their head-lace to the creak of the bullock wheels. As the language returned, I found myself also recognizing fragments of accepted wisdom in everyday conversation, and building up once again an awareness of the major cultural values of my hosts.

One is never so perceptive of such things as during the first days and weeks after arriving in a new environment. So I deliberately used to remind myself of my accepted values as a Scottish Presbyterian in order to remain alert to the multiplicity of distinctively un-Scottish ideas indicated by my hosts. One of the first and most enduring perceptions on my part was that of my hosts’ tolerance in accepting my presence in their midst. Sometime I tried to imagine what would have been the response of my cousins or of other farmers on the western coast of Scotland if an Indian scholar had pitched his tent near their village and proceeded to interview them in a great length. I am afraid that their hospitality towards the stranger would not have come up to Indian standards!

As I became more at home in these Indian villages I was able to attend to the sick, after my Western fashion, while observing their own quite different concepts of sickness and healing. I also found myself being invited to take part in the activities of Indian leisure time as well as to join them in their often strenuous daily work. There are, in India as in other countries, some leisure activities which are simply filling-in time — perhaps enjoyably but sometimes quite idly filling in. In contrast, there are other organized spare-time activities which are much more demanding of their participants’ skill, their creativity and their sustained interest. And usually these are felt to be more rewarding uses of leisure.

But let me say a word first about one worldwide, relatively idle use of leisure, namely relaxing in a convivial atmosphere with a number of friends. Typically in Scot-
land, men like to share a drink of beer or of whisky with their friends when the serious work of the day is over. Scottish culture, including the writings of our greatest poet, Robert Burns, is ambivalent about alcohol. Alcohol is praised because it promotes fellow feeling but its feared because it can become addictive and a danger to health and happiness. In India among the Rajputs (literally sons of kings) of northern India with whom I was living, I found a similar glorification of strong drink and also similar sad stories of men whose lives had been ruined by alcoholism. And in the second year, while living in a larger village, I found another group of regular drinkers who never touched alcohol. These were highly religious people belonging to the Brahmin and the Jain communities. It was customary for this group to meet for a half-hour of conversation almost every day of the week, and then they would share in drinking a decoction of cannabis Indica leaves. They would then disperse and, each in the privacy of his own house, enjoy an hour of private meditation enhanced by this infusion of marihuana.

The Scots and the Rajputs both know and display publicly the sense of friendliness and disinhibition which at times can lead to socially unacceptable behaviour produced by alcohol. They glorify drink because it creates a momentary state of subjective well-being and of good feeling towards others. Those who drink most heavily do so perhaps because these experiences occur rarely in their ordinary, non-alcoholic lives.

In both these communities, extreme self-dedication to religion or meditation is very much a minority pursuit even though this was proclaimed by Hindu teaching as the highest aim of mankind and even though in Scotland the first instruction in the Presbyterian's catechism is the question, "What is man's chief end?" To which the answer is given: "Man's chief end is to glorify God and enjoy him forever."

Rajputs are traditionally warriors, defenders of their faith rather than its adepts. In their moments of relaxation they also often take cannabis as well as alcohol, but they take cannabis not so as to heighten their private meditation, but for the quite different purpose of adding to their enjoyment of music, feasting, and love-making.

These contrasts between the whisky-drinking Scots and their sober, church-going, fellow countrymen, and between the inebriated Rajputs and their ascetic, introspective, fellow Hindus are a reminder of two basic dimensions of human personality: the Dionysiac, dominated by the gratification of instinctual drives and appetites; and the Apollonian, in which disciplined self-control subordinates, so-called, animal impulses to the deliberate, mental exploitation of knowledge, beauty, and truth.

There are elements of the Dionysiac and the Apollonian in all of us. But societies differ greatly in their attitudes towards these contrasting tendencies and consequently in the opportunities which they offer for their realization. Not the least remarkable features of Hindu culture are its acceptance of the very many, sometimes contradictory, aspects of human nature, and its encouragement to its people to explore for themselves the experiences and the discoveries which are to be found in each of the many paths which all lead ultimately to the summit of the mountain of self-knowledge.

It did not take very long for me to become aware of the permeation of every aspect of Indian village life, work, and recreation by unseen spirits and divine agencies; and at the same time one kept finding references to play in the context of religion.

For example, Lord Krishna is worshipped in many aspects, but not least as the handsome young man who sported with milkmaids and made love to them light-heartedly. The all-powerful Lord Shiva, creator and destroyer, expresses himself especially through dancing. It is true that serious devotion to religion tends to assume the character of work, rather than of play for its adherents. This is partly because of the Hindu belief that the practice of severe austerities will heighten a man's spiritual power until not only his fellow men, but the Gods themselves begin to fear him.

To cultivate one's talents in music, poetry, or the dance is viewed in India as a form of religious discipline. It calls for years of dedicated study and practice. Performances begin with an invocation to the Goddess Sarasvati, the patron of the arts. It should be stressed, however, that these years of strenuous preparation are not viewed as an end of themselves, but as a means to an end: namely, the ability to experience the bliss of a truly unworldly performance, one in which the performer is no longer aware of considerations of technique but is able to forget himself or herself completely in an outpouring of pure feeling.

There is clearly an analogy here between the ecstasy of a superb performance and that other ecstasy of the meditator who has at last attained illumination — a selfless, wordless awareness of direct communication between his individual consciousness and the universal, divine consciousness or Parmatma.

Both of these events are attended by the timeless experience of bliss; but both are beyond the reach of the mass of ordinary mortals. Meanwhile on the wordly level of common, everyday experience, the millions of Indian citizens like their fellow men all over the world, use their leisure time to pursue — and sometimes to capture — humbler forms of momentary joy and delight.

It's still true, thirty years after my first stay in the North Indian village of Sujarupa, that one of their favourite recreations is to summon a communal gathering at which talented singers take turns in playing a native guitar and singing devotional hymns called bhajans, some of which have been handed down by oral tradition by illiterate men and their illiterate ancestors for 400 years. These are extremely joyful occasions and are rendered more so when a pipe charged with marihuana as well as tobacco is passed from hand to hand.

Here, once again, the contrast with Scottish religious practices is very marked. In Scotland, hymn-singing is a serious, not to say, dreary performance. The very idea of actually enjoying the art of praising God, far less of becoming intoxicated and performing an improvised dance while you are still singing and making music would be sternly condemned in my other country of upbringing.

The English writer Marghanita Laski has devoted a
book to describing experiences of ecstasy which have been experienced unexpectedly, in unguarded moments, by people with a wide variety of backgrounds. A common element in these experiences has been previous interest in particular areas — be it poetry, painting, music, dance, disciplined training for physical exertion, or the appreciation of beauty in nature. This seems to have laid the groundwork but the experience of bliss itself comes as a sudden visitation; all that one can say is that somehow the subject was ready for it and was "open" to it at that moment. This readiness and openness seem also to be attributes of the meditator's sudden experience of Satori.

It is, I am sure, unnecessary to emphasize that such moments of heightened feeling are relatively rare. Most experiences of recreational use of leisure are enjoyed at a more mundane level. In village India, one was made aware of the relief of being able to escape from the burdensome tasks which filled their long working days. This escape from routine clearly added to the pleasure of going away from one's village in order to call on a relative in another place where one would be greeted with the courtesies and kindness of Indian hospitality, or going to worship at a distant shrine, or — perhaps best of all — to make a pilgrimage to one of the many holy fairs whose annual celebrations enliven the Hindu calendar. Those are real holidays or "holy days" in the old usage of the word.

I also had the opportunity of witnessing two other kinds of holiday from the normal conventions of Indian village life. One is the annual springtime festival of Holi, which has much in common with the ancient Roman Saturnalia, a time in which rules of behaviour which must be strictly obeyed throughout the rest of the year are temporarily set aside. This applies especially to respect for authority. During Holi, those normally in a position of authority can be teased, made fun of, held to ransom in various ways — and they are not supposed to show anger even though the teasing can become quite rough.

Part of the fun in which everyone joins is to spray each other's person and clothing with brightly coloured waters. This is also an occasion in which the men entertain each other to drinks, spiced cakes, and cigarettes again charged with cannabis, which adds a benevolent intoxication to the enjoyment of the festival. In the large village of Delwara, in which I was living throughout 1951, at the height of these celebrations I was rash enough to walk in the main bazaar. Before I knew quite what was happening, I was drenched with red, green, and yellow sprays, mounted on a donkey facing its tail, and then led in mock triumph through the village. This caused great hilarity, in complete contrast with the formality and politeness which we all observed towards each other during the other 364 days of the year.

This festival has its counterpart in Scottish culture, where it is customary to greet the New Year, just after midnight on December 31st, by visiting friends, neighbours, or even strangers who are expected to exchange greetings for a "Happy New Year" and also to offer their visitors whisky and cake. It was indeed at this time of year that a South American scientist engaged in advanced study in nuclear physics at Edinburgh at the time, was so taken with this custom that he exclaimed to me; "But Morris, why can't Edinburgh be like this every night of the year?"

While living in Sujarupa village, I was twice able to witness a minor form of Saturnalia in which only the women took part. This happened at occasions when nearly all the men of the village (but none of the women) had gone to accompany a young bridegroom to the village of his future wife, where their wedding ceremony was to take place. In the absence of the men, the women were kept extra busy tending the crops and looking after the cattle and goats. But in the evenings, they would gather together and sing songs — often accompanied by a simple form of play-acting — and these songs gave free expression to feelings which couldn't be uttered at any other time: such as resentment of their husband's ill-treatment, and rebellion against the tyranny of their small babies, or rather against the fact that baby care was regarded as their responsibility all the time and no one else's.

These songs were clearly regarded as "naughty" and dangerous to utter even in the absence of their men-folk, and their singing gave rise to a great deal of excitement and hilarity. It was evident that they used this opportunity to indulge in an abreaction, that is, in the expression of strong feelings which were normally suppressed. Here was a form of "play" which also served a valuable purpose in the prevention of mental ill health.

Similar Saturnalia, marked by licensed temporary reversal of customary social restraints, have been reported from many cultures. Their function seems to be like that of a safety-valve, allowing members of these societies to "blow off steam" in relation to particular social relationships in which one group feels oppressed by another and correspondingly resentful. They represent a temporary, but recurrent, acknowledgement by all concerned of the basic equality of all members of the society. This seems to lessen conflict within the society even though inequality continues to be the rule during most days of the year.

In Sujarupa, I was able to observe outbreaks of hostility between small groups of households, clustered in each case around a belligerent head of a house who defied the majority ruling of the village council or panchayat. The first was a dispute over an inheritance of land, the other was when an elderly but very spirited woman who they believed to be a witch was beaten one day in an attempt to compel her to abandon her ways. But she was beaten too hard and she died. Over the next months, the minority factions led, in this second case, by the son of the deceased witch, was brought into line with the panchayat's ruling; the sanction was a simple one, those who rebelled against the panchayat were excluded from its meetings, and this exclusion proved too much for them to tolerate and within weeks or months they came apologizing and begging to be re-admitted into the community — and once they had done so, peace was re-established. In this village, and again in a larger village where I lived in the following year, I came to recognize the great respect which was accorded to peacemakers, the men who intervened between the opponents in a quarrel and who work-
ed to achieve a mutually honourable settlement of their differences. This role appeared even in their dreams, which quite often depicted violent quarrels but always gave prominence to the peacemaker who intervened and helped both parties to calm down and to come to terms with each other.

We have to bear in mind that no society has yet come into being in which inter-personal and inter-group hostility and anger does not sometimes prevail. This is presumably because anger and violence are part of our human make-up. Their existence cannot be denied. To attempt to do so results in their suppression from consciousness, perhaps for years, only to burst out with unrestrained violence in the face of some unfamiliar provocation.

An example of this occurred in the Indian subcontinent just after India and Pakistan achieved their independence in 1947. For a few months, in the newly divided country, there was a collective frenzy of hatred between Muslim and Hindu communities which resulted in the massacre of literally millions of inoffensive men, women, and children. This collective madness abated only slowly, and ended largely due to the heroism, patient example, and saintly influence of Mahatma Gandhi.

Popular tradition has long associated followers both of the Muslim and Hindu religions with feats of military prowess in defence of their faith. Similarly, Scottish history has been punctuated with religious wars between adherents of sub-divisions of the Christian faith. The extraordinary thing is that at the heart of each of these religions -- as indeed at the heart of all the great religions of the world -- is an awareness of the commonality of all mankind and of their shared access to the divine spirit which pervades the universe. How, then, can such contradictions arise?

Here again, we are forced to recognize that when under stress, and especially when afraid of a real or an imaginary threat from another group, human societies tend to regress to primitive modes of behaviour which include episodes of wanton killing and destruction. But today, as never before, mankind has nuclear weapons whose appalling destructiveness was first demonstrated in this very country. Now, the great powers have developed arsenals of atomic, fusion, and neutron bombs hundreds of times larger -- enough to obliterate all mankind, and indeed most living creatures, from the face of the earth. This is the threat to the very continuance of our species which, one hopes, is going to accelerate the development of new, shared world-values before it is too late.

We mustn't forget, however, that human history has not only been punctuated by wars; it has also been leavened by the teachings of men whose outlook embraced not only the needs, the fears, and the aspirations of their own particular groups, but also those of all mankind.

During this 20th century, technological advances have brought mankind nearer than ever before to the realization of the common interests of the whole of the species. High among these common interests are the need to protect the natural resources of the physical environment in which we live; close behind this, comes the need to expand our sense of fellow-feeling so as to embrace, not only our families, our societies, and our separate cultures, but also the common interests of all our fellow men. This is indeed to ask a great deal.

There are many people who would dismiss the realization of a single community of man as a Utopian fantasy, but the ideal is there, and it is a reasonable one. For those of us who believe in its feasibility, the pressing problem of the next few decades is to learn what steps we should take towards its realization.

It seems to me that the first step is to promote wider awareness throughout the world of the increasing interdependence of nations. This is nowhere more evident than in the sphere of exploitation of non-renewable resources. Only a very few years ago, the price of petroleum and the rate at which it was being extracted could be seen as being the concern only of the countries in which reservoirs of oil existed. Today, it is seen as a problem of the exhaustion, not merely of local but of global resources. Similarly, the denudation of forests and the exhaustion of soils and the pollution of oceans are now seen to affect the world community and not only each individual nation.

As the possibility -- and indeed the desirability -- of international collaboration in conservation of resources becomes more widely accepted, the awkward question has already been raised by the countries of the Third World: "Why should we cooperate with each other or with you, the rich countries, when our standards of living are so much lower than yours?" This surely touches upon a key value which will have to be developed within and between nations if conflicts are ever going to be significantly reduced: namely, the application of a sense of fellow-feeling beyond the limits of family, community, nationality, to embrace the whole of mankind.

Is this unthinkable in the two cultures to which I have been referring in the course of this talk -- those of rural Scotland on the one hand and of rural Rajasthan on the other?

Today, thanks to the radio, my friends in Sujarupa village have a much clearer awareness of events in their great country and even in other countries far across the world, than was the case thirty years ago. But even thirty years ago, they used to sing devotional hymns composed by Kabir, a poet of the court of Akbar the Great, and of Mirabai, a 17th century Rajput Saint, both of whom extolled the brotherhood of man and the abolition of barriers of caste, of religion, and of nationality.

The Scots, on the other hand, have travelled widely all over the globe during the last two hundred years, but it was their stay-at-home, national poet, Robert Burns, who welcomed the generous, equalitarian ideals of the French Revolution and in a memorable poem anticipated their being adopted one day by all mankind. His poem ends with these words:

Then let us pray that come it may
As come it will for a' that,
That sense and worth, o'er a' the earth,
May bear the gree and a' that
For a' that, and a' that
It's coming yet for a' that
That man to man the world o'er
Shall brothers be for a' that.

Let us remember that poets and saints have been the heralds of new ideas for mankind in the past. Perhaps Kabir, Mirabai, and Robert Burns have each been playing their part in preparing their respective cultures for the major attitudinal changes which will be necessary to make the new, one-world culture possible.

We know that on the biological plane the human species has been the inheritor of chance genetic mutations which persisted and multiplied because they had survival value. On the psychological and cultural levels things move much more rapidly: we don’t have time enough to wait for chance mutations, but fortunately this isn't necessary because cultural evolution can be accelerated by the application of our intelligence as well as our emotionally grounded value-systems to a continuous monitoring of our collective attitudes and behaviour and to their deliberate modification by acts of choice. Biologists have drawn our attention to the increasing part played by the evolution of ideas in enabling modern man to realize new phenotypes of intelligent performance.

The pressing challenge to mankind in the next few decades will be to develop new species-protective values to supplant the old paranoid attitudes of conflicting subgroups. Such attitudes may have served a useful purpose in an earlier stage of human social evolution but they have become obsolete and indeed actively harmful in the emerging world order in which global human co-operation is going to be essential to enable our species first of all to survive, and then to move on to its next evolutionary level.

REFERENCES

BUDDHIST CONCEPTIONS OF FUTURE SOCIETY

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We, men of the contemporary period, are enjoying prosperity such as never imagined before by men of the past. Entering this century, we experienced repeated warfare and destruction, and yet we still have witnessed a steady advance in the progress of human civilization. When Japan and Germany were defeated over thirty years ago, who could imagine that these nations would enjoy such a high degree of prosperity as today's? Even though people of the developing nations are said to have been experiencing hardships, they have benefited to some extent from modern technology, so that their living standard has obviously been improved far beyond the level of past generations. Nevertheless, we are confronted by some problems which require serious thought since they are characteristic to us today.

With the arrival of global society, mankind has confronted an entirely new situation which has not been experienced before. Up to now, world religions or universal religions have taken the fact for granted that multiple, world nations exist in mutual opposition, and therefore attempted simply to prevail in these countries. The history of Buddhism has been no exception. Should we, however, allow these states to compete in ways in which they exercise oppression and aggression against one another? As long as struggles continue among nations, the motto World Peace will remain as meaningless words. From the practical point of view, how can we terminate such mutual antitheses? And from the Buddhist point of view, what kind of propositions can we present? Is the ideal of a world state simply a dream?

Here, we are obliged to consider initially the problem of the self-contradictory feature of modern civilization. Despite our remarkable success in advancing machine technology as part of modern civilization, we have greatly neglected the spiritual and psychological aspect of humanity. That is, the man of the contemporary world has not essentially changed from his counterpart of the past. Accordingly, there has increased a discrepancy between man's material and economic aspect which depends upon the operation of machine technology and his spiritual and psychological aspect which applies that technology. The discrepancy has become so increasingly great that the resulting predilection of man toward destruction and devastation seems to be immeasurably threatening mankind. In the premodern days, no matter how brutal an aggressor might have been, destructions incurred by his actions were confined to the limited areas along the passage of his campaign. Today, however, once a reckless leader pushes a button for an attack with nuclear weapons, it is bound to result in the annihilation of the human race as a whole.

The threatening situation of the present-day world is comparable to that in which an insane plays with a deadly weapon capable of destroying the whole of mankind. This is evident in the fact that every powerful nation in the world has produced nuclear bombs, while keeping such weapons in turn has become a qualification for being a powerful nation. Hence, there is no difference whatsoever between the present-day world and the past in regard to the fact that the world is dominated by a barbaric force. To this effect, the early Buddhist texts have passages which describe the nature of secular rulers as having an instinctual urge for wars. They desire not only to conquer inlands and annex territories by barbaric force as far as their coast, but also, unsatisfied, they strive for territories beyond the ocean. Doesn't this characteristic, namely, "unsatisfied with the land within, desires for it abroad," precisely depict the picture of the bosses of the present-day powerful nations? I call them "bosses" because I wonder how their diplomatic transactions carried out through blackmail and threat could be much different from things the syndicate leaders have undertaken. Buddhist texts assert that there is no essential difference between rulers and thieves. I am afraid the implication directly applies to the present-day world.

Buddhist texts further characterize the rulers as "murderers," because their evil actions culminate in warfare in which a murderer captures another murderer, a victor captures another victor. This also describes the present-day picture, especially in the case of the military court trials convened after World War II. For, the murderers or those aggressors who once started war were captured and executed by the victors. Some years ago, the Japanese Minister of Education publicly criticized the event in the Diet, creating much repercussion. Despite the formality of the court trial, we cannot be completely freed from an impression that it resembled a head-hunting festivity of primitives. For, while men of the defeated were executed, those who dropped atomic bombs have remained unpunished.

Now, let me specify why the present-day situation is far worse than that of ancient times. Even after the disintegration of ancient civilizations, they found successors among those less civilized peoples who subsequently developed their heritage. Roman civilization, for instance,
was revived through the Germanic tribes to become a part of Western civilization. Similar cases are also found in the Orient. What could be worse today is that if our contemporary civilization were destroyed, there would be no successor who might revive it, because all of us, whether advanced or not, would be destroyed all together. The entire world would become the island of Bikini.

The second point, in the problem peculiar to modern civilization, is that the progress of this civilization has increasingly revealed its inherently self-destructive nature. I am not yet fully prepared for defining this self-contradictory aspect of civilization. In Japan, this destructive feature is called Kōgai — public hazard — which does not mean, however, “hazards publicly recognized.” On the contrary it refers to those damages resulting from people’s inarticulated actions to fulfill their hidden desires. In English, it can be called “environmental pollution,” but the term does not simply mean the pollution of man’s environment. For, it implies the pollution of man himself, with which I am concerned.

From ancient times, Buddhist philosophy has inculcated the concept of collective karma. The problem of human pollution is precisely the collective nemesis or retribution resulting from collective action. Today we are often gripped by fear of how multiple people are suffering, with no fault of their own, from sickness incurred by inappropriate uses of chemicals and the resulting contamination of rivers and oceans. We have no peace of mind with the possibility of such occurrences.

The progress of machine civilization has also affected moral standards because it has enabled man to indulge in an easy life. In South Asian Buddhist countries, for instance, alcohol has been prohibited as one of the five precepts, but this injunction has gradually been relaxed. In New England, in America, women’s drinking was once regarded as a sin beneath feminine dignity. Today, however, drinking has become universalized throughout the developed countries. A similar change has been recognized with the habit of smoking. Sexual ethics have also been greatly liberalized in the developed societies. Even within a short span of life such as mine, the change has been so radical that I am inclined to doubt the reality of my own memory. In the older days, we had an expression: “to ruin one’s life with dissipation,” whereas today people in the developed countries seem to be proceeding en mass toward such directions.

I am afraid that if we let things go as they have been, mankind is bound to perish; there will remain nothing but ruins like those of ancient civilizations. I am no longer sure whether the human race is entitled to claim the right of its continuous existence. Yet, as we were born and will die as humans, we must be concerned with the aforementioned human problems as our own. This concern is especially important because man is endowed not only with the capacity to make choice and decision over his action but also with the capacity of a far wider range than those of other higher animals.

Our confronting problems are very complex with which even political and economic experts are troubled. Hence we are inclined to think that they are beyond our capacity. I think, however, the practical principle to apply for their solution is very simple. It is the principle “not to injure other people” and has been known from ancient Buddhism to the contemporary philosophy of Gandhi in terms of ahimsā. The term has been translated as “non-injury” or “non-violence,” and in Chinese Buddhist texts it is rendered as “non-killing.” In Buddhist texts this principle is frequently explained in the following terms: since life is most dear to any and every living being, to injure life is the worst crime. Nevertheless, in this advanced modern era, this simplest principle has been utterly trampled into oblivion.

Human survival through competition for resources is liable to hurt other people as well as other living beings. The impulse that prompts man in his subconscious level is primarily the principle of selfishness and egoism. Because of this, we must be all the more cautious not to injure other living beings, and in accordance with the doctrine of Non-Self, make ourselves free from the attachment of self. Expressed from another angle, I think this is the equivalent to the principle that one must see other people’s position as his own. It is sympathy as well as empathy, and basically love, which, when made most genuine, is called compassion. If man is able to exercise this principle, he is able to solve problems spontaneously no matter how innumerable and difficult.

This possibility is evident in the fact that within one and the same country, the above principle has always been and is being invoked toward collective problem solution. Since we are concerned about how to work out our discussion and cooperation, I would like to make the focal point of our problems parallel to that of the international ones.

First, let us consider the problem of the antithesis between countries or between groups, because it is invariably a configuration of collective egoisms pertaining to different groups. Such an antithesis is configured into concrete forms in which the principle of human equality has been violated. While human life equally needs land and resources, the powerful countries monopolize vast territories, seize enormous resources for themselves, and prevent peoples of other countries from sharing them. Such monopolism has been so intensified that nations are claiming even the open sea. If it is within a nation or within a self-governing society, whoever is in possession of a vast fortune or enormous asset is required to be responsible for a greater burden in the form of tax payment. Thus, land owners of great magnitude are gradually disappearing today even in those powerful nations. Internationally, however, no comparable task has yet been carried out toward resource and land redistribution, nor is there even a move toward the goal of rectifying such inequity.

Although the United Nations was organized for the ideal of international cooperation, its existence solely depends upon the balance of powers. One of the problems of this organization is that whether highly or sparsely populated, each country is entitled fundamentally to hold a single vote. Accordingly, the weight of an individu is
different from one country to another. That is to say, the structure of the United Nations itself violates the principle of human equality. Unless every individual on earth is entitled with equal weight, it cannot be said to be an equitable or just organization. We are obliged to suggest that such injustice must be rectified in the light of the Buddhist principle of equality.

That nations in the world are busily engaged in military build-up and make themselves ready for war presents to us another formidable problem. Encountering similar states of affairs, the early Buddhists tried to influence the rulers to renounce their desire for expanding territorial domination by force. To this effect, parables were given in the Jātakas in praise of the image of a thoroughly virtuous king. This king is said to have set captured thieves free, providing them with some goods; when a foreign ruler invaded into his country, he refrained from fighting, opened the gate of his castle for allowing the enemy to enter and never resisted them. So the king was captured and buried in the forest. Wolves, however, could not devour his body because of his spiritual power. His binding rope fell apart by itself. The aggressor in his land also eventually repented and apologized for what was done to him. The underlying logic of this story was in fact identical with that of the contemporary pacifists in regard to their method of problem solution. In Buddhist literature such as Jātakas, the principle of non-resistance was focused as the praise-worthy virtue of the rulers.

Simple non-resistance, however, implies a fault since it leads to abandoning other members of the society and leaving their fate to the hands of brutal aggressors. Hence, it is required to take some positive stance. In fact, the early Buddhist Sanghas exerted influence over the secular authorities in two ways so as to reduce the occasions of warfare. In the first place, Buddhist leaders tried to persuade the rulers to abandon aggression by pointing out the excellent solidarity and perfect military strength of the enemy country and hence the hardship of its conquest. According to Buddhist legends, for instance, when Ajātaśatru, the king of Magadhā, sent his minister Vassakāra to consult with the Sākyamuni in regard to his plan to conquer the neighboring republic of the Vaijī, he is said to have persuaded the Magadhan king not to start war by pointing out the superior aspects of the republic. In the second place, the Buddhist leaders tried to edify the rulers to understand that whatever they gained by aggression was evanescent. Bhikkhu Ratthapāla, for instance, is said to have influenced the ruler of Kuru to refrain from the campaign of conquest by having him understand that whoever was desirous of the war of conquest was the slave of delusive attachment. Isn’t it important today to persuade the powerful to understand the wasteful nature of warfare irrespective of victory?

The method of spiritual edification, such as idealized by Indian Buddhists has a natural limitation just as Gautama Buddha himself experienced it. When the king of Kosala, Vidūdabhā, was approaching Kapilavastu, the capital of the Sākyas, the Sākyamuni is said to have waited for his passing under a withered tree. To the king’s question as to why the Buddha chose a withered one amidst all the other well grown trees, he is said to have replied that even though withered and dying, the shade of his relatives would be superior to any of other peoples. Although his edifying stance successfully restrained the king twice from his intended campaign, the Buddha is said to have predicted that even his influence could no longer rescue the Sākyas from their fateful past karma, and therefore refused to take other measures to protect the Sākyan stronghold such as suggested by his disciple Maudgalyāyana. Thus, the Sākyan clasmens were altogether destroyed by Vidūdabhā.

I assume that there was some cruel reality of history hidden behind this legend, because at the time of the Buddha, city states were gradually annexed under the powerful imperial forces toward the formation of territorial states. The tragic fate of the Sākyas was simply a moment within the stream of history, whose direction even the early Buddhist movement could not change. To maintain peace over a vast area requires the powerful authority and organization. It was Aśoka of the Maurya who actualized this goal. Although pacifist theories appeared as an ideal in all of ancient civilizations contemporaneous to the Buddha, they were invariably suppressed. We must directly face this cruel fact. Nevertheless, the fact of their appearance has an enduring significance.

Let us now turn to the ideal of cosmopolitanism, the apex of humanism derived from the equality of man, the contingent nature of secular state, and the universal love of man for his humanity transcendent of all state boundaries. There was a common characteristic between the members of the cosmopolis and those mendicant ascetics of the time when Buddhism arose, inasmuch as both maintained a thoroughly individualist consciousness and the sense of perfect self-reliance. In this individualist life style there developed a self-awareness of being a universal world citizen (cosmopolite) unbound by city, state, or nation.

In South Asia, the ideal of cosmopolitanism is expressed in the Buddhist Bhikkhu, namely, man of four directions (cātuddisa). Subsisting upon food obtained through mendicancy at each household, relying upon medicine extracted from cow’s urine, having the shade of trees for sleep and meditation, making robes out of bits of discarded cloth, and satisfied with such simple possessions, such was indeed the man of four directions. It is worth noting that among all other religions of ancient India, Buddhism alone had an expression of the ideal of cosmopolitanism. There are several reasons to which we can attribute this possibility. Buddhism especially emphasized the aspect of economic distribution and advocated the development of traffic routes. Buddhist mendicants were not confined to provincial regions, remained free from any state-belonging, and thereby kept the ideal of cosmopolitanism alive in their daily life. This cosmopolitan ideal was transmitted to Chinese and Japanese Buddhism. The name of the Tō-sshō-dai-ji of Kyoto, for instance, contains a transliteration of cātuddisa as shō-dai, so that the whole name meant “the Temple for the Men of Four directions as introduced from T’ang China.” Just as the
concept of cosmopolitanism was of a non-political but philosophical nature, the Buddhist ideal of "the man of four directions" was of a non-political but religious nature.

German scholars translated this term as Welt-bürger. This translation is important because the term corresponds to that of the Kantian ideal "World Citizen," which he emphasized to be the norm of man for realization of Eternal Peace. In his writing For Everlasting Peace (Zum Ewigen Frieden), Kant sought for ways to achieve world peace, and concluded that in such a utopia where man is to realize an everlasting peace, each one should be transformed into a world citizen (Welt-bürger). Despite the difference of non-political nature, the similar ideal was promulgated by the followers of early Buddhism.

In the above text, Kant admits that because there is no super-authority or system over individual states, there is no end in international conflicts and constant warfare, and hence no possibility for men to realize the goal of human self-perfection. He proposed therefore the idea of a confederate structure which could be organized upon agreement of various nations and to which they forsake a part of their national sovereignty. It was on the basis of such necessity that the League of Nations and the United Nations were brought into existence respectively after World War I and II. Those founding fathers of these organizations may have pursued logically a similar course of thinking.

Since, however, the present-day United Nations is by no means perfect and implies many irrational elements, human effort will be more and more required toward the fulfillment of the aforementioned ideal. In fact, many of the contemporary intellectuals aspire for the establishment of a world federation, in parallel to which, I believe, early Buddhist texts depicted the image of a universal ruler (Cakravartin). Nearly half a century before President Wilson introduced the idea of the League of Nations, Dayananda, an Indian social reformer, pursued the goal of establishing a world federation (Cakravarti-Rāja). In Buddhist texts, Cakravartin means the universal ruler who turns the Wheel of Dharma. Dayananda applied the ideal of this universal state to his concept of a world federation. According to his claim, in this world state, every nation must have its full independence, but shares a certain control system so that no nation could dominate another nation, nor could any nation violate the rights of another.

The sole problem is that no matter how supreme the ideal of a world federation might be, an actual institution would have to exercise the power of authority. In contrast, it was Tagore who advocated a clear-cut, supra-nationalist ideal. He claimed that his feeling of antagonism was not against some particular state but against the general idea of any and every nation-state.

Buddhism repudiates in principle the idea of governing by force. In actuality, however, there is no society or may never be a society in which the rule of power is completely absent. Nevertheless the Buddhists set forth the goal of a utopia as a world where the rule of power is significantly absent, namely, the establishment of a world community.

I am certain that the goal of a world community is not a dream, because the history of mankind has evidenced a steady progress toward it. In the feudal days, even the territory of one nation was divided into multiple states under the rule of feudal barons. But with the modern nationalist movement, those feudal states were eventually unified into a nation-state. In Japan, for instance, the Meiji Restoration ended their existence while similar instances are also found in other nations. When a vast territory was involved, it usually had taken the form of a federation. But the authority of the central government gradually superseded those of provincial states as a necessary tendency. Moreover, we have witnessed today a form of community that consists of several nations, such as the European Economic Community.

The unification of vast areas into a singular unit has been for the greater part helped by the development of modern machine civilization. From the period when people traveled on horseback to another period when they traveled by trains and steamers, political unit was necessarily engrossed through the process of unifying minor political units. In the contemporary period when airplanes and other systems of transportation are well developed and when communication systems are capable of instantly connecting any and every place on earth, everything has to be treated internationally. Accordingly the existing states have been necessitated to transfer parts of their authorities increasingly to a larger system of governing. Because of this, international systems have multiplied, and this trend will lead to the establishment of a world federation and eventually to that of a world government.

I think, however, this external arrangement alone is not sufficient, because the constituent members of such a unified state must have established satisfactory communication, possibly, in terms of certain goals, such as, those essential to the nature of a community. Some might say that a global state and a community are contradictory concepts, but as an ideal, why should they differ? For, even though we in actuality distinguish the concept of association (Gesellschaft) and that of community (Gemeinschaft), if there exists a full communication among constituent members such distinction will soon disappear. The Buddhist concept of Sangha, for instance, had no such distinction, for it could function not only like a guild oriented for economic interest, but also as a religious organization geared for the goal of salvation. We have a term in Japanese, "nakama," but it has several nuances capable of having both meanings. It should be our ultimate goal that all groups in the world can live within the life system characteristic of a world community. In the light of this understanding, our ideal of international activity must be identical with making the term "international" itself obsolescent.

Let us now consider how to realize such a world community. I propose that it is absolutely necessary for us to let every nation agree to a thorough reduction of armament. Whatever weapon which might lead to the destruction of mankind must be prohibited. I feel a great indignation with the fact that it has been the Asiatic people alone who suffered from the horrible experience of the use of
nuclear weapons, napalm bombs, chemical weapons, etc. If armament is not reduced, mankind is bound to meet its destruction, while those who are living now will die a horrible death. Since civilization has become global, destruction will be necessarily global.

If a world community is established, disarmament necessarily should follow and human life would become far easier and richer. Disarmament itself would solve the prime problem of the developing nations, such as starvation, at one stroke. In this world community no one has to injure others and each man enjoys equal opportunity to fulfill his humanity.

In order to realize a world community, moreover, we are also required to promote mutual understanding among racially different peoples by way of their frequent interaction toward the sense of their mutual love, i.e., to promote exchange visits of individuals and their friendship across the wall of national differences and to create an awareness of their fellowship and brotherhood. For, only when people acutely sense their solidarity will a world community come into existence, and Buddhism is especially concerned with the growth of this consciousness. In principle, this world community must be realized by way of conversion of human egoism, i.e., by converting and sublimating collective egoism toward a qualitatively higher goal. In this very process, the traditional doctrine of Non-Self will be spontaneously realized.

What is crucial to this process is man's individual voluntarism to seek for his perfection without any external compulsion. Modern thinkers have discovered the great power of societal influence upon individuals. By changing society, they hoped to create a utopian world and began to reform social institutions. Nevertheless, they were bound to realize that the idea of ideal social institutions would simply be an illusion, because no matter how superior social institutions are, their positive influence has not in actuality been matched with the degree of expectation. The contemporary man no longer feels despair with bourgeois society, nor has he been attracted to communism. Even democracy appears to have been changing into a mobocracy as it was once so criticized by ancient Greeks.

People will obviously continue to discuss how to improve social institutions, while institutions themselves, no matter how superior, are distorted by inadequate administrators affected by biases and selfish motives. Adequate administering of institutions depends upon the quality of men who apply them. Here is the reason that Buddhism has to be taken seriously for its efficacy toward human reorientation, such as to honest self-reflection and human perfection.

Let us admit that man's fulfillment of his capacity must be pursued in accordance with his given circumstances, such as his country and cultural tradition. And yet, in our future utopian world, his fulfillment must be conducted toward greater toleration with the meanings of different cultural traditions and maximization of the universal nature of mankind as a whole.

In recent years, the study in comparative philosophy has been in vogue not only in Europe and America but also in Japan. This trend, I believe, is precisely in accordance with the nature of mankind. Moreover, since every and any cooperative activity has been globally undertaken as a result of scientific and technological advance, the idea of a world federation or government as an interim organ prior to a world community is no longer considered to be a simple dream. Everything seems to be geared toward it, because many interrelated networks are proceeding en masse toward the fulfillment of the nature of mankind.

Since the task of realizing the nature of mankind is in accordance with the proper evaluation of cultural particularity, we must eliminate cultural imperialism as much as rule by the force of arms. For, in the actual world, these two features are inseparably combined. Indeed, thorough respect should be paid to the cultures transmitted in every and each race, country, and culture area, and to prevent occasions in which one culture terminates another.

Take an example from the main theme of this 12th Buddhist Conference, namely, "the Buddha's Message for the 21st Century." The expression "the 21st Century" must be derived from the Japanese term "Western Era" which culturally creates little resistance. In French, "avant notre ère" refers to the pre-Christian era and in English the post-Christian period is marked by "A.D." usually pronounced by their corresponding alphabetical sounds. In both cases, the underlying meaning may not be clearly grasped. But when the Latin terms anno domini, of which "A.D." stands as their initials, are known as meaning "according to the year of God," the Christian expression is bound to leave some problem psychologically. In German, it is clearly expressed as "before Christ" (v. Chr. or vor Christus) or "after Christ" (n. Chr. or nach Christus). If this is imposed to the adherents of other religions, repulsion is surely bound to arise.

In Japan, a louder voice has been heard in recent years, promoting the idea of instituting the year of national origin in objection to the proposed official use of the Western Era. A similar objection can be expected wherever there are strong religious traditions other than that of Christianity. There has been a deep rooted repulsion in every nation against any alien religious culture becoming predominant. Since, however, it is awfully inconvenient not to have any unified chronological era on earth, we must seek to establish a universal standard such as pertinent to all mankind and free of individual traditions.

Language difference presents a far more difficult problem, because riots or armed uprisings are often incurred when a language is unwittingly enforced upon linguistically different groups. Nevertheless if all the people on earth are supposed to organize a world community, they are going to need a common language. At this moment, English is most often used as a world language, while French, Russian, Chinese, Arabic, etc. are recognized as international ones. It is, however, almost impossible for a single person to master all these languages.

Some might say that a single vehicle, such as English, will serve this purpose, I am afraid it is too difficult a language when considered for the entire population on earth. Japanese, for instance, study this language for ten, twenty, or even fifty years, and yet, as I personally feel,
it has not become my own. I suppose many other people must have experienced the same feeling. So I think that making English a world language may be convenient to a part of the global population but disadvantageous to a larger segment of the population. Hence it is an unfair policy contrary to the principle of human equality.

Is it then possible to create an entirely new language? As far as the formal aspect of a judgmental statement is concerned, it has become possible. Ever since Leibniz discovered symbolic logic nearly three centuries ago, we have made it possible today to express judgments through symbolic notation free from particular forms of language. But we have not yet accomplished ways to express concepts and ideas in similar terms. Is it then beyond hope? As far as I am concerned, it is logically possible. For instance, we can think of two simple concepts such as Existence and Non-Existence. The Buddhist school, such as the Pan-realist (Sarvastivada), analyzed the concept of Existence and Non-Existence. The Buddhist school, such as the Pan-realist (Sarvastivada), analyzed the concept of Existence into varieties of categories through increasing limitations onto the concept; whereas, through the same procedure, the Hindu schoolmen of Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika did the same with the concept of Non-Existence. If we can combine with these two a Western logical category such as expressed in the Tree of Porphyry, we may be able to systematically construct many concepts and ideas endlessly and transfer their meanings into symbolic notations, so as to express them in terms of numerical values. While this is a future task of logicians, Buddhist logicians also are obliged to assume this task. The problem, however, is that the task requires a complex system of numerical value notations, and hence cannot be realized without the help of computers. That is, such a system does not serve our daily modes of expression. Indeed, it is the supreme task of the future scholars to search for some form of language which can serve not only our daily expressions but also all the existing ways of thinking. It is true that an attempt has been made through Esperanto. Since, however, it was developed from European languages, it still requires examination as to whether it can serve as a world language.

Moreover, when it is concerned with the problem of religion, the root of man’s spiritual life, its solution is even more difficult. In our actual world, we cannot deny the fact of pluralism consisting of many religions. There are also people who repudiate religion, some of whose obstinate passion is comparable to that of religious fanatics. In the past history, religious antagonism became the cause of warfare on no meager number of occasions, and even today it is observed to have caused similar trends. Unless this problem is adequately dealt with, there will be no possibility of attaining world peace. Here I would like to call attention to the tolerant nature of Buddhism which can guide mankind in dealing with this problem. If every group of people in the world could practice the spirit of Buddhist tolerance, there would be no more war that would otherwise be caused by religious difference or anti-religious sentiment. This can be a major reason that many thinkers in the contemporary West have been attracted to and sympathetic toward Buddhist thought. It is indeed our joy to witness that cooperative steps have been taken by various religions upon similar trends of thought.

Let us consider for the last topic the problems which are uniquely incurred by modern civilization. Because of the advance of modern science and technology, human life today has reached an entirely different phase from those of the past. As evident in the problems of environmental conservation, pollution hazards, etc., man is losing harmony with his external world and approaching the time of self-destruction. Human existence has been threatened by his own makings. From the Buddhist point of view, what kinds of propositions can we present?

In the Sanskrit Pure Land text (Larger Sukhāvatīvyūha), there is a passage which refers to an injunction not to enter a prison house no matter how beautifully adorned with precious stones. Contemporary urbanites are residing in the desert of concrete structures. Since the phenomenon of urbanization will continue from now on, life circumstances in concrete deserts are also on the increase. And man suddenly finds himself to be solitary and lonely. This creates the problem of alienation. The term in question has never been used in South Asia even since ancient times. In the West too, the Latin term alienare was almost never used for expressing philosophical human problems. It has been only very recently that the term became in vogue. This phenomenon may be attributed to the fact that man has begun to be gripped by the sense of solitude under the pressure of modern civilization. Amidst the phenomenal advance of communication systems, it is ironic that man increasingly feels his isolation and loneliness.

I am convinced that what rescues man from his sense of alienation is the gentle countenance of compassion condensed in the image of the Buddhist statues. For, only when people interact with people with harmony, affection, or Buddhist compassion, will human warmthness begin to prevail even within the desert of concrete and steel. Placing ourselves in this moment in time, we know we cannot reverse the course of modern industrialization. Since our civilization has induced varieties of misfortunes, we are obliged to discover ways of solution through modern scientific civilization and render services for the welfare of those who suffer from various calamities. I believe the practical goal of Buddhism is found in the act of service for those who suffer.

Natural science and religion have their respective domains. Research in natural science must be conducted on the basis of its methodology. It is not the kind of problem that Buddhism can interfere with. The practical application of scientific results, however, must be guided by the Buddhist spirit. According to Buddhist texts, man is said to be intrinsically arrogant. Arrogance is by no means attributed to great or powerful persons alone. The youth has arrogance in the sense that he is young; the elder man has arrogance in the sense that he is still in good health; even those elders who are not healthy have arrogance in the sense that they are still alive. Because of these forms of arrogance, men behave with haughtiness, or invite disaster by acting contrary to nature. Those who apply the results of natural science are obliged to be hum-
ble and act with gentle kindness toward others through the faculty of empathy.

If man humbly applies the results of scientific civilization, he can make the best of them for the sake of benefit and ease of every and any living being. The number of suffering people from sickness can be increasingly reduced; the lives of people can be increasingly made enjoyable through wholesome expenditure of resources. Up to now, man has survived by slaughtering animals for food and other purposes. But since artificial leather has been produced successfully, it is no longer necessary to kill animals for leather. If food protein can be successfully synthesized, man will no longer need to slaughter animals for food.

Mahāyāna texts predicted: when Maitreya Buddha will descend to earth at some future time, every street is said to be as wide as two miles (12 里) and as purely cleansed as that of the heavenly world, and there will be gardens, groves, ponds, springs, rivers, lakes in every city as well as each village. The residential areas are said to be filled with the water of eight marvellous qualities. The water is described as sweet, cool, soft, light, clean, odorless, smooth to the throat, and wholesome so not to induce illness. Imagine that we have such water supply today in modern city planning, and such splendid construction of cities even within the real desert.

If nuclear energy, which is intended for destruction, is used for peaceful purposes, the life of mankind might be radically improved. To this effect, it must be requested that nuclear scientists should refuse to engage themselves in research for destructive purposes.

The progress of machine civilization has especially affected the spiritual aspect of man. Although the advance of science, especially in medicine, has made it possible to treat innumerable diseases, psychological illness has been singularly an exception. The number of psychiatric patients is even increasing, so that the number of psychiatric hospitals has never been enough. In those developed countries where social welfare has been well maintained, the case of elderly suicide is ever on the increase.

Juvenile crimes also have increased. Especially, with no clear reason, homicide cases are on a constant rise. It seems that man is losing his harmony and balance within himself and proceeding toward self-destruction. We are sometimes gripped by the fear that man has become insane. Is he entitled to continued existence?

Natural science cannot, unfortunately, provide any solution to these problems. Sociologists and scholars of religious studies who excel in obtaining statistics and collecting questionnaires may provide reference materials toward solutions, but they are unable to give answers themselves. The same can be said about the scholars of Buddhist studies who indulge themselves in textual critique. It would be only those who directly confront human affairs, namely, men of path-seeking, who are able to give solutions to the aforementioned problems. In this way alone, Buddhism can evolve its true potent significance. And irrespective of whether they are scientists, sociologists, scholars of religious studies or Buddhist studies, or, for that matter, even ordinary individuals who can reach that level of consciousness, they all should be able to participate in the task of realizing the great goal as that of a path-seeker.

There is no doubt that from now on, all the nations on earth will interact and influence one another more intensely. Precisely because of this state of affairs, mankind is now confronted with the crisis as to whether it will survive or perish. The teachings of Buddhism which have been transmitted throughout various countries should reveal the path which mankind is obliged to follow. We Buddhists are obliged to reflect upon ourselves from our point of view on this task and put it into practice so that we shall be able to expect a brighter future.
WOMAN'S ROLE TOWARD THE 21ST CENTURY

Betty Friedan
Clinical Psychologist
Founder and First President of
National Organization of Women

The very significance of this Conference on Human Values and Work and Leisure says already what the enormity of the change is. For the first time really in human history, woman moves toward the 21st century as a person, defining herself not just in a sexual relation to man, not just a child bearer, but defining her existence by her own actions in society.

I speak now of women's roles in terms of the advanced technological societies. In the developing countries, women have those problems but other problems, too, that must be accomplished first.

There is a matter of actual necessity that has forced woman to assume her own position in society and the simple matter of that is the 80 years that is women's life span on earth now in Japan and in the United States and in the other advanced nations of the world. In a life span approaching 80 years, there is no way that motherhood, which has defined women's identity in the past, takes up and occupies most of her life in addition to the physical chores of the service of the home. And if she exercises the choice to have children, it is a choice now technologically (in the advanced nations) weighted with new moral considerations of the quality of life, not just the quantity and of what it takes to rear a child, and of the cost and the increasing crowdedness of the planet.

I do believe that most women as we move toward the 21st century will exercise the choice, because I think it is profoundly rooted in the identity of women and it is more than what I call a feminine mystique — it is the perpetuation of the human species. Even if she exercises that choice it is something that is only going to define the first part of her life and there will be half or two-thirds of her life after the activities that have to do with the carrying of children that cannot possibly give her identity to support the functions and the status of society. Therefore, it becomes necessary for her to assume her own personhood.

Further, there is the evolution of work also. The advanced work of this society no longer requires the brute muscular strength where women could never possibly be equal to men. Although she certainly did do a lot of routine, tedious, and even heavy work in a simpler society, the advanced work of society in which woman is barred increasingly requires not muscular skills and strength but qualities of human intelligence which women share potentially equal to men. So there may be no differences.

Qualities of human sensitivity where women, by their socialization and by their life experience excel, if not necessarily by their biology, make equality necessary, or possible. Woman must move now to assume her personhood. As she has done this, as she has begun to do this in the United States and in other advanced technological nations, also in Japan, there has been a lot of smoke and confusion. I want to distinguish a little bit between the necessary aspects of this movement and some of the phenomena of transition or reaction.

When women awoke in their consciousness and said, "I am a person," and "My fulfillment is human fulfillment," then, in the United States at least, she moved to assume her human and American birthright which is equality of right, equality of opportunity, and that is also happening in this nation and in other nations. The energy, the focus, in that first stage of the women's movement was breaking through the barrier that kept her from employment in society because the rewarded work was done increasingly outside the home for money and the work that women had been doing privately inside the home was not valued. More and more even the things that women had done in the home were being done outside in the city of profession, so she had to move there, too. The children were being taught there, the ill were being cared for there, the clothing, even much of the food preparation was done outside. She had to break through the barrier that kept her from moving toward equality, and she had to break through that image that I call the feminine mystique.

And the whole first emphasis on the personhood of women starts as an independent being in society using those abilities, those capacities which have previously been the prerogative of the male. Much anger was expressed in the first part of this movement. Women had a right to feel anger, if they were denigrated, as women were. Now that anger was out in the open. It was clear that man had the power, that man had the value, that man had the decision making and, in comparison, the home was run for the benefit of the man. And there this anger comes to the fore, as when, in my country, where we had come out of the movement against racial oppression, the black civil rights movement with an ideology of class warfare had been applied to the problem of race. If there was any ideology at all, it was simply the ideology of democracy, of the individual, of equal opportunities implied to women but never had these values, that are the values of every revolution, being applied not to a
minority but to a 52% majority. That is the style of the women's movement and no child can escape since children are born of women and men come home to women at night. If the ideology of the conventional sexual politics had remained, this movement would have not changed lives of women in the world because that kind of formulation did not have the profound, human, biological, psychological, social, economic, sexual relation, or interdependence of the dynamic bond between women and men. If women had been defined completely, as wife, as mother, she reacted absolutely in the extreme against it. The daughter of the trapped housewife says, "I will not marry, I will not have children." That kind of formulation did not have the profound, some way to move into society as an equal person herself.

Now in the second stage, as I, at least in my country, am formulating this movement, it becomes not any longer just a small avant-garde radical movement but is really now changing the mainstream of society. I see we are heading now to the second stage in this movement toward the 21st century where it is not so much a denial of the family, but embraces the family in new terms. We cannot see the second stage of what began with the women's movement and we cannot see even what I am going to say about women's role in terms of women alone. Because the profound changes are taking place. Woman's change was only the first stage of a massive sex war revolution. The second stage is not a woman against man, but a woman and a man breaking through the stereotypes, the masculine mystique and the feminine mystique that have locked us both to some degree in mutual torment in the family.

I hear a lot of whistling in the dark from some of my Japanese male colleagues who think that "we can continue to have life revolve around us and we will go and stop in the bar in Ginza on the way home and we will get home five hours late after having drunk and the wife will continue to be happy just taking care of the husband and the children at home, and she will forgive us because the mother always forgives the son and we will continue to be the grown-up son of the mother." No, I think that Japanese men are practicing massive denial. Underneath there is a lot of nervousness and they should be nervous because the Japanese women that I have seen and the statistics that everybody figures that I have read and the statistics that everybody would like to deny would indicate that there is a massive movement of change about to explode. There will not be a return to the traditional role of family.

A lot of violence erupting in the family in the transition of all this witnesses the last gasp of old pathology as created by the old conflicts and the old polarization. The sons must somehow be suffocating with all this care of his mother in some way. He needs to be a man to somehow break loose of it. I think that the new family based on equality will be a very strong family, a very humanizing force as we move toward the 21st century.

A study done in the United States shows that in the United States now 58% of mothers of school age children work outside the home, and 43% of mothers of pre-school children work. Most parents work inside the home and outside the home in America. There are increasing divorces, 40%, and the single parent is usually a woman. So in the United States young women who have children do not feel guilty if they are working, because they must work. What worries me is the conflict to keep some young women in America from having children. We fought for the right to choose and that in one way meant medical and legal access to birth control and abortion. We still have to fight for the right in the U.S. because in a reactionary moment in my country they are trying to take that right away, and have already taken it by court and by Congress away from the poor women. But the right to choose doesn't mean just the right to have an abortion, the right to choose means the right to choose joyously and responsibly to bring a child into the world.

A false image of the family is waved in my country to keep from meeting the real needs of the new family today, the needs for child care centers, the needs for programs of child care and parental leave when the children are sick and so on and so forth and for restructuring of jobs. Because of the mobility of modern society, the grandparents, the other relatives, the neighbors that might help are not any longer living in the same community the way they used to be. However, this particular study says that these women who were working with one or two children under five were very harrassed, very burdened, because there wasn't a good child care system. Lack of child care and the influx of working hours made terrible problems. The husband did share the parenting much more than in the traditional family. And the bonds of the family between mother, father, and children and between mother, father, children, and the grandparents and other relatives were much stronger because there was real need, more interdependence than there was in the conventional family. There was that image of the classical family of Western nostalgia in my country. And the banner was waved to prevent action on the real innovation, the real social changes needed to meet the real needs of families today.

Now the family was stronger when they shared the parenting and when they shared the earning. And what we see now, as we move into the second stage, is that for the equality to be livable and workable it must be possible for women to meet their own needs. We must meet a new set of issues: the restructuring of work and the restructuring of home and this cannot and will not be done in terms of women alone. Women were trying to be superwomen. She was trying to do a job in industry, meeting standards of success set in terms of men who had wives to take care of the details of life, and whose whole identity was based on being a success in that rat race. Not many women can easily be a superwoman. It is not any gain for women to exchange the old frustrations as housewives for men's heart attacks. I think that we are going to see changes happening with men and women that will transcend that old polarization of sex roles.

Some very interesting change is happening in men in my country. The movie "Kramer versus Kramer" which my workshop for the good life for women and the good
life for men tried to talk about was very interesting. It was a very popular movie in the U.S. at least because it showed a man having new strengths as he discovered feelings in himself from taking active daily responsibilities for the nurturing of the child. It was true that in that movie the woman had to leave for him to do this, but symbolically the woman only has to leave that definition of the role, she doesn’t literally have to leave the house, but in some cases she will. I hear that divorce rate has been increasing in Japan because women want out.

A study of mental health done in the U.S. about 15 years ago showed that in every decade after the 20’s, the mental health of women has been deteriorating since marriage has come to place too much burden on women, while the health of men has been showing some improvement. A few years ago these studies were repeated and they showed that the mental health of women in their 40’s and 50’s had been bettered. So, we can note that the deterioration observed in the previous studies did not correlate with their age. And the young women today in their 20’s and 30’s were showing increased signs of stress. The demographers and the epidemiologists have studied and concluded the fact that there has been this massive change in the mental health of women on a large scale in America and it has something to do with the women’s movement. The movement toward equality was infinitely better for the health of women than the old absolute dependence. Now this study also showed the women in their 20’s and 30’s were showing more stress and this could also be explained in terms of what has happened. Life is no longer over for the woman at 40. She moves to new zest, to new dimensions of growth, or she goes back to school as she begins to look for fulfillment in her own life and development of her own potential in society. The young woman, in her 20’s and 30’s has to face a much more complex situation than women did 20 or 30 years ago. The children become problems since this change lies with man. This half of the movement is also important for the survival of the species; they are important even for leadership in the military academies today. These qualities are also increasingly important for human satisfaction, human life, and human happiness. If you said as we move toward the 21st century, “If you deliver women to the bowls of a corporate capitalist world, then, the whole society is going to be just slaves of capitalists to advance capitalism. Under such circumstances, who is going to arrange the flowers? Who is going to look for the tender human sensitivity that might not be replaced by the computer are increasingly needed even for leadership in the corporate and professional and political world; the big, strong macho is not necessarily the man that is going to get elected to any office, or that is going to be a successful corporate president. “Feminine qualities” become increasingly important for the survival of the species; they are important even for leadership in the military academies today. These qualities are also increasingly important for human satisfaction, human life, and human happiness. If you said as we move toward the 21st century, “If you deliver women to the bowls of a corporate capitalist world, then, the whole society is going to be just slaves of capitalists to advance capitalism. Under such circumstances, who is going to arrange the flowers? Who is going to look for the tenderness?” It was not a very good bargain to specialize all that on the woman in the first place.

Some women fall into the reactionary access and try to reverse roles. But women have strengths that have come from what has been called the “female life experience” that resist the de-humanizing thing. Then those who no longer have to define themselves solely as bread-winner come to develop these other human strengths and capacities. As we move toward the 21st century, there will be a sharing of parenting, a new importance on the family, a strength of the family as the humanizing force that resists the impersonal demands of a Communist bureaucracy or Capitalist bureaucracy, and life can be worth living. For men, it isn’t as easy as women, who have had a kind of easy detour for a while. She could just develop these new capacities in herself by going into a kind of education that had been reserved for men and going into the male professional and political world. She has to come to the same crisis that now I think is the front edge of this that man is facing now.

What is the next step in human evolution? Not revers-
ing the roles. Men would say, "I need a wife to take care of all these other details of life," and "I supported her all these years, let her support me and I am going to stay home and write 'haiku' or something like that." I don't think that reversing is going to work so well: if it didn't work so well for her, if it was killing her, it would kill him. The answer is probably the transcending of the polarization. If you have a more humane man, a more humane woman, you have an integration of these masculine and feminine qualities.

As we move toward the 21st century, I do not think there will be increased divorce, perhaps there will be temporarily in your country, as in mine, an increase in divorce because of marriages that were made and entered into where women had to stay from absolute economic dependence. I understand that in your country it is women now that are seeking divorces. Women are also going to demand of men not just the bread-winning qualities that were enough before, but feelings, some sharing, some real intimacy. And now, the woman is moving to her independence, and I bet you Japanese men are shaking underneath this. Will she leave him if she no longer has to depend upon him? Maybe we will discover love. Maybe it will be very good for human sexuality. We will liberate ourselves and discover the real human intimacy to make love. In the Biblical world where sexual love was to know someone as in "he knew her," they never said "she knew him."

Now she will know him and perhaps there will be a great liberation of the sexual revolution. When we can have intimacy where he and she can really be all there are and know each other and love and share the family that they make together, share burdens of work, share new adventures, share new dimensions.

It is interesting that the discovery in the studies showed that in the empty nest when the children go to college and leave home, there is no trauma for the woman that was expected, just as menopause is no longer the trauma for women that it was considered to be. She has a further line. She is not just defined as a child-rearer and she simply moves to new interests, although she has some problems along the way.

On the other hand, the man finds the emptiness traumatic. Because he was working so hard to earn, to get ahead, he did not let himself enjoy the feelings he could have had with the children until too late and now suddenly they are gone. And now what? There will be new dimensions. In the Workshop we had on the good life of men and the good life of women, one of our friends from Indonesia talked about "Suadamada," self-fulfillment. One American psychologist talks about the hierarchy of needs: needs for survival, for food and shelter, then needs for safety or security, and then needs for achievement, for status, for love, for sex. Then what? Well, then we move to higher dimensions of human possibility that have only perhaps been explored before by religion. To spiritual dimensions, to the true possibilities of self-actualization which may be not different for women and men as highest creatures.
Ladies and Gentlemen, it is a very great privilege to be here and to speak to this audience at the Conference on Human Values in Tsukuba.

As you perhaps know, I did not choose the topic, which may sound to you very ambitious, which was indeed assigned to me, to try to offer you to-day some basic principles for the improvement of the environment towards the 21st Century. I hesitated when I received the letter asking me to give this speech here, and after some hesitation, decided to take the risk and to offer something that may be called basic principles for the purpose.

After all, for 45 years, as a geographer, in several walks of life and in several countries, I have worked trying to understand better the environment, both the physical and human environment, in which we, as individuals and groups, are living and working and taking our leisure. I also had to compare what was happening in this respect in different parts of the world. Previous speakers from this rostrum have already underlined some basic facts on which I shall not insist now.

They have shown the great diversity of the world! The diversity that still prevails in the perception we have of what is around us, of our neighbours, of our own customs, of the environment as a whole. That is, of course, perfectly true. I think we all agree on that diversity. But we are still trying to find some values that are general.

The geographers have long emphasized the variety of the world. This was their main task when modern geography began, a little more than 200 years ago, to organize the data describing the diversity of the world. We could not understand the environment without all that data. But we now have relatively good data on most of the world, and we are then trying to understand the relationships between the various phenomena in order to manage the problems of this complex environment better. The problems are in fact not as sweeping, in my opinion, as some of my colleagues here in previous days have seemed to imply.

The environment presents us with many problems. We have always had a good many. Mankind has never lived in a perfect environment. Paradise is not to be found in our past history. I am not sure that we will bring about paradise in this world in the future. But to-day we certainly are, for the majority of mankind, suffering from less ills and even from less wars and less starvation, despite all that has been mentioned and all that we know; I think there is less deprivation than there used to be in past centuries and millennia.

Therefore, we can say that, if we continue our endeavours and we try even to do better, perhaps we shall improve the human condition. Ideas about how to do it vary with nations and with generations; however, a certain number of ideas have been coming back, and back in almost cyclical ways, into the limelight. We are to-day at a turning point of history when the world around us, not only the environment but human society itself, is undergoing a very deep metamorphosis, a complete change of forms. This is a painful process. We know that any kind of biological change involves some pain, some suffering, even when that change is aimed at an improvement.

It has always been so in biological evolution or in the process of medical treatment. In order to straighten out a broken limb doctors have to cause pain to the patient. Society has been doing that to itself in the process of looking for a better life.

In meetings like this conference, as they gather repeatedly, there is a fair possibility that some way of understanding what is happening to society and to the physical world may be reached that enables us to deal with the problems somewhat better.

If I may, I should like to tell you of a conversation I had at Narita Airport a year-and-a-half ago, after I attended another Conference in Tokyo dealing with the problems of the large Japanese metropolises and sponsored by your National Institute for Research Advancement, which is also one of the sponsors of this Conference. I was then taking a flight from Narita Airport to San Francisco and went to the little bar near the gate to have a coffee, while waiting for the flight to be called. A Japanese gentleman was also having a coffee next to me and he engaged in conversation. After a few minutes he found out that I was a professor and asked me "a professor of what?" I said "Geography." Now he was a computer expert going to Australia to improve the marketing of some parts of computers for a Japanese company. He got very excited by my mention of geography and told me that, although he had not really studied it, a teacher in school—which went back some thirty years or so, I suppose—had taught him that there were two kinds of geography: a new geography and a traditional kind of geography.

In the last ten years, there has been much discussion among professional geographers of a "new" geography
which is very quantitative, and obviously I could not expect this gentleman, recollecting about his childhood, to know about it. So I asked him what he meant by "the new geography." "The new geography," he said, "was started by a man with a long name, something like 'Blash,' who taught that mankind had a choice between options as to how to use its environment, while the traditional kind of geography asserted that the physical environment determines human behaviour." Of course, he had thought that the new geography was right but now he wondered, with all the recent concerns about the environment and ecology, whether we were not going back to what the old kind of geography taught.

Well, this was a very good way of putting the basic problem of how to use the environment. Do we let the environment tell us, in the way we think it is telling us, how to behave, or do we try to choose the option which, in our opinion, is the best in using and organizing the environment? Then I explained to the Japanese gentleman that his founder of the "new geography" was obviously Paul Vidal de la Blache who, in the years 1890–1915, started the French school of geography; I had been taught in Paris by his students, and so I asked the computer engineer: "What do you mean by the environment determining our behaviour?" And he answered: "Well, right now for instance, we are both drinking coffee, and coffee is something that grows on trees which require a climate we do not have in Japan; therefore, we must purchase the coffee from Brazil." And my answer was: "Coffee, as you well know," — and, of course, he had been to Brazil and to Sao Paulo — "was grown all around Sao Paulo. To-day there are still a few coffee trees left in the gardens of some suburban homes but basically in the suburbs of Sao Paulo they now do not grow coffee; they make Volkswagens and petrochemicals. Coffee is still produced, of course, in Southern Brazil but in the other parts of the State of Sao Paulo and in Parana, which shows that we still have some choice between options as to how to use the environment and how to move things around."

This was a very remarkable encounter to me because it demonstrated the very high quality of the knowledge of environmental problems and of the basic problems of geographical thought among Japanese people who are not specialized in that field. This encourages the hope that, once we have understanding and knowledge, we may proceed to improve as best we can. Now, I said earlier that we were at present undergoing a metamorphosis of society and of the environment, the two being very closely related — one all the time commanding to the other. The interplay is so constant and complex that to ask about changes in the environment and in society which is cause and which is effect of those two, is like asking which comes first, the chicken or the egg. However, let us remember that we are the society, still the more active part of the complex, that creates and responds to values.

Now, what is happening in our society? The values we know have been changing. Even some basic values have been changed. A few minutes ago, Mrs. Friedan gave some examples of the trends. Many other speakers have given other examples and we know more by just reading the daily newspaper. What has been changing, I think, relates to a very important aspect in the organization of society and of human rights, which must not be overlooked. Previous speakers have already shown that the basic values of mankind have always been the preservation and the promotion of human life and of its quality. But a very large part of human life which is at the very basis of its promotion and of its preservation is human labour. And we have not yet, I think, in this Conference discussed enough the evolution of the forms of labour. If we think of it for just a few minutes, we shall see that human labour in the 20th Century has been changing extremely fast, faster than for thousands of years before and that we can, as a fair assumption, project those changes towards the 21st Century. I do not think we can suggest that the 21st Century is likely to go back in terms of the evolution of the forms of labour.

Now, those forms of labour have evolved towards saving human labour. One of my teachers in Paris — a French geographer called André Siegfried — wrote a book in 1926–27, the American edition of which was entitled "America Comes of Age," while the French edition was entitled "Les Etats Unis d'Aujourd'hui," which became a classic for a time on the evolution of the United States and, for a few years, a bestseller both in America and in Europe. Without having checked it, I am quite sure that there has been a Japanese translation, and several editions of it. This book is now half-a-century old but, in its last paragraph, after discussing the trends of evolution in America and what America could contribute to the world in the 20th Century, Siegfried pointed out a basic difference between Europe and America. America tried to save human labour and wasted materials; Europe traditionally rather tried to save materials and, in the process, wasted a lot of human labour. This was a basic opposition and conflict in values. To some extent it still exists although by now, of course, Europe has been largely converted to the American idea of saving human labour, and not only to the idea but also to the tools, to the equipment that achieves this purpose.

In fact, the Europeans have been trying to save human labour before; they started the Industrial Revolution in England, in France, in Belgium, in Germany, in Holland, two hundred years ago. The Americans used, to a large extent, the tools of the Industrial Revolution better than the Europeans because the Europeans, while producing the means to save human labour, were still hesitant in applying them as fully.

But then André Siegfried concluded by saying that, traditionally, Asia saved human labour even less and wasted it even more than Europe. And the last sentence in that book read: "The 20th Century may well be a debate between Henry Ford and Mahatma Gandhi."

Now, that was written in 1926 at the time when, of course, Henry Ford was the name that symbolized the most automated and most mechanized automobile industry and also the idea of mass consumption, while Mahatma Gandhi symbolized the resistance of the old traditional philosophy of India to the values which Ford's name then
expressed. The Indian resistance was then probably due to political reasons as much as to social and cultural ones. But both were obviously at work.

Now it is certain that the India of to-day, while still revering Mahatma Gandhi and his philosophy, also wants to obtain most of the tools, advantages, and opportunity provided by industrialization and mechanization. These trends are now far beyond what Henry Ford might have dreamt of; the Indians want to use them, if they can, to the extent they can, though they will use them, of course, differently from the Americans. But altogether we have recently been endeavouring all around the world to save human labour. The more advanced economies or cultures have saved more human labour, and faster than the others. The results of labour saving caused a gradual shift from the work of production to work in the services and in the management of production. Production occupies less and less hands working at it, and that trend will continue whether you consider the production of agricultural or mining or manufacturing goods, or even the handling and the transport of these.

Some twenty years ago, I believe, the Japanese labour force was still employed in agriculture for about 30 to 33 per cent and this proportion is now down to about 8 or 9 per cent, if my figures are correct. If my figures are not absolutely correct, I beg you to forgive me, but I am sure that the trend is in that direction. And that is, of course, a general worldwide trend. Now if we have a similar trend in most areas of employment producing or handling goods, labour must be employed in the services and in the more and more qualified services, that is, in management and in research and in giving advice to management and to research. This is the sort of mankind that is shaping for the 21st Century. It does not mean that these workers in the advanced services will be "parasites," as some people claim. If they do not do their job right, then all the structure of production will collapse and the survival of the species will be endangered. If they work well, they will manage to produce more goods than ever, in different ways, and they can produce and handle them, once they learn how, without all the waste and without all the bad consequences that production may entail at the first transitional stage. May I give an example:

When they began making beer in Switzerland in large quantities, the wastes from the large breweries were thrown into the rivers of Switzerland, polluted them badly and killed fish. So a law was passed forbidding this practice in the 1940's and the breweries found a very good way of using those wastes. Instead of throwing them into the river they put them into special ponds, insemi nated them with some micro-organisms, and produced huge quantities of yeast. From that yeast they produced feed for poultry, for chickens. The high protein mass obtained from yeast was mixed with straw and other stuffs to feed cattle. Such feedstuffs were very cheap. One brewery produced a very delicate paste to put on little sandwiches for cocktail parties. So that, instead of polluting the rivers, good management and research produced high protein stuff enjoyed either at cocktail parties or throughout the dairy and poultry production, of which Western Europe now has large surpluses. As you know, so-called mountains of butter and meat accumulate which the experts do not know how to market.

The fact that we are unable to market these surpluses of butter, meat, and grain in Western Europe shows that our services in higher management and economic research are not quite what they should be. They should have found a way of using those surpluses in a more beneficial way for mankind than just storing them at high cost and consuming a lot of energy in the storage. Sometimes they are able to sell some of the surpluses but they must destroy them after a few years of storage.

This sort of process, I think, testifies to the fact that we can produce more with fewer people working at it and therefore more are being liberated from the hard, constraining work that men and women had to perform in the past millennia, in order to produce the food or other staples needed for their survival and comfort. Later many had to work very hard at the machines in manufacturing plants, which often caused much pollution and gave the workers many illnesses of which, of course, we have been able to get rid, at least of some of them, even most of them. So one can hope that the improvement trend is going to continue. But we have to realize what is happening. We must realize that the trend of manpower, of the division of labour, points towards a different sort of human labour which requires more people in a categories of work requiring brains, requiring information, requiring knowledge, and all the time more and more data. These trends bring about the information society and, of course, it is increasingly accepted that the future will belong to the information society. But what is not quite accepted yet, or not realized, is that the information society calls for a different use of the environment than was the case with the old types of labour. The new organization will not only be using materials better or avoiding the polluting wastes; this is just a detail. It will bring to society new massive demands for happiness.

If we want to see more happiness, if we want the values to be more satisfying for the people, we have to organize the environment for the kind of life that the people educated for and living in an information society will desire. May I give you one example to reflect upon? We are meeting here in a new town, Tsukuba, which is precisely an attempt at providing a modern framework for the information society. But I hear, and I read also in an article published a few months ago by my colleague at the University of Tsukuba, Professor Nobuo Takahashi, that Tsukuba is still striving to get a more exciting, a more satisfying way of life. In many respects Tsukuba is an ideal environment: it is not polluted; it is new, elegant, and so forth. I do not need to describe it to you. But there is some dissatisfaction, people are not quite happy here: many still keep their families in Tokyo or in other large cities. They run in and out of Tsukuba. Apparently, the population census now being taken in Japan will not show very clearly what the population of Tsukuba, and many other cities, actually is because so many of the inhabitants are on the move. The census forms give them the choice of indicating whether they live here in Tsukuba,
or in Tokyo, or in another place. Many of them belong in several places. We are a society on the move and we will be so increasingly, because that movement is part of the information society, part of the processes which work at making the information society interesting and exciting for all its members. The information society is a mass society in which the individuals are gradually being liberated.

The division of labour that is working itself out and constantly refining itself causes new professions to appear all the time. New specializations are constantly created, and that is going to go on. The modern division of labour corresponds to terms of employment where people have to work less time for their employers than before. Altogether, working time is shortening within the day, the week, the year, and even the lifetime. Masses of individuals have a choice of options on how to use that time. Therefore, the need arises to solve the problem of leisure and the need for such institutions as the Leisure Development Center. Japan is not the only country facing that problem.

However, in the information society leisure will never be exactly “lazy” leisure because the sort of work that is being performed by many is work that does not stop and cannot be forgotten at the moment you leave your office, your laboratory, or your school. This work is brain work, which goes on in the brain of the person; and in our competitive society, as people are indeed competitive, the strain is going to carry on and on. However, people have much more free time and they have also the option of being in different places, due to increased freedom of movement. I believe that, until the Meiji Revolution, the Japanese people were not free to move from one place to another. Of course, some moved, nevertheless, but only a few because the law said that you could not move freely. You were rooted in the place where you had to produce the goods or perform the services. That kind of rule existed for most of mankind.

Now we are uprooted, we are free to move around much of the time, and we do. We are just beginning, as a mass, to take advantage of this freedom. It is going to cause more and more problems: all those flows of moving people! All that uprooting is going to create more and more difficulty and complexity in the administration of the local community. But the local community needs a life of its own and people want to be happy as members of a local community. This again is not only the problem of the Japanese. In that moving system which affects the inter-dependent countries around the globe, resistances to the fluidity are strongly felt. We need to give more attention to freedom. We have given a great deal of attention to equality in recent decades. Now we must give more attention to freedom, although to survive as a lawful society we have to stress certain limits to freedom. In my opinion, this means the ancient values of respect and tolerance for the neighbours and for the other people who move around us. It also means temperance in all aspects of consumption. To obtain such behaviour by large masses of recently liberated individuals, instruction has to be given to the people and they have to be educated to live a free life, but as members of a community in which freedom is exercised with responsibility. In the next century the new extent of freedom may create a new set of values, I believe. Mankind will have to live at great density in a pluralistic sharing of space.

In conclusion, I must now propose the basic principle to improve the environment: I should say that it should be organized around the freedom of the individual being encouraged but being regulated with the values of temperance and tolerance in the forefront. Thank you very much.
Chairman (Professor Takeuchi): I would like to open this symposium by first asking Professor Matsubara to report briefly on the results of “The Survey of Human Values in Thirteen Countries” which was conducted specifically for this International Conference. Mr. Webb of Gallup International, which actually undertook this survey, is with us today, so he will also give us some additional comments on the methodology of this survey, after Professor Matsubara.

Professor Matsubara: First some comments about the result of this survey concerning the feeling of happiness. The survey showed, in general, that a relatively high percentage of people the world over possessed the feeling of contentment, saw positive values in life, and held reasonable prospects or hope for the future, which confirmed the view that many people are on the whole happy. The feeling of belonging to the middle class was found widely prevalent not only in Japan but also throughout the world. In terms of national tendencies, the feeling of happiness was found to be most widespread among the Anglo-Saxon countries of the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia. By comparison, such feeling is relatively less prominent in France, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and India. The difference of human values between the countries of the West and Asia is most pronounced with respect to the values concerning family. In countries of West Europe and North America, from about 5 or 6 percent to utmost 12 or 13 percent of the population consider living with elder parents under one roof to be desirable whereas this share is 60 to 80 percent in countries of Asia.
other than the Philippines. A similar percentage for Japan is somewhere close to 55 percent. In regard to divorce, less than 20 percent of the population consider this to be desirable under any circumstance in Asia including Japan. Whereas human values concerning family may, in general, be divided into two types, one West European and another Asian, the values existing in Japan may be said to be a confused and unstable mixture of the two.

Now turning to human material desires, people in countries such as Brazil, India and the Philippines were found to have the keenest desire for higher income, usually wanting to more than double the level of their present income. By contrast, people in France and Australia do not seem to desire particularly high income. In terms of correlation between the income desired and the present level of income, people in Japan, the United Kingdom and Canada tend to feel more or less happy with what they have, irrespective of their income category. In the Philippines and Singapore, however, there is a tendency among the people of the higher income group to desire still a higher income. By comparison, in the Republic of Korea, India, France and Italy those persons in the lower income categories want to raise their income most desperately.

There is still a wide gap between advanced industrialized countries and developing countries in the degree of diffusion of television receivers, refrigerators, and other consumer durables. Among developed countries, France represents an exception due to her relatively low possession level of these consumer durables. To the question of whether they have found a particular consumer durable item to be of essential value, relatively many people in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and France answered “No,” showing the rising detachment from materialistic things in these countries. On the other hand, such detachment seems not to have set in in the cases of Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany, which happen to be the countries enjoying relatively high rates of economic growth, as well as in developing countries. Concerning the luxury items, people in the United States, who already possess them anyway, tend to consider these non-essential to their life whereas people in France and Italy do not show the wish to acquire them in the first place. By comparison, people in Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany show a substantial interest in the possession of these items.

People’s general attitude toward their society may be divided into three categories: those wanting a complete reform, another group wanting gradual and moderate improvement, and the third conservative group who want the status quo. The portion of persons who want moderate improvement is in the majority in all countries but Singapore, the Philippines, and India. This portion reaches 80 percent in the case of Japan. The reform attitude is relatively strong in India, France, the United Kingdom, the Republic of Korea, Brazil and Italy. India, the Republic of Korea, and Italy also happen to be the countries where the general dissatisfaction about life is most pronounced. By comparison, both the general dissatisfaction about life and the reform attitude is relatively less widespread in Singapore, the Federal Republic of Germany, Canada, the Philippines, the United States, and Australia.

As typified by the case of the Republic of Korea, people tend to show more conservatism with rising age whereas a greater preference for more drastic reforms exists among people in the younger age groups. One exception to this general trend is the United Kingdom, where both the younger and the more elderly people are progressive, but people tend to show conservatism in their mid-forties.

Whereas the popular religion differs from one country to another the share of people believing in God is universally high. The only two countries in which this share falls short of the 80-percent level are Japan and France. On the other hand, people do not necessarily support the view that a religion is indispensable for one’s life. Whereas this view is widely maintained in the Philippines, India, the United States, and Brazil, less than 50 percent of the population supported this idea in France, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of Korea. In general, the older people the greater their tendency to consider a religion to be of essential importance. In the case of Japan, such view is supported by more than 75 percent of the people aged over 60 whereas among the youth less than 5 percent consider a religion to be of essential value. A similar trend is also observed in France. Generally speaking, those people who give a high value to their religion tend also to be the people who find a value in making contributions to the society. Interesting enough, these same people tend to find more happiness in life. “Having a lifestyle suited to his taste” was quoted as the primary goal of life by many people in countries including Japan, and the Republic of Korea, as well as all countries of Europe surveyed except France. Except in India and the Philippines, not many people thought “becoming rich” or “becoming famous” was their goal in life. The appreciation for social values including “honest and puritan life” and “contributions to society” differed substantially from one country to another. These social values are relatively highly appreciated in France, the United Kingdom, the Republic of Korea, and Brazil while receiving relatively low marks in Japan, Australia, Canada, and Singapore.

These observations, it seems, tend to show that the degree of human happiness and fulfillment are functions of ethnic and national characteristics of people and their affinity to religion rather than their material wealth or personal attributes. It is also very interesting to note that as far as their values are concerned, the basic dividing line between Asia on the one hand and West Europe and North America on the other seems to be the difference in people’s values concerning family, which happens to be the most fundamental social unit. Another interesting finding is the lack of difference between youth and elderly people in values concerning happiness. The major difference in values between these two groups of people lies basically in their attitudes toward lifestyles and goals in life. If people are ready to find values in their social contributions and religion, therefore, the rising average age of people in society will perhaps not pose the expected social strain on society. People’s values are clearly diversifying and becoming pluralized. The division is, however, not so acute as to produce confrontations or social dis-
In other words, the diversification of values is still at a comfortable magnitude. My personal impression is that due respect should be paid to these diversified values of people.

Mr. Webb: The first thing I want to say is that all of us gathered here are the worst people to make observations from personal experience because we live quite different lives from the mass of the population, or are cut off from them because of different educational backgrounds. Here lies the value of an objective survey of the population – that it corrects your own limited view of the society you live in. If it is necessary for me, an Englishman, to do a survey to understand how British behave, how much more necessary is it for me or for others to take properly conducted surveys of other nations to see how they behave.

The absence of many Third World countries from this survey is a pity. But in some African or some South American states, there exists the situation where it is impossible to conduct a proper sample survey in an objective way.

The initiative for this thirteen-country survey came from the Leisure Development Center in collaboration with our Gallup friend, the Nippon Research Center. Other Gallup institutes did not take an active initiative apart from conducting the field work and translating the questionnaire. This survey has quite a different structure by comparison to the “European Values Survey” we are planning. Whereas the latter will try to find a typology of values, the present survey seems to represent a kind to prediction process, trying to explain happiness as functions of certain given factors. Anyway, I hope there will be further surveys sponsored by the Leisure Development Center in the future which will develop and widen the knowledge already acquired.

Chairman: Will the panelists now give comment?

Professor A. Aoki: This view that human happiness is closely related to ethnicity, nationality, and religion is very interesting, and so is the view that the values concerning family divide the West from the East. The second point seems all the more worthy of note because there is now in Japan the rising problem of generation gaps between parents and their children as well as the increasing incidents of serious violence within the family. I personally evaluate highly the role of mass communications as a social mechanism to adjust frictions and confrontations arising from different values. In the so-called information society of today, it will be very important to undertake, in parallel, discussions and studies on values as well as on communication and mass-communication.

Mr. Yamane: I am personally very interested in the influence of ideologies and the state on people's values concerning happiness or fulfillment as well as the formation of other values. In the particular survey under question, countries such as the USSR, China and East European states were excluded. When we study the interactions between human values and the world system, ideologies and the type of state system are essential elements which cannot be forgotten.

Mr. T. Aoki: In the postwar Japan there has been a tendency to excessively lay trust in figures and also to frequently conduct popular census and surveys. However, it is about time that the simple dualistic measure of reference used in such surveys, whether conservative vs. progressive or the West vs. the East, be re-examined. Recently frames of reference such as male-female are becoming no longer always valid. The fundamental basics in international understanding are to know the differences. However, just knowing these differences in terms of figures is of little use. The important thing is to try to understand the undercurrent behind such numerical differences. To take an example of Japan's relationship with the United States, one should avoid having an illusion that these two are sister countries despite the apparent closeness as Western allies. Rather we must try to know the differences. On the other hand, efforts are needed, for instance, in trying to find some common grounds between Japan and the USSR or East European countries, because we generally believe there are so many great differences. These efforts, in my view, constitute the first constructive steps toward solving international frictions and confrontations.

Mr. Suzuki: I think we must accept the fact, as fact, that confrontations and frustrations over different values are causing crises and tensions in the world of today. Examples are ample: the Iran-Iraq war, the tension between Israel and Arab states, numerous quarrels and armed confrontations in Africa, and the problem of refugees from Vietnam. One consolation is the relative unlikelihood that these tensions will actually lead to another global war. It is very important to keep our eyes on the certain hidden exclusiveness which exists in any value system. I think there is a need, therefore, to establish international rules for arbitrating the differences. Some of the problems which exist today may be attributable to the relative inexperience of those parties now in confrontation, especially with the norms of self-restraint which arise from the fact that they tend to be newcomers to the central world scene of politics, or to the lack of crisis-control power by the United Nations and other international bodies. However, the biggest problem may be that the Super Powers and a number of so-called developed nations have knowingly exploited the exclusive elements possessed by the latecomers. Such practices must be re-examined and terminated altogether.

Mr. Kitamura: I would like to comment on this survey with emphasis on the point of view of people in developing countries. Personally, I have spent seven years in the Middle East and Africa out of my eleven years of assignment abroad as a foreign correspondent. Generally speaking, people of developing countries in the South were found to feel a low degree of economic and social fulfillment. Many people in these countries possessed the
wish to more than double their income. At the same time they tend to prefer a rapid social transformation rather than a gradual evolution. A major social factor behind the rather widespread feeling of unfulfillment in these countries is the spontaneous and global nature of the mass-information society of today, where information and social awareness spreads rapidly across national borders. The mass of poor people in the South, where actual social and economic progress has not caught up, are being drowned in the flood of information originating from affluent countries of the North, with understandable frustration and agony as a byproduct. The rapid modernization process which has taken place in these countries had also forced many people to move out of rural areas into big cities and thus to become rootless both socially and economically. These are the people who have lived in the same traditional system and traditional values as their ancestors several hundred or one thousand years ago. This is why I feel human values as such cannot be talked about without also giving considerations about the role and influence of politics. Another important element in assessing values especially in the Third World countries is religion. In Islamic countries, the religion plays the vital role in human life, both politically and socially. In many cases, a religion has a special importance in these regions not only as a source of individual faith and psychological support in life, but also as a symbol of people's regained ethnic pride and identity in contrast to their history of humiliation by the Western civilization.

Chairman: A number of worthwhile opinions have already been given along the subject of this symposium. May I make some comments here to give a frame of reference to these discussions. In my view, there are four levels in human values. The first is a purely personal level. This is the "me" values, that is, what is the most desirable life or conditions for me? Then comes the second level, or the "we" values. This is the considerations of what might be the most desirable goals for the social groupings one belongs himself, either his family, community, company, or nation. The third level is the "they" values, that is, considering values with respect to third persons. And over and above these three levels, there is the "absolute" values. The final objective of this symposium is probably the search for the mechanism or rules which may be applied to dissolve frictions over different values. It will be useful if there will be a consensus amongst ourselves on at which level we are discussing the values.

Mr. Webb: The values such as freedom from war, freedom to speak, freedom from poverty, freedom from fear — those are not absolute values nor "me" values. They are secondary instrumental values; more physical, material conditions. What we have to look for are the absolute values or personal values in ourselves and in other people that will enable those material conditions to exist.

Professor Matsubara: A supplementary comment on Professor Takeuchi's statement on the "me" values and the "they" values. According to the survey, only 4.6 percent of the Japanese polled said they have "thought deeply about (their) relationship with the State." Such share was also relatively low at about 15 percent in France, Italy, and the Republic of Korea, but in all other countries the share exceeded the 30 percent level.

Professor A. Aoki: I am personally not too pessimistic about our ability to overcome frictions over values. Even the United States accepted its defeat in Vietnam although the use of nuclear armaments might have changed the outcome of the war. I think a number of grave international crises have been managed within a limit although they might have led to a global war some decades ago. The Japanese as a people also seem to possess a large capacity for such adjustment. The mass-psychological tendency of the people, as well as the country's family and social systems, tend to absorb confrontations and frictions.

Mr. T. Aoki: There is a view that the Japanese have low public morality by comparison to the West Europeans. When I was stationed in Bonn, there was a heavy snowfall one day, and I saw a number of middle-aged neighbors shoveling snow. I thought this was an act of public morality. But these men explained to me that they were afraid of some old lady slipping in front of their house, which would put them at fault. In fact, the Western public morality has the idea of penalty attached to it. In understanding the concept of values or in attempting an international comparison, we must understand not only the surface but also in depth.

Among all the values, those having an especially high degree of exclusiveness are the ones related to religion and race, as already pointed out by Mr. Suzuki. By comparison, values over ideologies are somehow reconcilable as these fall within rationality or logic. Numerous armed conflicts and regional wars throughout the world show that racial and religious factors are the ones most difficult to reconcile. Our task and challenge is to undertake factorial analyses of these very irrational elements.

Mr. Suzuki: When the matter comes to what we can do, the earlier remark by Professor Matsubara about the low consciousness of the Japanese people about their nation causes some apprehension. When one studies possible Japanese contributions to the maintenance of the world peace or to the reconciliation of international frictions either through economic or cultural cooperation, the framework for the decision making and efforts is bound to be that of Japan as a nation. Therefore, the importance of consciousness as a nation does not simply stop at considerations for national security or defense build-up. In a way, it was very fortunate for the Japanese that so far we have managed to cope with things with a relatively easy-going mentality of being simply inhabitants of the country rather than Japanese "nationals." On the other hand, we have perhaps forgotten in the meantime to seriously think about what Japan can possibly contribute as a member of the world community.

Mr. Yamane: I agree with the classification of the levels
of values presented by Professor Takeuchi. On the other hand, I should point out that if everybody started to behave at the level of absolute values, then the result will be a disaster. The system of democracy functions sufficiently only because most of us operate at the levels of "me" values and "they" values. In our society of today, a multitude of values co-exist side by side. Those values are each put forward, meet confrontation, and they are adjusted by the majority vote. A majority view at one time may become a minority at another. Likewise, those values accepted by a large majority of population will also change over a period of time. Therefore, an important thing for us is to recognize the existence of values which are different from ours, and also to have an attitude that this is nothing illogical for others to have different sets of values.

Mr. Kitamura: I agree with this view that the future stability of the world will depend on how well we will recognize the heterogeneity of values on this planet. In this connection, what worries me is the general inexperience of the Japanese people in having the feel for different values and in making objective judgements on diversified values existing in the contemporary world of today. These worries arise from the peculiar homogeneity of the Japanese society, in terms of culture, language, race, physical features, and moreover the feeling that we belong to the same group. It is very interesting to point out, in this connection, that the vast majority of the Japanese people consider themselves to belong to the middle class. In contrast, Britons seem to view their society as heterogeneous from my experience, consisting of three classes of people — the upper class, the middle class and the working class. Whereas these class distinctions may have certain economic drawbacks, they may at the same time put the British people in a better position than the Japanese in understanding the diversification of values in the world. Any comments, Mr. Webb?

Mr. Webb: Mr. Kitamura pointed out the heterogeneity in English society, where there is a distinction between middle classes, upper classes and working classes, which we British understand from inside. Middle class values in Britain are related to behaving in a prudent and careful way, to acquire what is needed to be less dependent upon the State, to be careful about the saving, to have respect of your neighbours but not to be too involved with them, for instance. I personally did not have those values because I was born into the working class. When I was young my parents never dreamed of buying a house; we were too poor to save; and we relied much more upon our neighbours for survival. One of the post-war changes in Britain is a type of bourgeoisification of the working class, although class diversity still exists.

A very strange and sad thing about the conflict in Northern Ireland is that it is between two Christian communities. From the point of view of the Japanese or other Orientals, these two should be very close to one another in their values. Yet their very closeness seems to be part of the reason why the conflict is so severe. I was just thinking that the Japanese would live quite in peace with either of these two groups in Ulster, much better than each other. Perhaps the bigger differences between the two communities would lead to greater peace. Maybe, it is the closeness of some values which, because of the small differences that are left, creates greater tension than big differences in values.

Chairman: The panelists emphasized the need for a mechanism of adjusting between different values and also the indispensability of principles of democracy. I am in a whole-hearted agreement but this is because all of us here accept democratic values as a common reference point. Therefore, we should keep in mind that there are people and societies that do not accept this. My next comment concerns rules. Setting aside any decision on what is right and what is wrong, it is better to have certain rules which everybody abides by, for instance, the selection of whether we drive right-hand or left-hand autos on the road. These rules do not have to be as rigorous as laws, simply social customs or etiquette. It is also perhaps better to set the rule that everybody follows a rule once it is decided. As time is running short, I would like to solicit opinions on what is there for the Japanese to consider in the contemporary world of today which is full of different values.

Mr. T. Aoki: One of the reasons we are having this kind of discussion today is the recent upsurge of global interest in trying to learn from Japanese ways. Those very elements of the Japanese society which we have had doubts — whether collectivism, life-time employment system, or seniority system — are now becoming the subject of applause. To me the biggest immediate problem of values which we have now in Japan is the contradiction and confrontation between these foreign appraisals and the reservations possessed by us Japanese.

Professor Matsubara: In my view, the Japanese people traditionally have the tendency to either allow the existence of a plurality of value systems, or to ignore the different values altogether. Japanese youth nowadays are especially known for their unmotivated attitudes and increased indifference to politics. What the people tend to do is unfortunately not to make the effort to accommodate the plurality of values and the solution of any friction over those values by democratic rules, but rather, the blank ignorance and indifference of other people's values. It is my feeling that what the Japanese people need now is to have a greater awareness and pride about the values possessed by themselves, even to the extent to have certain offensiveness against the values held by others. It is not fruitful for the future of the Japanese, perhaps, to tell them to tolerantly accept a multitude of values.

Chairman: I know there are still other opinions but the time has run out. Thank you very much for your valuable views.

(The symposium closed after the question and answer session with the floor.)
SYMPOSIUM II

SICK SOCIETY AND SANE SOCIETY

Participants:
• Co-ordinator
  Akio Sawada
  Professor, University of Tsukuba

• Speaker
  Hiroshi Wagatsuma
  Professor, University of Tsukuba

• Panel
  Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana
  Rector, National University of Jakarta
  Maitraye Devi
  Poet
  Takeo Doi
  Professor, International Christian University
  Hayao Kawai
  Professor, Kyoto University
  Yoko Kirishima
  Writer

Peter Milward
Professor, Sophia University
Hideyasu Nakagawa
President, International Christian University
Hisahide Sugimori
Writer
Takashi Tsujii
Poet

Chairman (Professor Sawada): First some comments about the title of this symposium “Sick Society and Sane Society.” D. Erasmus in his work, Encomium moriae (“Praise of Folly”), described three types of folly or insanity. The first type is a joyful and innocent folly, an example of which may be a lecture given by a teacher before his pupils. The pupils sincerely believe in the lecture whereas the teacher also enjoys the lecture. The second is a loathsome and objectionable folly, such as a mobilization of military forces with accompanying bloodshed for the purpose of territorial expansion. The third is a folly which should be praised and followed by others, that is an act which ignores or supersedes common considerations of money, wealth and social prestige. According to Erasmus, the act of Jesus Christ who was willingly crucified would represent insanity by any common standards but it was in fact a wisdom. The particular title of this present symposium might, at a first glance, seem remote to the theme of the Human Values Conference. Nevertheless, these two themes are in fact very closely related in my view because the question of what is sanity and what is insanity is actually the question of what is happiness. I would first like to ask Professor Wagatsuma to give the keynote presentation, followed by remarks from individual speakers.

Professor Wagatsuma: According to Ruth Benedict, “normalcy” is something accepted by a society. A normal action under this definition is an action which falls within the framework of expected or predictable behavioral patterns in a given society. In other words, standards of human behavior are something relative, which vary depending on time, society, and culture. Even in a given society, furthermore, the borderline between sanity and insanity is not always very clear. In one experiment undertaken in the United States, a total of eight quite normal persons went each to different psychiatric hospitals and spent seven to fifty-two days. Although these eight persons were behaving quite normally, none of the doctors at these hospitals ever suspected that these persons were in fact not patients. In contrast, a total of thirty-five patients at three of the hospitals started remarking “you are not a patient” to the participants of the experiment. When the information was given to the staff of these hospitals that there were fake patients at these hospitals, these staff diagnosed a total of 83 patients out of the 193 then hospitalized to be normal persons. In fact there was not a fake patient included at all among those diagnosed to be normal. As already mentioned, there is no clear borderline dividing sanity and insanity. Some people may say “sanity” represents an ability to adapt themselves flexibly to a given environment. But I wonder whether we should call a person mentally healthy if he succeeds well in an insane society such as Nazi Germany. Also, if there exists a leader who wants to create a new social order by altering the already well-accepted social standards, we can hardly call this leader sane and normal. The standards for judging the so-called social misfits or psychiatric cases may also depend on how the society treats these persons. For instance, a person who is considered mentally ill in one society may well be worshipped and respected in another society as a medium or shaman. I really wonder if it is at all possible for us to set absolute and universal standards of reference for distinguishing normalcy from insanity.

Professor Kawai: Insanity and sanity are certainly not distinguishable easily. This fact itself makes it even more desirable for us to warmly welcome the so-called insane persons into our ordinary society. From the point of view of those of us who are engaged in psychological therapy, however, this is in fact not so easy to implement. There is one person whom I have known for six to seven years, who is an excellent critique of paintings by E. Munch and van Gogh and novels of the German Romantic school. This person asked me once when he would be able to start working like everybody else. I told him right away that he did not necessarily have to do the same thing as others. His immediate and also rather strong reaction was that it was exactly what others did normally which he wanted to do desperately. This reaction came to me as a major shock, showing how difficult it was for some
persons like him to spend quite an ordinary life ... especially in a harmony with Munch and van Gogh. In fact, it is very difficult to tie such things as sanity and insanity, normalcy and abnormality, work and leisure, life and death, and men and women. Nowadays, a man and a woman can easily find each other in a physical sense but an analysis of their differences and of a sexual intercourse as a symbol of unity is hardly part of our existing knowledge.

Ms. Kirishima: Despite the general recognition that sanity is preferable to insanity, people often show certain craze for insanity. They torment themselves in love, enjoy dancing in discoteques, and they get drunk on alcohol. I personally tend to feel that a society in which little bits of insanity is mixed in with ordinary daily life, that is a society which tolerates a reasonable room for abnormality, is healthier than a impeccably normal society. This is why I am not afraid of insanity. What threatens me, however, is mass insanity, like a country in which everything is controlled by a religion or a society like Japan during the World War II. Some people show strong nostalgia about the past war time, saying that everybody felt a shared goal during those days. Funny enough, these are often the same people who are quite self-possessed in their ordinary lives. I think we should cultivate and enjoy small measures of insanity within ourselves in our ordinary lives. A good example is perhaps love, which is harmless.....

Professor Kawai: The type of love I encounter is unfortunately not so harmless. Perhaps it requires the calibre of personality like Ms. Kirishima to make love quite harmless.

Ms. Kirishima: Now I am a bit sorry I have mentioned love. What I meant was the function of love as mental catharsis, the type of love affairs which help relieve tension and refresh ourselves.

Mr Tsujii: There is a recent recognition that the system of West European cultural values — once thought universally applicable in the world — in fact does not always apply in many parts of the world. With reference to this recognition, I am beginning to worry whether we have in Japan an independent cultural system of our own. A modern society which does not have as a backbone a system of cultural values is really unthinkable. Without such a system, how can a society undergo internationalization or try meaningful contacts with a different cultural system? Nowadays, one often hears about diversification of values. But to me this diversification is phony. The Japanese people live, it seems to me, in a monolithic society where the only existing value is that which is accountable in terms of money. This is why I think we face a special problem which is of a fundamental nature.

Professor Alisjabana: The human values represent motives which satisfy human interests. There are different types of values. The first type is a theoretical or logical value, which is knowledge. The knowledge satisfies human interests. There is also the economic value. In addition, there are religious or divine values as well as values concerning beauty. From time to time, different values cause frictions. On a personal level, such frictions produce maladjustments with the social environment, unfulfilled desires, and neurosis. Frictions on a social or a group level cause revolutions and wars. Religions lost the power they once had as instruments to reconcile such frictions, having been replaced by economics and science. But with the invention of the atomic bomb, economics and science also seem to have hit a deadlock. This is why human being are again going back to religion and the related super-human elements for relief. One byproduct of this is the booming sales of books on religion and sex.

Professor Nakagawa: Jesus Christ by the social standards of those days was not at all a normal person. Rather, he was nearer to insanity. The type of persons he preferred to have contacts with included those outcast by the society, the very poor, and the illiterates. By having close contacts with these persons and sharing meals with them, Jesus showed that these persons have at least as much value as others in the eyes of the God. This act in a way represented a diversion from the existing values. The Christianity, like other religions, possesses the quality of certain insanity because it challenged the conventional customs and tried to identify underlying problems. From the religious point of view, the standards of judgement concerning sanity and insanity would be whether and how a certain action or idea will contribute to the formation of a person on the level of the individual, and how it will contribute to the development of the human society and the social structure, on the group level. A person who is successful and doing well in a society may be considered sensible and sane. But from the religious point of view, he may be actually nearer to insanity.

Ms. Devi: Insanity means loss of balance. So far discussions here have centered on individual insanity. Actually we should also discuss social illness. What I have been thinking for some time is whether the industrial development and science has caused social imbalance in our society. Although the industrial society has some good aspects for sure, in improving living conditions, in bringing different people together like this symposium and extending our horizon, it also has sick aspects. It has created strong hunger for consumer goods even in India and it has propagated the egoistic approach to life which is breaking down families all over the world. It is true that we need some basic things for life. But acquisition of more refrigerators and televisions cannot bring happiness. Happiness can only come with contentment, which you cannot buy with money. Contentment takes time to grow. It grows like health. If we try it will grow with us. Contentment is the only source of happiness and the base of a healthy society.

Mr. Sugimori: Insanity of individuals, I think, is a matter of pathology and medical sciences. On the other hand,
I wonder whether what is referred to as mass-insanity is really insanity at all. The Japanese people during the World War II, for example, acted in accordance with calmness and reason in many instances. Unfortunately, what the Japanese thought as reason also included ignorance about international relations and also the lack of understanding about China. Suicidal actions by kamikaze pilots might have been a result of ignorance, but I do not consider those insane. If those are examples of insanity, then all the self-sacrificing and heroic actions in history must be termed insanity, which I cannot accept. Please understand that behind what seems to be an action of mass abnormality at the first glance, there may also be a rational will and high morality of a group or a society in their own way.

Professor Milward: I would like to define sanity in terms not of normality but of balance, of breadth of vision, and sickness in terms of the effect on the human mind when it is thrown off balance owing to some limitations of vision. William Shakespeare's Hamlet and King Lear are studies of madness or of a mad world, and how people behave in a mad world. Hamlet is an example of the Wise Fool, who pretends to be a fool because he cannot accept the insanity in the society around him. He is looking for sanity in a mad world, striving for sanity. King Lear is also a tragedy, a very powerful tragedy. Here, he presents the ideal of man, the ideal of the end of life, some heavenly ideal which is the goal humanity must be seeking in spite of death. I think Shakespeare shows us that for the sake of sanity we must by all means look to an ideal which is not merely an ideal of this earth. We must look from earth to heaven, from man to God.

Professor Doi: The story which Professor Wagatsuma mentioned at the beginning is a very interesting case in point. I think the experiment was a dirty trick; it was an insane experiment. The physician works on the premise that the patient is telling him the truth. Unless this premise is observed, the physician cannot perform the role he is supposed to perform. I think there is a general realization that something is drastically wrong with the contemporary world, as shown by the example of the experiment already mentioned. So far nobody has mentioned the word morality. I believe that the universal values must be moral values. Despite the general feeling that we are now faced with grave crises, many speakers have ended their remarks by expressing hope for the future. I think that is as it should be because without hope men cannot live. Men cannot maintain sanity without hope for long. I am also troubled by the rapid disintegration of families by divorce because family is indispensable for children. The family provides them with the object of identification so they can grow. Finally, one word about what Mr. Tsuji has said, namely that Japan has no system of culture. Naturally, the system we have in Japan is different from that of Europe, the United States or China, but we do have our system. I think we should have more confidence in Japan.

Professor Kawai: Perhaps what Mr. Tsuji was saying was that the Japanese culture as a system is very difficult to identify in any concrete, visible terms. I personally feel that Japan has a system of "non-existence." In other words, Japan accepts and takes in anything, but the country does not have the values which have a center of integration. The speakers have mentioned the loss of balance. The peculiarity of the Japanese cultural and value systems is that they balance well without the need for a center of integration.

Mr. Tsuji: What I wanted to say is this; the Japanese system is characterized by what appears to be the lack of a system itself in such a way as to accept and tolerate a plurality of values from abroad. Since the Meiji era, people have not become happy, it seems to me, on the basis of a cultural system which was claimed to be Japan's own. I think the major task for the Japanese people now is to choose, at their own initiative, a suitable cultural system for themselves.

Professor Nakagawa: Professor Doi indicated to us that hope was one of the most important elements of being sane. On the other hand, one also gets the impression that the world is perhaps heading toward the end in view of the wide-spread disintegration of families, the problem of global over-population, environmental destruction, and the short-supply of resources. Does this imply that the world as a whole is losing hope and thus becoming gradually insane? Or, can we still have hope?

Professor Doi: It is by definition that man cannot live without hope. In other words, as long as you live, you somehow continue to have hope. It still remains, however, that this is an age in which one can hardly find hope, and also the word "hope" sounds somewhat empty. I would like to return this question to you, Professor Nakagawa. For I think it must be religious persons who inspire hope in people. Unfortunately, they do not seem to be doing much of this nowadays. They are rather busy with political, social and other secular issues. I wonder if they have forgotten their raison d'être as the religious persons.

Professor Nakagawa: I am puzzled because I thought I asked this question. Being a Christian, I think only God can give the values, which can give hope and strength to men.

Professor Milward: I would like to answer Professor Kawai's objection about the idea of balance. If you take the two words, balance and integration, there is actually not so much difference between them. Integration means a center of integration, that is, you integrate everything in terms of one central point. So, it is a balance after all in its deep meaning, or the idea of the golden mean as Aristotle presented it. The question is, what is the point you choose for the center between two extremes, or the point you choose for integrating all experience. This is where I emphasize the importance of a heavenly ideal,
something that inspires man. What does the word “God” mean? What do we mean when we adore God or worship God or speak about loving God? If you ask many people in a sociological survey, they won’t be able to give a clear reply. But it does come down to something very deep in human idealism whether East or West. Everybody has such a deep ideal at the heart of himself, but there is a kind of society which seems to crush or repress this ideal, and this is what drives a person crazy. He must find a way of expressing this ideal freely in a free society, where there are many opportunities. Thus by the balance of free ideas a certain sanity is achieved.

Chairman: Professor Wagatsuma kindly gave a keynote presentation on the current topic, but he has not had a chance to comment on his opinion. So I would like to give him the floor.

Professor Wagatsuma: I have accepted my role for this symposium to present a series of questions because I personally did not have any good answers to these. Cultural anthropologists, who are in search of some cultural universality as well as the varieties among mankind tended to cite family arrangements for procreating and raising children as an example of important common points among societies. As seen in countries like Sweden and the United States, some people now deny any type of family life in search of experimental “alternative lifestyles.” As shown by this example, I am unable really to answer the question on what is the universal human nature.

Ms. Devi: Being here in Japan, one man’s name comes very much into my mind — Kakuzo (Tenshin) Okakura. In the beginning of this century he visited India and influenced great Indian thinkers — the idea that Asia is one. He was opposing Western ideas and praised the values cherished by the East. However, I think we can no longer make this sharp distinction between East and West. His idea that Asia was more meditative, more moral and more spiritual whereas the West was more materialistic no longer holds. The difficulty today is that the discoveries of the scientists fall in the hands of the businessmen, market men, and consumer-goods makers whereas the advancement of knowledge falls into the hands of the politicians who use it for the extension of their own power and destruction of mankind. What I am concerned is that now with the power of science we are squeezing out all the wealth on earth and soon everything will be finished, leaving our children and grandchildren in an empty world.

Professor Milward: I would just like to touch on the note of hope, because I wouldn’t like to leave this hall with a feeling of pessimism. Hamlet has almost given up hope, and yet for him life is to suffer, and to suffer is to hope against hope. The fundamental Christian ideal of the Cross, I think, is that new life springs out of suffering and death. This is what Shakespeare also tries to show in King Lear. There is death at the end, but he implies that out of death, out of misery, can spring new life. And this is what keeps us going when things all seem dark. In a sense, what I say may sound even more pessimistic; but pessimism is the way you look at the present. If you want to become optimistic, you had better throw all the newspapers away. But that’s living in a fool’s paradise. On the other hand, even though your view of the present may be a little dark, still you always hope against hope looking through the suffering, even through death, to some divine ideal.

Chairman: Thank you very much.

(The symposium closed after the question and answer session with the audience.)
SEARCH FOR BASIC PRINCIPLES IN THE HUMAN SOCIETY OF THE 21ST CENTURY

Participants:
- Co-ordinator: Natuhiko Yosida
  Professor, Tokyo Institute of Technology
- Speaker: Kinhide Mushakoji
  Vice Rector, The United Nations University
- Panel:
  G. Morris Carstairs
  Visiting Professor, Postgraduate Institute of Medical Education and Research
  Gregory Clark
  Professor, Sophia University
  L. Johnathan Cohen
  Professor, University of Oxford
  Jean Gottmann
  Professor, University of Oxford
  Jaromir Janousek
  Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of The Czechoslovak Science Academy
  Jiro Kawakita
  Professor, University of Tsukuba
  Tadashi Kawata
  Director, Institute of International Relations, Sophia University
  Alexander A. Kwapon
  Vice-Rector, The United Nations University
  Ashis Nandy
  Center for The Study of Developing Society

Professor Yosida (Chairman): The title of this symposium is "Search for Basic Principles in the Human Society of the 21st Century". A question immediately arises whether there are any fundamental principles to speak of, and even if there are, then whether these are actually attainable. A number of different attitudes may certainly exist on the question. Some persons would wish to identify the universal values behind the apparent diversity which exists in our society whereas others will search for a method of peaceful coexistence but based on the recognition that there are different values. Still others may feel that the diversity should be left as it is and there should be no artificial attempt to set a common framework for coexistence. At this symposium, I feel, we should not attempt any prediction. But rather, we should exchange as many opinions as possible, considering together what are actually the possibilities or alternatives available. In the course of discussions I may nominate certain speakers to give their views to make the debate constructive, exercising my prerogative as a chairman. May I first ask Professor Mushakoji to give a keynote presentation?

Professor Mushakoji: The Geinoh Yamashiro-gumi, a group which is in charge of entertainment for this Conference, uses the so-called bel canto system of vocalization only when its members sing the Western songs. For all other songs, they use their natural voices. This practice represents a major departure from the concepts Japanese people commonly have about music. This is exactly the point I want to bring up for discussion at the present symposium. The question is, in other words, how we can supersede the traditional civilization based on Western values. Of course, we all benefit greatly from Western civilization. Accordingly, we have thought all along that steps such as the Westernization, modernization, industrialization, and internationalization are all important preconditions if we were to achieve a happy society and a happy life. What we are observing today however is, in my view, the limit of this civilization, a series of revolts from non-West European camps against the system based on West European values.

The characteristics of the Western culture include the according of a high priority to science and technology as a driving force to progress, and the restless efforts in search of power and wealth, the two representative values. On the other hand, we are seeing various symptoms of the maladies of this civilization. The examples are the colonialism, the society based on mass-consumption, and the proliferating technocracy. Under the present system, richer industrialized countries grow ever richer using poorer countries as steppingstones whereas the poorer countries tend to become still poorer. In the process of transferring civilization and technologies from an industrialized country in Europe or elsewhere to a developing country, it also happens often that this developing country becomes subjugated to the donor country one way or the other. Both the Darwinist and the diffusionist logics of industrialization are, after all, the same as the law of the jungle where the stronger prey upon the weaker, which leaves only the fittest to survive. Where the principles of competition predominate, the values for getting power and wealth are given the top priority. As a result, preferences are given to Gesellschaft over Gemeinschaft, industrial technologies over traditional agricultural wisdoms, and male-centered logics over female-centered logics. Furthermore, the prevalence of the evolutionistic world outlook tends to perpetuate certain values as desirable while precluding others as irrational, thus as a result even endangering the existence of pluralistic values.

The moves to reconsider and depart from these existing preoccupations are manifold. In Iran, the Shah who tried to introduce the Western technologies to his country without modification was ousted by Khomeini who
contradicts the European logic itself. Within countries of the West there are also voices to reconsider the existing values, exemplified by the phrase “small is beautiful” which offers a contrast to the dominance of giant technologies, and by an emphasis on ecology as against economy. I am not advocating to abandon the West European ideas of industrialization. What is desirable is not to make the poor rich, give power to the weak, nor to substitute women for men. The important thing, in my view, is to re-evaluate those values which have so far been set aside as insignificant and to recognize the value of those things which up to now did not receive any positive value. The mutual recognition of diversified values, this is the indispensable precondition for attaining a good human society in the twenty-first century.

European Values, Home Rule and Independence

Chairman: Professor Mushakoji made the point that there are limits to Western civilization. Before proceeding with this discussion, we should perhaps listen to see whether any of the panelists have a basic disagreement with the view just presented. Professor Cohen?

Professor Cohen: There is a great deal of over-simplification about Western values in the last speech by Professor Mushakoji. As I listened I tried to relate the context of his speech to the history of the United Kingdom, and I could hardly make sense of it at all. There was a great deal of talk about the growth of industrial power and the use of this power to the detriment of other countries. But then, I thought that already at the beginning of the present century there was a movement within British politics to give home rule to Ireland. At that time Britain had under its control a powerful army and a powerful navy. Home rule was given to Ireland as a triumph of liberal policies and not because it was a necessity. In the same way, progressively many people in Britain started to think in the early part of the twentieth century that home rule should be given to every part of the British Empire including India. India was given home rule by the Labour Government immediately after the Second World War. Home rule was given because it was part of the political programme of the Labour Party, which had received overwhelming electoral support at that election. When I am asked, do I think that European values should be spread, I think of the granting of home rule to countries as one ideal which should be spread. I regard that as a European value, or at least a British value, of which I am proud.

Chairman: Since a reference was made to India, would you, Mr. Nandy, like to comment?

Dr. Nandy: I find it interesting that Britain decided to give India home rule only after the War, that is, years after home rule was proposed to Ireland. In the meanwhile, there was a major anti-British upheaval in India and thousands had been arrested and put in jail. Evidently, that beautiful idea of granting home rule came to British India only after the weakening of the Empire. In any case, what Dr. Mushakoji was stating was a general principle, I think, that the biggest are not always the best and that the smallest and the most cornered are perhaps not the worst, although this may not have much to do with Western values as such.

Chairman: The question of whether the recognition of a home rule and independence will represent the propagation of a European value will make an interesting debate. But let us avoid getting too deeply involved in such political issues. Professor Mushakoji, any comments about the opinion presented by Professor Cohen?

Professor Mushakoji: What I wanted to elaborate was those European values which have particular relevance to the type of industrialization under progress. I do not necessarily deny the importance of other European values such as the concepts of human rights and freedom, and their historical role and meaning. It should be kept in mind, however, that the non-Occidental world, including Japan which imported the Western values, had the tendency to neglect the freedom and human right portion of the system while having fully acquired the pursuit for wealth and power. By the same token, it was only the richer countries of Europe which had the latitude to recognize home rule for their protectorates. The relative latecomers in Europe as shown by the examples of fascist Germany and Italy had to pursue power logics which were quite different from these of Britain.

Dr. Kwapon: I think it is important to try and move the discussion from the purely parochial to the much more objective and general. It was unfortunate to concentrate on the examples of home rule and non-home rule as instances of Western values, because if you start arguing that home rule is a European value, then taking away the freedom of the Irish and the Indians is also a European value, because, before a Western colonial nation gives home rule to its dependent peoples, it will have first to deprive the latter people of their freedom before the liberal principles can come in. So I think it is really a false equation to think that freedom or non-freedom are by themselves “Western” values: these are intrinsically “human” values.

The basic question at issue is really whether industrialization and the use of modern science and technology in the creation of power are essentially the intrinsic and moral property of any one particular group of people or whether in fact these processes are basically human to which all peoples, whatever their nationalities, can contribute in their own way, given the appropriate conjuncture of conditions and opportunities and, above all, whether in fact individual human beings in the various parts of the world should each have their different peculiar cultural contributions to make to the sum total of human civilization. If we can conduct the discussion on that basis, we shall avoid bogged down in this calculus of
political and moral virtues and vices.

Chairman: This debate has certain meaning to the extent that both industrialization and modernization originated from Europe. But our time is limited. Perhaps we should also have views from persons who find validity and positive relevance in values such as associated with words like industrialization, technological progress, and modernization.

Professor Janousek: Let me briefly explain a view from a standpoint of a social psychologist who lives and works in a European socialist country. As well known, there exists the critical analysis of the effects of industrialization as developed under the system of private ownership. The important psychological aspects of the problem have been pointed out, for instance, by Erich Fromm, namely, the type of frustrations arising from the lack of human contacts and affection, the lack of long-term economic security, and the unfulfilled desire for creativity, which are all caused by anonymous manipulation and exploitation of men. By abolishing private ownership as a means of production and by transferring these means into the hands of society, the socialist countries are also trying to re-integrate human consciousness in such a way as to preclude any frustration. This is of course a time-consuming process because it involves development of man's human qualities in step with the further development of the socialist society itself. As regards the issue of the materialistic approach toward values, it is not adequate to discuss only of material needs such as consumption because there are also spiritual or "ideal-oriented," materialistic approaches. I feel some concretization of materialistic approaches could help us discuss those values which we are all interested in.

Chairman: May I ask Professor Kawakita to give his comment, representing this point of view that we now need some new thinking which supersedes the traditional concept of industrialization?

Professor Kawakita: This phenomenon of modernization or industrialization is really the latest development in the human history in the field of cultural transformation which is still under way. The changes brought about are quite wide-range, incorporating the non-materialistic aspects including changes in social structures. The modernization actually started from more visible materialistic aspects whereas the less visible alteration, for example, in values started with a substantial delay, in fact coming to catch our eyes only recently.

Can We Bridge the Gap Between the Poor and the Rich?

Chairman: I think there is a general agreement that industrialization has also brought rather undesirable side effects. And the problems faced by the countries which have been long industrialized and those about to industrialize or still relatively new at industrialization seem to be different problems. Professor Clark, will you perhaps comment along these lines, preferably in Japanese?

Professor Clark: I was asked to speak in Japanese. But my Japanese is very poor and I hope you will not be distressed by it. I have been listening to what Mr. Mushakoji has mentioned and I have known his ideology for some time and I have reflected on these points. When we talk about Western civilization or culture, I agree it is full of defects. But where is the cause of such defects? According to Mr. Mushakoji, it is because we in the Western cultures tend to lay too much emphasis on industrialization. I think that the problem is much deeper. What is important is not so much the accumulation of wealth but whether we use it for good or evil. These things are determined by the values of a culture. In other words, industrialization does not create the values of a society. These values create the industrialization, and determine how it will be used. Under Western culture we have at times tended to abuse material power. The Indo-African countries were deprived of freedom for example. But we also at times used power to do good and as a result we have the independence of many countries.

In the same way, as a result of power and wealth we have the problems of alienation between man and woman, over-competition and so on. These are the more unfavourable aspects. But also with the same power and wealth, we have ability to correct or rectify these wrong aspects. So the problem is one of how we are going to correct the harm-producing values within the framework of Western culture. I have been listening to what Professor Gottmann mentioned earlier in his lecture. And he cited the words of Mr. Siegfried about the discussion between Gandhi and Ford of U.S.A. If we judge by results, I think Ford has won that discussion. Yesterday a very different discussion took place in Japan between Ford and Toyota Motors. And this time it was Ford which was defeated by Toyota. It was ultimately defeated because the Japanese way of managing companies puts more emphasis on the human element. This very special way of managing business is based on the value system. It is not produced by economic wealth or industrialization.

In any case, Ford was beaten by Toyota, that is to say the wave of the Western industrialization was beaten by traditional values of Japanese culture. There is nothing inevitable about Western materialism triumphing over all. I think Mr. Mushakoji was quite correct when he mentioned that the Western culture has chosen a differ-
ent or a wrong approach. In other words, I think we have to admit that the Japanese way of approaching matters is correct. But when we consider the problem of industrialization, I think we should evaluate this problem in a more positive manner. We talk about the survival of the fittest. But if the weaker are to become stronger, I think economic power will be necessary. From Indonesia, from the Philippines and from Taiwan, Japan is importing a great amount. Due to this they have been able to increase their economic power. This is a good thing. But it would not have been possible if Japan had not had economic power in the first place.

Professor Gottmann: I would like to express my agreement with what Professor Gregory Clark has just said; but I would like to add to it one point towards which he seemed to be going but didn't get to. That point was touched upon by Professor Mushakoji as the increasing gap between the rich and the poor, both in terms of countries and also within countries. I happen to disagree with this alleged fact itself. I think that what is called the gap between the poor and the rich may by some measurements seem to be increasing, but this is largely because we measure these phenomena in a way that is no longer consistent with the present reality. I do not see how one can say, for instance, that the Western nations which used to be very rich in the past are still today richer than all of those that used to be poor. If you take any statistics, whether per capita income or per capita gross national products, the highest level is now found in countries that used to be very poor but are producing petroleum and exporting it. Those are, by a good many yardsticks, much richer, and in many respects, they seem more powerful also, than the countries on the two sides of the North Atlantic. That is a recent change. It may be a good change for those countries that became richer, although Ayatollah Khomeini did not think that it was a good change for Iran.

I think that the gap is also decreasing in most countries that have democratic governments today, because we have invented the so-called Welfare State. In its present shape, it was probably chiefly a British invention, but many countries have contributed to it. The philosophy of welfare is that when, in the acrobatics of competition between people, some fall down, you do not let them fall on to the hard floor. The survival of the less fit can be secured if you extend a safety net. This is what the Welfare State has been doing and doing increasingly. Of course, it still leaves the unsuccessful at a relatively low level in comparison with those who are winning all the applause. But it is a level of dignified survival. This principle is something which could be followed in a great many countries.

Chairman: What are your opinions on the view just presented, Professor Kawata?

Professor Kawata: It is extremely difficult to ascertain whether, in fact, various conditions are improving over time, and whether the gap between developed countries and the Third World has narrowed. On the other hand, the process of industrialization has been pushed on a global scale over the last few centuries with vigor and in such a manner that even the poorest countries have been directly involved. As a result, the Third World came to possess the dual-structure society and the dual economy. I think a good example of this is countries of Latin America where although political independence has long been achieved the countries still lack independence in an economic and psychological sense. This represents the fact that the national economies of these countries are still in a disintegrated stage.

A similar state also exists in developed countries, although the economic environment surrounding the problem may be different, whether limitations imposed by natural resources, or pollution, or the inflation. Let us take the example of Japan. On the one hand, this country has the economic sector represented by rapidly growing enterprises with multi-national operations, such as in fields of motorcars, steel, and shipbuilding. At the same time, local and regional economies are also flourishing and getting out of control from the central government. This phenomenon is incorporated into what the ruling, Japanese conservative government terms the Rural Town Concept. The same phenomenon is referred to as rising regionalism by the oppositions. The question then arises as to how these fragmented elements can be re-integrated into the national economy. Or alternatively, should we leave the major enterprises to grow beyond the national economy to become nation-less and also let local economies consolidate on a regional basis? When we talk about industrialization this is the major question at issue for Japan as well as for other industrialized countries of Europe and North America. In the Third World, the biggest problem is the widening gap existing between those sectors of economy affected by the global industrialization and the indigenous agricultural sector which is left unattended in a historical state. This widening gap and the appearance of the new type of economic disintegration now under way in developed countries are really serious economic problems of large magnitude which are facing us today.

Dr. Kwapon: The point I wanted to make was both to agree with Professor Gottmann's conclusions but to disagree with his analysis on the basis of what I have been reading. The World Bank has just brought out its Third World Development Report which I have just been looking at. I am not an economist. But the whole bearing of this report and the debate at the recent meetings of the IMF and the World Bank seem to indicate the contrary to Professor Gottmann's rather optimistic analysis that the gap is closing. There may, of course, be some improvements and changes here and there within the Third World. But the main point is that on the macro-scale the lot of the Third World in general is getting no better. The prospects, in fact, are much worse. There is a lot more starvation now in the Third World, for instance, in Africa. There is a lot more poverty. Some of this is, of
course, due to political mismanagement, oppression, and corruption. But a great deal is also the result of the traditional geopolitical and economic structures which have not changed. Political independence has come to many African countries, to name these, but it has not really meant their gaining any economic or social independence. Because of the present international division of labor and the inequitable and gross imbalances in the use of global resources by the affluent industrial nations, the developments now taking place in the so-called interdependent world order are completely unequal. This is the crux of the North-South debate and the demands by the Third World nations for a New International Economic Order. They maintain that the gap is widening, and they regard this as unjust.

But the part of the analysis by Professor Gottmann with which I agree is where he stresses the positive values within Western and other societies which put a premium on holding a safety net for the disadvantaged and underprivileged. I think it is rather mythical to maintain that the gap is closing or is already closed, unless I misunderstand him. But I would say that I do accept the emphasis he puts on helping the weak and supporting the poor, on sharing resources fairly, and on real tolerance and freedom, which, I agree, are important values. The present situation is that the global economy and world order are becoming more and more interdependent. But the argument for a New International Economic Order, to adopt Orwell's phrase, is that some few nations are more interdependent than the vast majority, and that this should be corrected. The need is for more over-all global, social justice. However, I do admit that, when you look at individual Third World nations, you do find improvements here and there. It is true that in Brazil or in Saudi Arabia or in Kuwait or such places, you find pockets which are much better-off and much wealthier than many countries in Europe. But when you look at the over-all international position, the fact remains that there are still gross imbalances and that the prospects are gloomier for the poorer two-thirds of humankind, and that it requires more positive efforts on the part of all concerned to try to overcome these difficulties.

**Expected Role of International Organizations**

**Chairman:** Now I would like to give the floor to Professor Carstairs. He will perhaps tell us, based on his expertise, the type of problems being faced by a country, which has recently gone through industrialization.

**Professor Carstairs:** I am myself a psychiatrist, and therefore I do not claim any expertise in economics, industrialization, or international politics. But I share with everyone in this hall a fascination with the topics of human attitudes and values. I take some comfort from the fact that the topic of this symposium is the "Search for Basic Principles in the Human Society of the 21st Century." That seems to assume that there will be such a society. In our pessimistic moments, we tend to wonder if the human race will survive at all until the twenty-first century.

Let me touch upon some of the changes which I believe will have to come about before the ideals embarked upon by the League of Nations and further enunciated by the United Nations will become steps closer to reality. First of all, the gross material inequalities as existing on earth today must be reduced. For this purpose, I think, we need to move towards a one-world community. A few minutes ago, Professor Gottmann was reminding us about the concept of a welfare state. But if that concept is to be applied to the world community as a whole, a substantial change in the attitudes of almost every nation will be necessary as regards the continuance of extreme poverty and starvation, which should be viewed as an insult to the human race and not merely the problems of the unfortunate masses in a number of poor countries.

Another attitude that has to change is fear, the fear between the nations. Here I would like to emphasize that the greatest manifestations of fear are demonstrated by the most powerful nations. The more "over-kill" in the possession of the United States and the U.S.S.R., the more fearful do they become that somebody will preempt the first strike; and their fear echoes through the other, less powerful nations of the world. During the last four years there has been a spectacular increase, in nearly every country, in the amount of the national economy devoted to the stockpile of arms. This is not only in the rich countries but also in the poor countries of the world who can least afford it. That attempt to overcome fear by arming will only cease when the conditions for feeling more confident and secure are established by a world order. And that in turn requires a belief in the accessibility of genuine justice in the case of dispute. When I read in the papers about the continuing and totally unresolved dispute between the Israelis and the Palestinians, it seems obvious that both of them have the very same fear — that they will be deprived of a homeland. Palestinians have even more cause to feel deprived, because they are excluded from their homeland; and the Israelis too have cause, because many of their neighbours declare their intention to drive them out of their hard-won homeland.

All of these instances add up to the major change, of attitude, of value, which involves the surrender of national autonomy. We in Europe are having difficulty in making a true reality of the European Economic Community. We are painfully coming to recognize that it will only be a thorough, worthwhile community when there is a real surrender of national autonomy. This irritates some people because they cannot bear the thought; but still it is gradually being advanced in Europe and some day one hopes it will be achieved on a world scale.

**Chairman:** I think the discussions so far have evolved around the earlier comments by Professor Gottmann. May I now ask him to give some responses before we move, after recess, to the second half of this symposium?

**Professor Gottmann:** I want to register my gratitude for the attention that my colleagues on this panel have shown to a few remarks that I made. Many of them have refined some of the points that I made. May I add one
point to answer the two books that have been thrown at me, that is, the recent reports by the World Bank and of the International Monetary Fund. Those two reports, it has been said, have demonstrated that the gap is still there and has been widening for some time. Those two institutions, which were created to eliminate or close the gap, have functioned for thirty-five years now. And now they say that they have failed and that the gap is worse than before. If that is true, one could say: let us scrap them. But I do not think that it is true. I think these agencies have done a lot of good, much more than they care to say. The main point is that all those organizations, the United Nations, the World Bank, and so forth, have had the function, if I may continue my image of the safety net for governments, for independent states. They have been acting as agents of the welfare state not for individuals but for governments and multi-national organizations, because their main task has been to try to maintain a certain political stability. To some extent they have succeeded in that task.

Political stability involves a certain straightening out of the credit accounting between the banks, the central banks and the big private banks, and also the national treasuries. To the bankers and to the governments, if there is an imbalance in these accounts, the gap is widening, quite independently of what is happening to the individuals in the countries concerned. That is a very different set of values. I think, from the human values we are discussing here. Basically, human values evolve in a way that is not accounted for by the usual methods of measurement at all. The basic values are not accounted for at all by most of the comparative statistics at our disposal. In fact, the reports of the World Bank and the IMF are at much greater variance from reality than the erroneous censuses that we all get and use today.

A Value System Based on a Life-Model

Chairman: In the second half of this symposium I hope to have discussions centering around the topic of the "propagation of industrialization." We have with us today experts on philosophy and comparative cultures. Perhaps we can start the discussions by considering what type of fundamental global outlook on nature we should establish regarding industrialization. No doubt, industry and technology are arts developed on the basis of natural sciences. On the other hand, it does not necessarily mean that the scientific outlook should be the only governing concept of the world. Some people may have a fundamental world outlook different from those based on naturalistic or scientific outlook, because this is an aspect closely related to one's values. Although the scientific outlook is the predominant one in the world today, I think, there is a room for other outlooks which either oppose or supplement the conventional one. Professor Kawakita, have you any comment?

Professor Kawakita: Prior to industrialization, individual countries had, I think, well-balanced cultures, where science, technology, economy, social structure, and values were in good harmony. However the industrialization has prompted the growth of a material culture in a selective manner out of the total culture, leaving other aspects practically unchanged. This is what we call the "cultural lag." Instead of a new set of values to replace the old ones, what is happening is just the disintegration of the old value system. In the absence of an alternative value system, many people tended to adopt cheap values — which I prefer to call the inorganic or machine-model values. An example is the type of philosophy that this world is made up of lifeless parts and components, or an analogy which compares human beings to machine parts.

I think we need to search for some new "X" to replace the machine model. In other words, a new outlook which is based on the idea that the world is alive and it is composed of living things. Perhaps something similar to the primitive animism, which is based on the concept of what may be called a life-model. I should avoid over-optimism, but I think the world is moving toward that direction.

Professor Cohen: The last speaker suggested that when industrialization developed, the value in the countries in which it developed, still remained the same. This may have been so in some respects but in others, it was not so. For example, the greater production of wealth that was made possible by industrialization made it possible for politicians gradually to work toward the establishment of a welfare state and in this way aspirations for the satisfaction of people's basic needs could be given reality. It was not so much use in having the value until it could be made possible to apply it. Of course, we have to now think of a situation in which the satisfaction of needs comes into conflict with the satisfaction of wants. In the history of recent philosophy in the last hundred and fifty years and the many discussions about the pursuit of happiness, or as it is sometimes called "utilitarianism," that distinction has not always been sufficiently drawn.

We have heard several times in the course of this conference, about the very real dangers of what is sometimes called consumerism, the desire of more and more consumer goods for their own sake. It is quite clear that this satisfaction of wants as a value, since it can be pursued by only the wealthier section of the world community and in doing so they consume resources which might otherwise be distributed to satisfy the needs of the poorer sections, is in real conflict with the satisfaction of needs. We heard the other day from Professor Isaacs about the creation of the Open Society in the United States. Although it is a fine ideal that everybody should be equal before the law and although no one wishes to sacrifice any part of that ideal, nevertheless if the Open Society also means the freedom to consume as much of the world's resources as the society can obtain, then that Open Society will not seem to people in other countries, and above all in the poorer countries, to be a good ideal.

So, we need to have something like a hierarchy of values, with the satisfaction of wants rather low, and the satisfaction of needs at the top. I would like to tell one
brief anecdote about John Stuart Mill, who was perhaps the very best expositor of the philosophy of utilitarianism. He reports in his autobiography that when he was a young man and had learnt about the philosophy of utilitarianism from his father, James Mill, he thought that the prime objective in life was to pursue happiness, which he he construed primarily in terms of the satisfaction of wants. But he found that when he pursued that as an objective, he became very unhappy. Indeed, he had what nowadays would be called a “nervous breakdown,” and it was only after some months that he suddenly realized that contentment would only come if he pursued other objective than simply happiness directly through the satisfaction of wants.

Now, I think that the world in general and many particular communities within it are in a situation analogous to that of John Stuart Mill in that period. Over and above the satisfaction of needs we must find other objectives to pursue. For example, the last speaker I think has mentioned, quite rightly, a respect for nature, and already we find this growing especially among the younger generation. I have just come here from Australia, and I have been astonished by the strength of the environmentalist movement there, which includes now a concept which I had not heard before, namely, a respect for the wilderness, that is to say the desire to maintain areas of nature completely without any regard for human purposes. This is a value which is independent of human objectives. That is just one example of the way in which our value system is changing. The pressures of industrialization are bringing about now, as they brought about in the nineteenth century, a considerable change of values.

So, although we may need to some extent to direct this, I myself am quite optimistic that in the natural course of human development, industrial pressures will bring about a revulsion against the worst features of consumerism, and in this respect we may expect an adoption of alternative objectives to the mere satisfaction of wants.

Professor Mushakoji: To a certain extent it may be true that, as industrialization progresses, new values will appear as a reaction to the industrialization. Where I personally find the problem is that all of the Western values have been, and still are today, tied one way or the other to industrialization.

For example, the concept of human rights is a very important West European value. Due to the heavy emphasis placed on power in the power politics, however, human rights tend to be viewed merely as a supplement to such politics. Another example is the present approach to the problems of industrial waste and environment, which are treated as an affix to industrialization and the logics of the industry. What is more important is always industrialization and the rest comes in only as a patchwork to the safety net. In this era of industrialization, I am afraid those important desirable values of the West had been propagated only in such secondary roles.

A completely new approach will perhaps appear when the Western values become grasped not in an absolute but a relative manner, clearly separated from industrialization, to form a dialogue, so to speak, with non-Western ideals. The concept of human rights may, for instance, be thought in a non-Western framework of reference, such as liberation from fear. The result may be something quite different from the conventional legalistic idea of human rights. Alternatively, the Western concept of environmentalism may be merged with animistic naturalism perhaps to form a new worldly outlook which replaces industrialism. What I want to point out is that a new outlook for life may emerge if we manage to form a real dialogue on an equal footing between Western values and other values.

Chairman: May I have your views on the subject, Dr. Nandy?

Dr. Nandy: We have been discussing primarily industrialization and industrialism. These however are a part of a wider syndrome. When we, for example, talk of Westernization, we mean something more than the West. Westernization is also a part of an ideology in which industrialism, urbanism, some forms of scientism and technologism fit together. It is a complex structure of consciousness and institutions which we confront today.

Now, this by itself would not have been dangerous because the world has seen many traditions over the centuries. Many traditions have died and others have come into being. Human beings were there before this modern tradition emerged and they would be there after the modern age ends. Modernity is also a phase. Unfortunately, in the interim period, we see that the complex of mutually potentiating forces which constitutes modernity has a tendency to totalize. In other words, not only does modernity want to survive as one of the many traditions of mankind, it wants to modernize and, if possible, annihilate all other traditions which the modern man sees as inferior and, hence, primitive. These other traditions are now in real danger. If we are thinking in terms of an alternative set of values, we must start by building bastions by which we can give some protection to the alternative traditions which are still surviving in the world. Otherwise I do not see any escape from a situation where you will have a universal man or a universal brotherhood in the worst sense of the term.

What are the Real Needs of Mankind?

Chairman: Now I would like to have opinions from Professor Janousek and Dr. Kwapon.

Professor Janousek: I think our important task is the search for means to overcome negative effects of industrialization and of processes connected with industrialization. Ecological considerations in the field of environmental protection are one of such available means. However, this is not the most prospective concept because of its limitations. The ecological movement bears — at least today — a defensive character, namely the defense of nature and mending of ecological conditions. A more
prospective and human possibility lies in the sphere of inter-human relations.

We underline in our country the importance of collectives and collectivism in this connection. It is incorrect to identify collectivism with conformance or with suppression of individual development. On the contrary, the self-development of individual personality is a necessary precondition for a true collective, as much as the development of the collective is a necessary precondition for the full development of personality. The promotion of collectivism is in fact built up on the basis of the shared acceptance of progressive values not only within a collective but also in the socialist society as a whole. Professor Mushakoji has made a reference to Gemeinschaft, which has an important bearing on collectives and collectivism. From the psychological point of view, the specificity of Gemeinschaft in terms of close human relationship represents a useful means to overcome the negative effects of industrialization.

Let me end with a remark concerning our conference emblem. I admire it very much but I have one comment to make. Whereas there is only one man in the emblem, we should not forget that a cooperation of many different persons toward a common goal is necessary to solve the difficult problems such as we discuss here.

Dr. Kwapon: I would like to go back briefly to the point made by Dr. Cohen and Dr. Nandy. This concerns the issue of wants and needs within both countries which are industrialized and advanced technologically and those which are not. First of all, there is no question that the evil effects of industrialization must be countered wherever they may be, whether in the developing or the developed countries. But this question really is subsidiary, in my opinion, to the major question of the individuality and identity of real human beings who make up this world.

I wish to emphasize the point which Mr. Nandy made, which is that, while building a common civilized world, in which men and women share the same basic material needs and wants, we must also recognize the vital necessity to ensure that the different human communities each retain their own individualities and their own beliefs, religions, cultures, and way of life. The majority of the people in many of the developing countries live in such conditions as to make it impossible for them to admire the beauties of the “wilderness” because they really live their normal daily lives in real “wilderness”; and there is no virtue for them in protecting this wilderness, from which they desire to escape to some of the creature comforts of modern, urban “civilization.” They would like to change their rural misery and poverty and enjoy some of the so-called “evils” of life in the urban centers, which are condemned as just rank materialism and consumerism by the very urban dwellers who take these city amenities for granted.

Many societies in many places have been unable to combine social justice and freedom with modernization and that is one of the challenges that we will have to deal with more and more as we go into the twenty-first century. My remarks are really a footnote, in a sense, to the point made by Dr. Carstairs on the need for human solidarity. In the long-run, freedom everywhere is invisible. You only have to look for the context and try to reconcile the different needs and different wants.

Japan as One New Model

Chairman: I think Professor Kwapon raised one important issue. Professor Kawata, will you perhaps comment?

Professor Kawata: What Professor Kwapon has mentioned, I think, has a special reference to some 700 to 800 million people in South Asia and Africa who live in absolute poverty. How we should cope with those people who lack any measure of peace, who are left out from the global wave of industrialization. This is in fact a very great problem. Urgent solutions to this problem must be found because those people, who until recently did not realize their state, now recognize the terrible conditions they are in, and expect and demand improvements. The explosive demand and dissatisfaction of the people have induced riots, and these riots caused counter riots and terrorism, producing nasty, vicious cycles. I have the disquiet feeling that unless mankind can solve these problems of developing countries, there will be many armed conflicts of different types in the 1980s and 1990s in South Asia and Africa, and all over the Latin American continent. This is certainly not an easy task. It will involve not only the creation of a new international order but also the pavement of orders within developing countries, a prerequisite of which is the rectification of the current situation in which a handful of persons monopolize the wealth in these countries in collusion with masters in developed countries who have control over industrialization processes.

People in developing countries often use the term “human dignity” but not so much the term “human rights,” which well illustrates the type of expectations and values held by these people. Unless the developed countries seriously consider these wishes and seek methods to accept them in the world society as fully participating members, the countries of the North are bound to receive a painful retort from the South.

What kind of role can Japan play then? Having experienced a standstill after the rapid and reckless industrialization, Japan has promptly turned to the building of a knowledge-intensive society by putting efforts and resources into information and culture industries. The country seems to have also managed to overcome stagflation. In contrast, countries in Europe and North America have not coped successfully with these challenges, either out of relative indifference or a defeatistic attitude. Japan as a country undergoing a new type of industrialization, although its substance may perhaps be superficial, should give an answer to the problems mentioned above by way of example by successfully completing the industrialization in progress. I see some positive prospects on the horizon by viewing, if I may, the current Japanese economy in a rather optimistic
Can We Have Optimism for the 21st Century?

Professor Clark: We are spending too much time debating technicalities of economic and social progress. I have great confidence in the ability of man to organize and regulate the affairs of his own society. I believe that we have seen a remarkable improvement in the question of pollution and environment, and that improvement will continue. I think thanks to the example of the socialist countries, the excessively laissez-faire philosophy of the Western countries has been checked, and we are approaching more of the balance there in that respect. I think thanks to the example of Japanese economic progress, particularly enterprise management, we in the West are gaining valuable lessons. I am even optimistic on the question of male and female relations, even if the Japanese businessmen like to drink in Ginza bars every evening. In fact, drinking in Ginza bars every evening could be one of the elements involved in successful Japanese management. Not only men have to relate with women, but men need to learn to relate to other men.

We can even be optimistic about the so-called North-South problems and the energy problems. Ultimately it is up to the countries concerned, the developing countries themselves, to decide which way they want to develop and how they will develop. Japan did that and we are seeing other examples in Asia, and I believe eventually we will see the examples elsewhere.

In other words, when man is dealing with his fellowmen in his own society, there is a considerable hope for sanity and improvement. We are here today to talk about the values needed in the world in the twenty-first century. By the time the twenty-first century comes, in another 20 years, I think that our so-called economic and social problems — our domestic problems — will be quite different from what we have today, and we will be able to handle them on our own just as well as we can today.

There is one problem, however, towards which I remain totally pessimistic. And this is the ability of man in one society to relate to a man in another society. In other words, the problem is not one of domestic values, but international values. In recent years we have seen many examples of how the people of one large country have taken the license to go into other countries and massacre millions of people. Massacring of millions of human beings to me is a far more serious problem than whether fish can live in the river Thames, or whether the Ethiopians will achieve progress through aid from abroad or on their own efforts. We are seeing massacring going on today for exactly same reasons that it was going on 20 or 30 years ago. We have learned nothing from the past. Until we tackle this problem, I feel that the world will not be a worthy place for us to live in.

Chairman: Many important issues have been raised by panelists today. Unfortunately, we have hardly managed to give any direction to solutions of these problems. It is perhaps all the better that we now have to close the symposium with a lot of frustrations inside ourselves, because any short-sighted consensus on solutions, as might have been reached, may represent a threat to the human survival. Anyway, I am very grateful to all the participants for the very heated discussions which took place today.
NEW LIFE AND NEW SOCIETY—
AN ACTION PLAN TOWARD THE 21ST CENTURY

Chairman (Professor Yamaguchi): We now open the symposium Collage 21. When we named it collage, what we meant was a jigsaw puzzle-like admixture of sorts of values, blended and mixed together. That's why we named it collage.

To open this collage, Professor Michio Nagai, will make an address in the way of making a proposal, proposition. Professor Nagai.

Professor Nagai: Thank you, friends. Our moderator told you just now that to lead off this Collage 21 panel symposium I am to advance forward with a suggestion or proposition. Let me, however, say that I only arrived here last night. I attended a discussion meeting last night, but I had missed earlier discussions from the first day until yesterday. For me to try to propose a proposition or put forward anything like it without hearing everybody will be discourteous and exceeds my function. I am fortunate however, that Professor Yoshida and others have told me very kindly about the general lines of discussion that have taken place. I have been able to gather together some of my thoughts and observations to speak to you.

1. Neither Pessimism Nor Optimism

What I would like to say first is when we consider the contemporary society, I see three orientations, or directions. One orientation is optimism. As an optimistic expression, I would like to quote the case of Robert Hutchins, an American educator who wrote in 1968 a book entitled The Learning Society. In a sense this book was in search of a noble ideal, not just to respect science and technology. In this book Hutchins said that in the present society there is an information explosion, indeed a revolutionary explosion of information. He continued to say that automation and cybernetics had been so well developed that, for the first time, in the history of mankind, man is being liberated from physical labor. According to Hutchins all men would be like the citizens of ancient Greek city of Athens where they could rely on and utilize slaves. The citizens of Athens were freed from manual labor, because they could employ slaves who had to serve their masters. The citizens, freed from manual labor were able to pursue cultural values, intellectual truth, and moral goodness and beauty, thus they were able to afford to deepen their internal self. According to Robert Hutchins today man can employ machines as slaves. Consequently not just a handful of noble citizens but all men, being freed from lowly labor, are able to seek not just monetary income but possessions of something more essential. So Hutchins called it learning for learning's sake. Learning, in other words, would not be merely for obtaining academic degrees or amassing wealth or attaining stations in life but for learning's sake.

Thirteen years have elapsed since the publication of this book. Unfortunately the kind of picture outlined in this book has not been attained, and I do not know when it will be attained. In the 1980's, Hutchins said, that kind of a society will have arrived but we all know that the reality is far from that prophecy as pointed out a number
of times during this conference. There are many people living below the poverty line in the world. This depends on how you define poverty line but according to many economists, and they seem to be agreed, some 500 million people live in the world today below the widely accepted poverty line.

So you know that man has not been freed from labor by machine. Actually there are still many people who are living as miserably as ancient slaves. What about then in the highly developed societies like the United States of America, Europe or Japan? Here have people been liberated from labor? No, not yet. What became very apparent in the 1970's was the problem of unemployment. There was the problem of inflation. These are problems that still plague us. In America, in Europe and in Japan we are increasingly concerned about regaining economic stability which is a thought that disturbs us day and night. And in fact when you consider America, Europe, and Japan, these are societies that have been highly mechanized, so that many people have become experts with very narrow fields of specialization. Men have not become a kind of free philosophers as citizens of Athens but instead they have become unfree mechanical individuals with narrow fields of specialization.

The second orientation therefore would be of pessimism. There are pessimisms as expressed by a report like The Limits to Growth by the Club of Rome. That is an example of pessimism. But until recently a widely read, famous pessimistic writing was George Orwell's 1984 written in 1948. 1984 is less than four years ahead of us. 1984 is trifle parody. Nobody can afford to call it a laughing matter. Science and technology have prospered and succeeded and yet amidst this success of science and technology, items such as nuclear weapons, when combined with sovereign powers of some huge nations, a foreseeable consequence is known that can be quite dismal. George Orwell wrote a possible scenario in 1948. He called it a "balance of fear" that would prevail and said that in the superpowers, namely the United States of America and Soviet Russia, the power machinery would be strengthened so that human freedom would tend to be more and more constrained. And society is becoming today a controlled society. This is roughly the scenario that George Orwell portrayed. Men, instead of becoming masters, are becoming slaves and will forsake once and for all the freedom that they once enjoyed.

We are living indeed in a curious age because there are these two directions, optimism and pessimism. Both optimism and pessimism have a large number of advocates, yet neither of these orientations seems to be decisive in any sense. So here comes a third way or a third orientation. If you scrutinize George Orwell's writings, in 1984 he did not say what would happen would be exactly what he had written. He also wrote in a letter to his friend, that a picture he painted for 1984 was only a possibility. It was a suggestion that a kind of despotism may come. That is the message of George Orwell. In this vein of thought I am prompted to feel that there is a third way, neither optimism nor pessimism but an idealistic realism, if I may label it. I think we can very well pursue this path.

I for one do feel that we should stay on the track of this third road. In other words, in the present society there are so many vexing problems such as the problems in developing nations, those in socialist countries, and those in capitalistic societies. No society is immune from vexing problems. Whether we are in Japan, or Indonesia, or Ghana, we are obliged to carry on revolutionizing work. We must innovate ourselves and our society constantly in an effort to attain the values that we seek. This is a challenge lying ahead for us.

II. Social Innovation and Education

Therefore I come to the second part of my speech. Between innovation of the society and the growth of human beings, there is a deep interrelationship. One cannot take up only one to argue one way. Neither one is panacea to the problems.

Social psychologists have tried to explain how men are different from animals. Animals have the pattern for survival well perfected by instinct, but a newborn baby, while having its instinct, has no pattern to follow for survival.

Therefore, man must learn and does learn. In that sense, man is plastic. He plasticizes himself in relation to influences from the people and the environment around him. Man can acquire new patterns for survival, in addition to being moved by instinct. That is why we have various cultures and the variety of societies over the surface of the Earth. This is where man differs from animals.

The President of the Leisure Development Center, Mr. Sahashi, wrote in a recent issue of its house organ, called "Loisir," that man is plastic. That is why he would like to call upon this conference to ponder how we can stimulate people to learn.

But when we say "man is plastic," it does not necessarily follow that we can educate people to create any kind of society. People living in this world are unfortunately not born in vacuum. They are born into a certain social system, or into a set of certain cultural values. Therefore, if you are born in Japan, you learn Japanese cultural values, and take the norms of this given society.

The social values that man acquire are in fact the social values that are given as the norms in that society. In other words, man learns what the society tells him. The social norms and desires of man are interactive in the process of learning, and thus people acquire certain sets of social values.
If follows logically that we cannot overexpect from education. Expecting too much from education would be not only too idealistic, but too abstract a notion. Instead, we should keep in mind various problems existing in society. For example, we must question: Does equality exist? Does brotherhood or does fraternity exist in this society? There is no perfect society in terms of liberty, equality, and fraternity. And when we find a problem, we must move positively. And such a move is political, not a function of education. Without positive political action, education cannot be effective in the end. It is true when I was Minister of Education, I proposed that education must not be politicized. Today I am saying education is closely interrelated to politics. One may say that I am contradicting myself. No, I am not. What I meant earlier was that education should be apoliticized from the standpoint of partisan politics. Education should be freed from partisan politics, while politics and education are inseparably related. Education should be non-partisan and non-ideological. And in that sense, I will reiterate today that education should be removed from politics.

Now, in this vein of thought, we inevitably come to think about the need for political innovation in a society. The innovation is necessary for international as well as domestic communities. For example, we have often talked about the aging of our society. Demographically Japan is fast becoming an aged society, faster than all other countries in the world. Every year, the average age of the Japanese population advances by approximately one year. It has been so for the past 20 years. This is an amazing record. We should be more concerned about new distributions of income in relation to the demographic distribution of people. We must reorganize the total social system while we are moving very slowly in the way of adapting ourselves to this demographic change.

We must question, for example, can we secure a sufficient production workforce? Are there sufficient funds for the old age pension system? Are we to expect the old people to continue to learn and refine themselves for the rest of their lives, and to contribute in their way to our society? These are the questions we must be concerned with. We must also be concerned about oil, environment, consumption patterns, etc. In this process, new social norms will be created, which in turn will be learned by the new generations.

In the past people went to universities, preferably well-known universities, in order to obtain a degree. Many people were content with just that, mainly because such was the social norm. And if one was a famous university professor, he was promised social status and prestige. Now that advanced education has become so broadly universalized in some countries like Japan, degrees no longer mean as much as they did before nor necessarily guarantee one's station in life. Being a university professor does not guarantee that he is a possessor of valuable knowledge. Karl Jaspers once said a university professor is similar to the monkey busily eating all the coconuts on his tree. In our society, with all the drastic changes about knowledge such an old-fashioned professorship has to be revolutionized. Without innovation, how can education bring about new people? But then, who innovates this system? In one society there are so many other contradictions like this example.

In almost every social system, particularly in a rapidly changing society, that society is not complete nor stable by itself. Therefore, instability itself must be squarely recognized and appreciated. And this is done usually by those people who have strong sense of values and who are intellectually sensitive. The growth of man and social innovation are interactive.

In this Collage 21, we are taking up the problem of new society and new men. Let us keep in mind this mutuality or interactive relationship between society and man.

III. Three Proposals

Now I come to my final point. In thinking about a new society and new men, what are some of the matters we should pay particular attention to? Let me just give you three points. There are in fact many more than three points. But one is: plan versus freedom. When I talk about plan versus freedom, let me talk about the social framework of a nation. It was Erich Fromm who wrote in 1976 an extremely interesting book called To Have or To Be. In this book, Fromm stated that in order to realize new values in both capitalistic and socialistic societies, it is necessary to pay attention to the fact in both societies there are social mechanisms which guarantee continuous production of goods. In socialistic systems, there is tendency to produce more; and in capitalistic societies too there is tendency for producing more than necessary. And there is also strong advertising. Therefore, he states that it is necessary for people to shift their values from "to have" to "to be."

Some of his specific propositions are noteworthy. For example, he sees a need for a supreme cultural colloquium or conference. The other need he sees is for disclosure of information. What is the role of a supreme cultural forum in preserving environment, or in the case of Japanese, in controlling consumption in the future and ensuring a high quality of life? These are matters where individuals can act. But at the same time we need a social system conducive to such an effort. And we need a search by experts and reports by experts to this end, otherwise for most people it is extremely difficult to envisage such a new social system. There are advisory councils galore for our governments. But what Erich Fromm advocates here is something more sophisticated, not a machine nor a subservient subordinate body to the government nor to the majority political party. It should be, according to him, a forum or conference that serves the people with intellectual leadership. There is no such conference in Japan. Are there any such conferences in other countries? I do not know of any. In a highly complex society as the one we live in, we must attach great importance to such a new institution. However, this supreme cultural confer-
ence should not control people. If it does, we will simply create another controlled society which we certainly do not want. Therefore, in regard to the supply of knowledge from the supreme cultural conference, there must be freedom to resist and to reject it. People must be guaranteed the freedom to refuse anything that comes from such a conference, and also from the government, and big businesses, and from universities. There must be a free flow of information.

In America, there is now full disclosure of public information through a legally adopted system. In Japan we are only talking about such a notion of information disclosure. Japan is still probing into how to disclose information, seeking to find an ideal combination between freedom and planning.

I come to my second point. You heard much discussion yesterday about Gemeinschaft versus Gesellschaft. Gesellschaft is the type of social organization to which Western societies have been moving. What then is Gesellschaft? Gesellschaft contains several important social norms, such as the rights of every person and a rational, contractual relationship based upon such rights. It is related to that elucidated by Professor Kuwabara this morning in which he stated that the rights of an individual are related to the principle of equality in the Western world.

Companies, factories, universities, and governments were developed in Western society based on the concept of Gesellschaft. However, in the course of time it has become clear that men cannot be comprehended and appreciated in any totality merely on the basis of the concept of Gesellschaft. Relationships other than contractual such as brotherhood and fraternal, have tended to be ignored or slighted or given little attention in the societal relations of Gesellschaft. Fraternity and brotherhood, which may not always be rational but which are very important emotional aspects of human relations, have tended to be slighted under Gesellschaft.

In Japan too, Gesellschaft has developed since the beginning of Meiji. But in contrast to the West, while Gesellschaft has developed in Japan, Gemeinschaft elements have survived for a long time. Professor Francis Hsu, who will speak later, also noted the typical Japanese social structure of the clan in Japan. Thirty years ago I wrote a monograph based on my study of "Dozoku," a traditional Japanese kinship system which is related to the study of Professor Hsu. In fact, combining Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft was an art developed by not Japanese alone. Some Western people had also done it. It is important to note, however, that Japanese have institutionalized the combination of Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft.

Anthropologists and sociologists have been looking into this combination. May I say that most recently Japanese people have begun talking about Japanese-style management based more on consensus than contract, employees and the management working together rather than antagonizing each other. They tend to say that their business is being run well, and Japanese bureaucracy exercise administrative guidance rather than legal control.

When I was the Minister of Education, I also learned the importance of administrative guidance in running the Japanese society. Not only Japanese speak highly in praise of this, a foreign scholar also wrote nearly the same thing in his book, Japan as Number One. However, a book similar to Japan as Number One was written more than 30 years ago by Ruth Benedict and it was entitled The Chrysanthemum and the Sword. In this book Ruth Benedict noted the importance of communal human relationship as expressed in "Giri" and "On," traditional norms of mutual obligation rather than contract. Despite the modernization and industrialization, these concepts are still alive in Japanese society. It is interesting to see that Ruth Benedict's book and Ezra Vogel's book are very similar. An important difference is that Benedict was critical of Japanese culture while Vogel is praising it. Benedict stated that there was no rational political system nor economic system in Japan. Particularly during the Second World War, the civilian control of the Japanese Army was certainly lacking. In its stead there had arisen military supremacy in Japan. These were the points which were criticized by Benedict in relation to the traditional Japanese culture.

On the other hand, Ezra Vogel states that exactly for the same reason Japan has been successful. This probably is a reason why present day Japanese like Vogel's book. Japan is indeed hard to change. That is why I used a term "fictitious kinship" when I referred to the family system and the business system in Japan in my study of "Dozoku" 30 years ago.

In Japan, the whole country is based upon fictitious or ritual kinship and as long as people are Japanese, they are like parents, brothers and sisters, and tend to think that way. Japanese cannot throw this notion away easily. There are both opportunities and dangers in this kind of notion. It makes the Japanese problem of creating a new society and new men all the more difficult. There are complex relations among the government, business, and politics. There is also a strong distinction between in-group and out-group, much stronger than in most other societies. Consequently the Japanese easily make a distinction between Japanese and non-Japanese, insiders and outsiders. Can the Japanese unshackle themselves from these simplistic notions? If the Japanese are to become a part of the global society, respecting each society's rights and contracts, they must blend themselves well into the rest of the world.

Every university here has the in-group and the out-group. You are in or you are out, this is true for each department and for each discipline. But learning should be a common asset for all people and education means, in this sense, a common sharing of knowledge among all people. Can we have a common sharing of education in the Japanese kind of communal society? This is a problem for the future in Japan with which I am deeply concerned. I cannot deny the fact that the Japanese have been successful in the economic sphere. Yet, while Vogel's book spoke eloquently on the reasons for Japan's success in business, it is the book by Benedict which has to be read today if the Japanese are expected to participate in the rest of the world.

My third point is concerned with the world and its
nations. Although Professor Kuwabara already expressed his views concerning this problem, let me add a few notes here. Yesterday, there were many criticisms on traditional Western orientations. Today, however, Professor Kuwabara singled out an example of French Revolution which, in his view, established certain social values as liberty, equality, and fraternity which even today remain very valid in most parts of the world. In that sense, in contrast to anti-West critique we heard yesterday, Professor Kuwabara’s view is appreciably different. I think we ought to give serious thought to Professor Kuwabara’s words. Unquestionably in the West and more recently in the United States of America the concept of military and economic power has become dominant. It has therefore only very recently been that the Japanese have become able to talk to the United States on the equal footing on such problems as the Mutual Security Treaty. In the past, Western Imperialism dominated the world. Japanese Imperialism also became strong in some parts of the world. All of us have learned that such Imperialism was not conducive to the future of mankind. Now the urgent problem for all of us is to create a new world order in which all men can live together with the spirit of liberty, equality, and fraternity. However, the fact which has to be remembered today is that the League of Nations, the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the GATT system have been almost without exception products totally of the Western mind.

Without these efforts by the Western people, all of us may have still been living in a more chaotic world. Let us not forget these important contributions of the West. We should not easily discard the age of the West as finished and it would be much too arrogant for us to say that the Orient is now creating a new world order.

The Japanese ever since Meiji have been proud people. Because they have been so, they admittedly that they had been inferior, in certain regards, to the West.

It is important for the Japanese today to ask such questions as what have the Japanese done to repay the West. What have they contributed to the rest of the world? What political institutions or economic systems have they suggested to the rest of the world? What education systems have they come up with as contributions to the rest of the world? What have they done? If the Japanese remain as they have been in the past, future historians will chronicle very little about Japan’s contribution to the world.

Japan is not number one, far from it. We should not take the notion of being number one or number two. I noted frankly to Professor Vogel that it is not mature to call a nation number one or number two. If you must rank nations, what Japan has attained is only economic strength without adding other contributions to the world.

In this International Conference on Human Values, what are we to contribute to the formation of values in the world? Can the Japanese do this? Values alone do not solve problems and the creation of new socio-economic systems is necessary. By the year 2000, can we provide human, decent, minimum subsistence of life to the 500 million people who are living below the poverty line today? And what can the Japanese do to contribute in cooperation with other people? Only when the Japanese can make meaningful contributions, can we afford to talk about human dignity on this land. In the world of today, human dignity is too far in the future when so many people are living below the poverty line. It will still be too early for all of us to speak as though the dignity of man has been attained on this earth.

Rather than criticizing other nations, I would suggest we first criticize ourselves so that we can reflect on ourselves in order to move a step further toward the goal of human dignity and social justice.

Applause

Chairman: Thank you very much, Professor Nagai. Let us proceed to Symposium IV, Collage 21. We will have the co-ordinator and the panelists, numbering 18 and I think it is going to be difficult to undertake this Symposium and we have asked Professor Yamaguchi of Tokyo University of Foreign Studies to act as Coordinator.

Human Progress Through Communication

Chairman: Professor Nagai has just given us frank and valuable suggestions on the directions we should follow in tackling the problems of men and society toward the twenty-first century. Let us first have comments on these propositions by Professor Nagai.

Dr. Soedjatmoko: To be the first speaker on a panel is like jumping into a lake of cold water. One does not know the environment in which one has to swim. But let me make a few comments on Dr. Nagai's propositions. I really believe that the dichotomy between optimism and pessimism is an artificial one. We have seen in the history of nations alternating waves of cultural pessimism and optimism. Much more important than determining whether one is a pessimist or an optimist is to understand the underlying causes and the dynamics that account for these alternating waves. I rather think it is important to point out the social distance between this discussion about pessimism and optimism and the co-existence of despair among many of the poor in the world and the despair of many of the young in the industrialized nations, and their insistence on answers now. I sense a tremendous distance or an impenetrable wall between realities that exist in the world today among millions and millions of hungry and angry people, and the abstractions with which we deal here.

If, therefore, we want to deal with more of the real problems, I think that the third category that Dr. Nagai presents is a more promising line of pursuit. Here one really has to face the question of man's individual as well as collective capacity to learn. We will not be able to move into a better world unless we learn to enlarge our capacity for empathy; our capacity to listen to those who are now powerless, who have no voice, or whose voices even when raised, are not heard. They, their anger and their aspirations, but also their creative energies, will shape our future rather than the technologies about which we have been
speaking. One of the problems that stand in the way of the learning capacity of the human person is his reluctance to face up to his own inner fragmentation. One of the problems resulting from the fragmentation of science, about which Dr. Nagai has been speaking, is that it fragmented our own perception of ourselves and has led to the loss of a real sense of identity.

The new world will not be the result of the projections of economists or technologists. It will not be the result of the technologies that we use, but it will be the result of man's capacity to control himself, and as a result to determine whether he will be the victim and the prisoner of the technology to serve human, humane, social, and moral ends. The future will depend on humankind's capacity for moral reasoning rather than on the impulses of technological development which seems to lead to collective self-destruction. It is man's capacity to recapture the essential humanity of himself that is our real problem.

Dr. Sachs: In order to prevent discussions from becoming too narrow in scope, we need to have a good information feedback system which promotes expansion of knowledge and understanding of individuals. What is needed is not simply to gather and accumulate information but to actively disseminate such information for broad discussions, and then re-absorb the result of such discussions. Another important task for us is to always keep in our mind the image of the concrete real world. Now that a huge volume of knowledge has been accumulated already, it should be possible to create interesting matrices by combining different systems of cultural values with the food supply, housing, and technologies of other systems.

Professor Masamura: Now that the two previous speakers are already in the lake of cold water, it is quite a bit easier for me... I personally agree with most of the points raised by Professor Nagai. Japan does merit positive appraisals in a number of respects, not only in its efficiency but also in its relatively fair distribution of wealth among the population, its relatively liberal political system, freedom of speech, and the fact that it somehow has a mechanism of a working democracy. However, these facts tend to indicate only the country's potential. There is, at the moment, no clear Japanese role and contribution to the international society, nor any clear prospect toward the twenty-first century. This is something we Japanese should consider carefully.

The next point I want to raise is the question of what we should discuss at the present conference. Being an economist, I have certain difficulties in talking about combining different systems of cultural values with the food supply, housing, and technologies of other systems. One of the problems that stand in the way of the learning capacity of the human person is his reluctance to face up to his own inner fragmentation. One of the problems resulting from the fragmentation of science, about which Dr. Nagai has been speaking, is that it fragmented our own perception of ourselves and has led to the loss of a real sense of identity.

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Professor Isomura: The so-called information society of today which was brought about by the development of mass-communication systems, I have a feeling, puts people in the world of false images. Our important task is to see whether we can actualize these false images in concrete terms in the real world. The new society of the twenty-first century will emerge, I think, as a result of efforts to transform by various adjustments human imagery into reality. Professor Nagai seems to agree with Professor Vogel as regards the positive role of administrative guidance, but perhaps only as a caricature. I personally do not believe that administrative guidance will remain effective in the twenty-first century.

Reform of Values Surrounding Science and Technology

Professor Kondo: I was a Professor in the Engineering Faculty of the University of Tokyo for twenty-two years, at the end having become the Dean of that Faculty. Therefore, I am actually a monkey that ate all the palm nuts on a palm tree. Some people may call me the monkey that has jumped to the next tree but that still attacks monkeys on the old tree because now I have moved to an environmental research institute. My philosophy is that scientists are after the search for truth whereas engineers try to implement values into reality. As shown by the success of the Japanese motorcar industry in implementing the rigorous nitrogen oxides emission standards ahead of the rest of the world, engineers have the skill, I think, to put targets or values into reality when these are presented to the engineers in a clearly-defined manner. However, these values are defined or identified by scientists and not by engineers. I am setting aside for another opportunity the discussion of what technologies and what technological innovations are likely to bring human happiness in the twenty-first century.

Mr. Sahashi: What troubles me most is that disputes and confrontations in this world do not generally arise from
differences in values. Rather, these tend to arise because, I feel, everybody seems to be excessively occupied with his own interests and with interests of his own group, to such an extent that opinions of other groups are suppressed. This is in fact quite a dangerous situation. Everybody should be entitled to his own opinions and values, and the differences are what makes the world interesting. The outright denial of such differences should not be permitted. All freedom is very important but nobody has the freedom to suppress the freedom of others. We all should try to communicate with different values with wide-open and tolerant attitudes. Professor Nagai has mentioned that values do not easily change. I personally feel that values change on the strength of human wisdom and thought. It should be possible to coordinate values and give directions to values through education in the broad sense of the term.

Professor Matsuda: It is true that concepts such as equality and freedom to which we attribute as values have certain conflicting elements, and that there is a need for arbitration. It is my belief that what we need in the process of reorganization of the value system, is restriction and restraint on individual values rather than enhancement of these values. By putting these under restraints, individual values will develop their new life and new meaning rather than simply dying out. The Oriental attitudes concerning restraints should have relevance particularly in this respect. This may sound a bit depressing but there is joy in life under restraint as well.

Professor Seki: I found the lecture by Professor Nagai to have a deep significance especially as a summary of the entire Conference. With a view to the function of this Conference as a starting point of the Japanese contribution to the international society, that being the case, I think we should take up the matter of world systems as well as values. Today, the great world powers continue to expand their arms, mobilizing their utmost science and technologies in an endless race. This arms build-up race between the United States and the U.S.S.R. has a built-in perpetual nature because both sides try to predict the future scientific level of one another and accordingly undertake development of new arms to meet the potential threat. Unless we manage to impose a negative feedback into this mechanism the human race will continue to travel on the path to extinction. The only way out of this predicament is, in my view, to alter the system and values surrounding science and technology, because the application of science is under the control of the current econopolitical structures and the national systems.

How can we then strategically bring about such alteration? For this purpose, a reform of the global information network, and especially of universities which form the core of such a network, is necessary. The United Nations University should now assume its symbolic leadership in this kind of reform movements. The time is really here for universities throughout the world to jointly act along this line.

Professor Nishibori: At the age of over 70, I have headed the expedition to Chomolungma (Mt. Everest). G.H.L. Mallory said he climbed mountains because they were there. I feel I climb mountains because I am a human being. Being that kind of a person, I think mountain climbing is also an expression of human values. Unlike other animals men have the desire for quests. This is the desire which forces me to go to the Antarctic, to the mountains or to strive for the construction of the nuclear ship "Mutsu." I believe that such human desires for pursuits will become even more sophisticated in the twenty-first century, and that they will never diminish. Because humankind is equipped with the adaptability and the flexibility to make such pursuits possible, I do not feel we need to be pessimistic about the future of the human race.

Professor Barracough: I agree with Professor Soedjatmoko that the real problem is man. Many years ago when I was in the University of Cambridge I had a colleague who lived with chimpanzees. He used to come out occasionally to see a few human beings in order to have a standard of comparison. I think he really went there because it gave him an opportunity to get away from his wife. The point about this story is that it gave him a rather unusual angle on human values. His view, which became my view, was that on the whole chimpanzee values are far in advance of human values.

In fact, human values are not very nice values. It seems that the trouble started when this animal Man decided to get down from the trees. It became a lot worse when mankind decided or rather were forced by circumstances to live together in societies. There are what are sometimes called "stupid" animals. A stupid animal can be defined very simply. It is an animal that is so stupid that it does not run away when it sees a man coming. And that is stupid because when the man comes and sees an animal, he kills it. Humanity is, I think, probably the worst and lowest species which God put on earth.

I think it was the Chinese philosopher — I think his name was Yen Fu — who around 1930 said: the last four hundred years of civilization had taught man four things; one to be selfish; two, to deceive others; three, to steal what is not your own; and four, to kill people. And that seems to me to be a pretty good definition of human values, as we see today.

Mr. Matsuda said he was going to say some of the most pessimistic things but I have a feeling that perhaps I have outdone him. I see little prospect of substantial changes in human values given the situation, and the pressures today. It is society, living in society, and the conflicting interests of different societies, which create the pressures on man and these create the problems which when someone lets off the next atom bomb are going to destroy us.

Dr. Hensler: While it is important for us to ponder the effects of our policies and our programs on the future world, we really cannot fool ourselves, we are not the
architects of the twenty-first century. That is for later generations to do, for our children and their children. I think there are several important contributions or developments that our century has made, though, for that process. Many of these are what we have been talking about all week. An example is the increase in freedom of choice. Another field where our generation can still contribute is the implementation of a value once a choice is made. But ultimately, taking action requires not just discussion of values; it requires process and methods. I think that we need more attention to understanding the processes by which people all over the world develop and implement their social policies, the role of information in this process, and the ways to incorporate values of more people in this process.

Professor Hsu: When we think of values for all mankind we must consciously avoid being overly attached to particular systems. Instead I think it will be wiser for us to concentrate on some basic and universal elements that all mankind must strive for. For example, one such element is the elimination of hunger and disease. Another is the absence of oppression of one country by another, or one sector of a society by another, or one individual by another. And there needs be a fair chance for the individuals and nations to develop their potentialities. Finally, we have to realize that we need fair laws and regulations, but not total license. This is another vital element in any system of value which hopes to achieve universal applicability. Above all, a universally applicable system of values must aim at greater predictability of the human environment as distinguished from the physical environment. Except for typhoons and earthquakes, mankind has gained a tremendous upperhand over the physical environment. We are no longer afraid of tigers and epidemics, but the cities and suburbs of some of the most affluent societies are beset with vandalism and arson, riots and robbery, murder and mayhem. It is the human environment, namely the interpersonal relations and intersectional relations, interrelational relations as well as international relations to which we need to pay far more attention.

I was most interested in what Professor Nagai said, toward the end of his speech. He said the idea of striving to be Number One or Number Two is infantile. But actually, one of the human attributes is the concern for being Number One or Number Two. What I would like to see is not the absence of competition, but competition without rivalry. In this I will use a distinction made by Margaret Mead some years ago: rivalry involves the intention to eliminate the rival, whereas competition means to do better than the co-competitors. In human situations competition often becomes rivalry, and the next step is trickery, deceit, and violence to eliminate would-be competitors. The need for competition but not rivalry is the first element in our new human value. I would also like to see that we try to look for means for human beings to stop trying to seek revenge for past grievances. We must right the results of past wrongs, racially, sexually, economically, and internationally, if these wrongs are still alive. But the idea of revenge, an approach designed to make the one-time aggressors or oppressors suffer new aggression or oppression, must be avoided at all costs.

How do we achieve a pan-human value with these and other necessary ingredients? We have to go to the very heart of human existence. Beside food, clothing, shelter, and bodily safety, elementary conditions of existence which we share with all living things, what we need most as human beings is emotional support from our fellow human beings. In colloquial terms, we may call this condition intimacy, but not merely sexual intimacy. It is a condition in which one enjoys another's company even while carrying on no specific activity, one dares to disclose one's worst to another without the fear of rejection, and can accept help and sympathy from another without the onus of charity. A universally applicable system of human values must take into account the human prerequisite of affective relations among humans. Once this is understood, we will realize the futility of any system of values that centers merely in communication. Communication has two sides. It requires people who want to communicate, but also people who want to be communicated to. And the desire to listen is dependent upon the effective links between the communicators and the communicated to. Any kind of future value that we hope to have work must take this into account. It is from there we can generate others.

Value System in the 21st Century

Professor Isaacs: The monkey figure is apt. But I would offer a different figure: if we are monkeys, then we are monkeys being swept along in a swiftly moving flooding stream, each one of us trying to grab hold of some tree limb, and to use it like a pole or paddle to give us the illusion of having some control over our passage. Actually we have almost no idea of the course we are on, very little idea of its direction, no idea at all of where it is going. But more than this, we seem here to ignore what we do know about what has gone before. There is the matter of dealing with our history. The French revolution was an attempt to give voice to the unheard millions. But consider what has happened. The French revolution, with those great haunting themes of liberty, fraternity, and equality that still sound in the air around us like bits of songs heard in the night, brought about a world made up of a cabal of national states that continue until now to tear each other limb from limb with ever-increasing technological skill and rapacity. The great socialist ideas and the vision that was going to resolve these contradictions in a more satisfactory way achieved its apotheosis in Bolshevik terror and Stalin's labor camps in the Soviet Union, in tyrannical dictatorships that deprive all human beings of any kind of decent dignity in the conduct of their lives. Now here today we hear, in feeble tones to be sure, another call for a new society, in which little or no attention is given to all that so many generations of people have fought for and struggled for so long and at such great cost.

Indeed, most of what happens comes upon us unfore-
seen, or if foreseen, is foreseen in warnings and prophecies that go unheeded. This is true of most of what has been mentioned here, the grievous and grim problems that have been detailed for us is such a variety of academic dialects. So much has happened to bring about enormous gains in the human condition, most of it brought about by scientific advances in our knowledge. But these same advances have also brought us to the brink of nuclear destruction, of environmental catastrophe, and control mechanisms that will control the shapes of human life itself. We and our following generations are going to have to deal with these crises — if time allows. We must try to get some better handle on them ourselves. We have to try now to grab stronger limbs off the river banks that we sweep by in our blind and frightened ways. The least we can do is to pay a little more attention to history.

My young colleague here has stressed the importance of the process. The process is politics and politics is the way in which power is distributed. The shape of the twenty-first century will be determined by the way the politics develops, both in big power states and in the hundred or so small states. And when it comes to the values we attach to our politics, each one of us, as individuals, all of us in groups and in our states and nations, will have to make our choices.

Professor Lin: My impressions are that human happiness is found very close to us as Maeterlinck's blue bird of happiness is found at home, and that a new value system which combines Western and Oriental values will emerge out of efforts to closely study one's own value system and culture.

A Confucian teaching comes to my mind, if I may resort to a rather old thought: he said one who manages himself and brings harmony to his home also governs the state and brings peace to the world. After all values are passed on at home from one family member to another and then gradually spread from there in concentric circles.

Much remains unknown about the elements which contribute to value formation, its environment and processes, and we can hardly write a prescription for such formation. It is however reassuring to know that people of the new generation seem to have a spontaneous interest on this subject. It seems to me rather irrational for those of us who may not live to the twenty-first century to discuss about the values in that century. On the other hand, what we can do is to have more extensive dialogue with younger people, and to pass on to them whatever the experiences and opinions we have accumulated. We the old generation should only define and present the cases and the search for answers should be left to the younger generation.

Professor Solidum: I would like to respond to two problems, namely what should be the human being in the twenty-first century and what should be the kind of society in the twenty-first century. First I would like to talk about the human being who is life-affirming. He is not a morbid type, he is not a pessimist, and he is a man who accepts that life has a moral quality which is the acceptance of the responsibility to preserve life and to promote its quality. This good life is a combination of moral and material aspects. As John Stuart Mill said, it is better to be a dissatisfied man than a satisfied dog. Now, this man, once he has this moral quality in him, will have a feeling of love, a love for his fellow-men. Some of other qualities that I would like to emphasize for the man of the twenty-first century is a sensitivity to other peoples' needs and a willingness to respond to peoples' needs. If these qualities are present in man, he will moderate his desires, and he will be adaptable in many ways; though firmly holding on to his basic human values, he will be adaptable enough and tolerant about other peoples' differences.

It is expected that this man should live in a society whose institutions enable him to promote and encourage these values such as through education and socialization. Society must also accommodate those whom we referred to, the other day, as the insane, but who are also called non-conformists or eccentrics. These people should be recognized and appreciated because, as John Stuart Mill said, they are the people with mental courage and they are the innovators who help society to change. The kind of society I am talking about should also not overshadow the basic human values by the strategies closely tied to ideology or political system, nor should it repeat the past selfish mistakes such as depletion of irreplaceable resources and environmental destructions.

Dr. Qiu: I would like to pass a few words, as far as I know, about what basic principles the People's Republic of China, a comparatively new society, will follow in developing herself and educating her young generation in the twenty-first century. As you may know, China is now carrying out the four programs for modernization. But it seems to me that these programs do not constitute our basic principles, and that their fulfillment is only our strategic objective envisaged to be achieved by the end of this century. What, then, are the basic principles upon which the human society of China would be based in the next century? I think, they are as follows:

First of all, the socialist common ownership of the means of production would be maintained. Although New China has not been advancing along a straight road, and has made not a few mistakes because of lacking sufficient experience of her own in respect to socialistic construction, no reason whatsoever has been found, as far as I know, for abandoning our socialist basic principle of common ownership of the means of production. Such a principle would still be adhered to by our country in the twenty-first century. Private ownership of a very limited amount of the means of production is now permissible in China. However, this private ownership is now only playing a supplementary role in our economic life, and does not — it is also believed that it cannot — reach a high percentage in our national economy.

By the way, I do not think that industrialization is necessarily accompanied by the various morbid phenomena or evils mentioned by some speakers. It seems to me that it is only because industrialization has been carried out on capitalistic principles and by capitalistic ways and
means that those morbid phenomena or evils have come into being.

Now going back to our basic principles, I think, the second principle which would still hold good in China at the beginning of the twenty-first century is the socialist principle of distribution: "to each according to his work." The third basic principle would still be that no exploitation of man by man is permitted. The fourth would be that the moral level of our people must be raised according to our socialist standard of morality.

I have stated what I think to be the basic principles of our People's Republic of China, a comparatively new society, but I do not presume that other countries should follow all these principles. A policy of readjustment, restructuring, consolidation, and improvement has been adopted in our country, and it is expected that various steps for readjustment and restructuring would be taken in conformity with the above-mentioned basic principles so as to create a still better society, and educate our rising generation in a better way.

Chairman: Now that all the panelists have had a chance to speak, I would like to give the floor to Professor Nagai to give additional comments.

Professor Nagai: I am grateful for the precious thoughts which have been presented already. May I take this opportunity to supplement my earlier comments to cover some of the aspects where my explanation was somewhat insufficient.

The first point is related to the comment by Professor Isomura on administrative guidance. Professor Vogel praised Japanese administrative guidances as effective. I personally agree with the need for a dialogue for consensus building. Nevertheless, I consider such a dialogue undesirable when it takes place in secrecy. It is important that all the citizens have access to such administrative information and that they actually know what is going on in the bureaucracy. What appears to be a well-running Japanese Gemeinschaft cannot be really called a democratic society unless its defects are removed.

My second point has bearing on a suggestion by Mr. Sahashi. Social norms influence man, as he could also be influenced by education. Since these norms are closely tied to the institutions, political actions are indeed called for. Some other speakers have referred to this aspect by the term process. Therefore, I do not deny the role of education.

Chairman: Thank you very much for broad-ranging discussions. I would like to call for a recess before we move to the second half of this symposium.

Chairman: Now we shall move to free discussions. I would appreciate it very much if the speakers would care to become less considerate of the feelings of others, for the purpose of discussions, to clarify some of the points at issue.

Professor Nishibori: I would like to make a supplementary remark with a view to separate technologies from science.

I think there should be no limit to human pursuits. Man can accumulate as much knowledge as he wants to. Technology has the function of bringing this knowledge, which is acquired by science, to specific uses. Fundamentally there is no sin nor goodness in sciences. The question of goodness or evilness arises when knowledge is put to a specific use by technology. Therefore, it is these objectives and the thought, ethics, and morals which all control the objectives, that must be rigorously scrutinized. The fact that the element U235 releases a huge amount of energy upon bombardment by a neutron — this is a matter of science. However, deciding the use for this atomic energy is a different matter. Whereas scientists can devote themselves to studies of very narrow fields, it is the engineers who have to have a broader perspective, backed up also by high ethics and character.

Professor Kondo: I agree that in the case of science, any research should be pursued irrespective of the field, whereas this may not be the case with respect to technology. However, I think it is too much to lay the burden of responsibility associated with the use of technologies upon engineers and technicians alone. It might sound irresponsible, since my training is in engineering, but I think that this should be a problem for all of us, not only engineers, and that this should be decided on the basis of broad moral values.

There is one field of science, which has an exceptionally large scope for future development, namely the biological sciences. The technology for reorganizing DNA and the possibility of even creating a new life is one particular field at issue. The decision as to how to use this technology must be based on deep thoughts by a wide spectrum of people. To give the responsibilities to scientists and technicians alone is just going too far.

Science indicates generally that a process is irreversible: for instance, this is the principle of thermodynamics. However, when we take a look at the world as a system, a system which receives energy from the sun constantly, we see that this is an open cycle. Here, life regenerates itself, by births of children, grandchildren, and so on. Unlike other sciences, we can recreate a new process in the biology field. This is one of the reasons why I think the education process is very important, in order to relay and regenerate information from one generation to another.

Restraints on Values and Creativity of Men

Professor Isomura: Listening to the preceding discussions, one question arises to me as to what is then the responsibility of a scientist as a human being. In other words, how do you place the humanity of scientists as men when a selection on the pursuit of a particular science and a value judgement on the utility of this science call for different decision-making criteria as claimed?

Professor Nishibori: This question depends on the definition of science. I have defined the acquisition of knowl-
edge as science and the use of the acquired knowledge as technology. The question of merits and demerits depends on the purpose or the use of this technology. So it is partly the responsibility of the engineer who found a use for a particular knowledge.

Professor Kondo: I made a clear-cut statement to make my position apparent on this issue. However, I will not deny the fact that scientists are also men. One thing I want to point out is that the modern technology is huge and complex to such an extent that if you think of too many things and if you are hesitant, you can hardly reach the foremost level of technology.

Chairman: We should perhaps also discuss the issue of whether it is necessary to restrain technology. Professor Matsuda mentioned earlier the need to restrain values. So, I would like first to have his opinion on this issue.

Professor Matsuda: I have referred to human desires when I mentioned restraints. I feel freedom is necessary for the development of science, knowledge and especially of spiritual culture. I think freedom is useful as long as it supports creative potentials. I should point out, however, that human potential for creation may be hindered when there is excessive freedom. Max Weber once said that by bringing in the monastery-type ascetic life into the secular world it was possible to enhance creative activity. A similar ascetic life is also practiced by some people in Japan. For example, the Buddhist monks on Mount Hiei are known to live in this mountain sometimes for ten years without descending to the outside world. It is my personal feeling that we need a certain restraint in Japan because there is excessive freedom. I think such restraint will enhance the cultural creativity of Japanese people.

At the moment, who is then enjoying such freedom? I think it is the people in the middle class social strata. When people of such strata emerge everywhere in the world, then there will be ample possibilities for communication in a common language and on common topics, leading to a greater solidarity of the world. In my field of study, namely communications, both the development of this science and the demands for greater information arise from the middle class social strata. I think free and open exchange of information between peoples of such strata in different countries is very constructive. Coming back to the question of life under restraint, when it is applied to the middle class in particular in the case of Japan, maximum benefits will be obtainable. I think, in terms of rising creativity under the revived appreciation for freedom and ideals.

Responsibility of Scientists and Engineers in Formation of Values

Professor Hsu: The secret of the Japanese success, as already mentioned by Professor Nagai, lies in the great overlap between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft which exists in Japan. The first type of organization is based on what I term role, or what one does to provide goods or services for money. Role activities and affective attachments happen to overlap in Japan. It is this overlap which gives the individual Japanese a far greater positive approach toward what they do for wages than, say, American workers. When I speak of affect or feeling I do not simply mean love. I refer to all kinds of positive feelings including love, loyalty, sympathy, and trust as well as negative feelings including hate, disloyalty, alienation, and suspicion. Positive and negative feelings are two sides of the same coin. The former draw people together while the latter repel them against each other.

The usual sociological view is that, other things being equal, human beings will be nice to each other if they suffer from no economic want. But there are important facts contrary to such a view. For example suicide rates in different societies vary greatly but such variation does not coincide with economic conditions. When it comes to interpersonal violence Tokyo, with a larger population than New York, has only one-tenth the annual homicide as New York.

I am not suggesting that such facts, though spectacular, prove anything absolutely. But they put a big dent to any notion that material affluence ensures interpersonal security, inter-group security, or international security. Insecurity generates mutual suspicion. The impulse to draw first for self-protection is not confined to cowboys in American movies. Under such circumstances nations, like individuals, will be inclined to resort to whatever means at their disposal. Thus instead of competition we will get rivalry: rivalry among individuals and rivalry among nations. It is rivalry, not competition, which is the real danger among nations.

I do not say that we should not create more scientific and technological achievement. Sure, by all means do that. But whether you can use such achievements to make human relations more predictable or whether you are going to use them to make human life more jungle-like is not in the realm of mere exploration of the unknown in the physical sciences. What we need is more exploration of the unknown in human relations.

Chairman: Professor Seki, will you care to comment from the point of view of a political scientist?

Professor Seki: I am now working together with my colleagues within the University of Tokyo, who are scientists, in fields including physics, chemistry and biology on a major project, which is entitled “A Com-
prehensive Research into the Desirable State of Science and Technology.” We are finding it rather difficult to come to consensus opinions on the subject, and one of the items under dispute is the freedom of science. The problem arises because, although science should be free, a large scientific project needs a major budgetary backing with a result that certain priorities must be set between different projects for financing. In the process of setting priorities, group interactions tend to play a more significant role than considerations for the freedom of individual scientists or the autonomy of scientific knowledge. And the decision is naturally largely influenced by an external factor, namely budgetary limitations. There is therefore a strong voice, including among scientists, that the responsibility of a scientist does not stop with him as an individual but extends to the society as a whole.

Professor Kondo: I think the idea to devise a system for allocating the limited budgets and also the idea of a supreme cultural conference as proposed by Professor Nagai are quite desirable ones. In any case, discussions concerning sciences should not be limited to natural sciences but should also cover human and social sciences. Personally, I am putting a great hope in experts on human and social sciences in an anticipation that they will come up with good solutions to the problem we have just been discussing.

Dr. Sachs: The major question in the twenty-first century will be whether man will prefer to enjoy economic surpluses as a result of the higher productivity or should he alternatively take more free time.

I think we are now eating up the extra free time which we will otherwise be able to enjoy in the future, by mistaken uses of science and technology. I am referring to the waste of scientific and technological efforts now geared to the arms build-ups. Our new task is to seek methods for constructively using our extra free time, namely a search for a desirable life style which will be made possible by the extra time. To given an example, housework is now considered a non-marketable, hidden economy. In the future, the value of this service should be reassessed. When we discuss social values, this is the type of aspects we should really give thoughts.

Chairman: Professor Masamura, will you care to give your opinion on Professor Kondo’s comments?

Professor Masamura: Professor Kondo mentioned that engineers could hardly take the responsibility for the use and the course of development of science and technology, and that this was the matter for the society as a whole to decide according to its values. I feel rather uneasy about this statement. I wonder whether a technology could be neutral to the values of a society. In fact, certain technologies can affect values of people substantially. Unfortunately, such impact is also often made on the basis of incomplete information. For instance, the invention of a useful agrochemical may cause ecological destruction. People recognizes this danger only after a warning is given by someone. Therefore, there is a revision of a particular value judgement at that stage. Hence, I think there is a need to revise, starting from somewhere, the current mechanism whereby people formulate the value system on the basis of incomplete information.

There is another aspect with which I am concerned. Professor Lin rightly pointed out that it was not possible at this forum to set the values which will be applicable in the twenty-first century. What we should discuss here is certainly not the values themselves as we see desirable but rather a framework and a method according to which new values can be formulated. At another symposium the other day, Mr. Sugimori gave us his opinion that “the behavior of Japanese people during the War should not be viewed as a reflection of their insanity,” but that “the problem lay in the fact that they were not in the position to have a clear understanding of the state of international relations.” I think he has a good grasp of underlying factors behind values. Both scientists and engineers have a large influence on such factors. Of course, economists too, can hardly avoid their responsibility.

Do Values Also Determine Politics?

Professor Barraclough: I think what has now been made quite plain is that the decision on how we use scientific information, technological knowledge, and so forth, essentially is going to be a political decision. It so happened when I was in St. John’s College in Cambridge in England, that I was a colleague of two of the people who split the atom, Sirs John Cockroft and Appleton. I can assure you that neither of these people had the vaguest idea, wish, or intention that this should lead to a nuclear weapon. But that is what happened. It seems to me that this whole question is really a question of political control and of politics. But the problem does not stop there. If you consider the whole question of values, it seems to me that they are decided in very much the same way. We have a certain freedom to choose our values. But, in fact, our values are inculcated by an interest or interests in society. Such interests will not necessarily get totally their own way as it is more likely to be a question of interplay. But nevertheless, values are never entirely free. I was in basic agreement with what Professor Sachs was speaking just now. But toward the end he said we can have a margin of freedom with respect to economics, escaping from the economic straight jacket, with a particular reference to what he called the household industry. The question in my mind is whether we can, and how we can, because there are, it seems to me, vested interests which wish to maintain the existing economic system. They are very powerful interests which can influence people through the mass media. In the end I think we are driven unfortunately to a position that this is a political question more than anything else.

Dr. Soedjatmoko: I disagree with Professor Barraclough on the last point he raised. Values are not necessarily
politically inculcated. Political structures do affect the distribution of political power, do affect the development of specific value system, but there are other processes involved as well.

Our present period of history shows the strength of historical movements, of popular movements that have, in a very fundamental way, changed value systems. The liberation movements, the independence movements, were not inculcated by any political power centers. They were movements that came from below, namely manifestations of the poorest against poverty and powerlessness. The environmental movement was not a movement inspired by a particular set of political forces; it came from below. So did the civil rights and the human rights movements. The women's movement reflects another very fundamental value change that is taking place all over the world. None of these are predetermined or desired by a specific power structure in the country concerned or in the world in general.

Our societies are going through very fundamental and very powerful changes in the perception of values. In a variety of forms we can point to such a phenomenon in the Christian religion, in Islam, in Hinduism, and other religions. These are processes of profound value change that are not politically determined. I would therefore say that the margin for human freedom and for responsible choice may be greater than Professor Barraclough thinks.

Professor Isaacs: I must ask Professor Soedjatmoko if he will accept an amendment to his use of the term "political" because all the movements he describes trying to revive or develop this or that sets of values become political in content. This is what we are seeing taking place all over the world and not all of the new systems of power they seek to create necessarily bode well for human beings in the twenty-first century.

It can be argued that this reach for the sacred is an attempt once more to find the sacred kind of answer to all the unanswerables. These have multiplied around us, especially as a result of the swift pace at which science and technology has outraced all other efforts of human beings to achieve new levels of intellectual and other kinds of decent co-existence among human beings. On a worldwide scale people are seeking some kind of refuge from all the confusion and fear. Now depending upon where one places one's own values, one has to characterize these movements. I spoke at some length the other day about the fact that people everywhere are seeking this kind of refuge in their own separate tribalisms, to enclose themselves again inside their own walls in which they can find some semblance of what they think might be security in a world that has become totally insecure. This is the shape of so much of our current politics. Politics is not just the nefarious business of people in power trying to control their masses through control of the mass media at their disposal. Politics is also the search for power by individuals and groups operating in another kind of social milieu.

Many of the political movements out there behind the impenetrable wall to which Professor Soedjatmoko referred are indeed efforts to revive traditionalistic forms of belief. This is happening in Islam, among Christians, among Jews, and among all kinds of people who want to retreat or hold on to older forms of belief in which they think they are more secure. In effect, they turn out to be only temporary refuges.

I think the grim outlook of the politics by which we are now surrounded, and which will unfold further over the coming decades, is by far the cardinal issue before us. If it is a matter of unheard millions being heard, it is a question of how, through what political mechanism, and what it is they want a hearing for, and what political leaderships will make of their opportunities. Out of the Enlightenment and the Western European revolutions of the last century came many unhappy things; but along with them also came the beginning of effective democratic politics. This may be the worst of all systems, as Winston Churchill once memorably said, but it is the best we have got so far compared to all others when it comes to the matter of giving unheard millions a chance to be heard.

We stand on a defensive frontier at which we must try to hold on to what we have gained from the past, not only the fruitful and useful gains of science and technology but, on the political side, the small and halting gains we have made in creating democratic mechanisms, in making it possible for all members of all parts of a society to take part and in constructive and non-violent ways to arrive at resolutions, at consensus which can change over periods of time according to the means provided by the mechanism itself. The defense of democratic politics, in my view, is the cardinal issue before us.

Professor Solidum: I am interested in these discussions about political processes and political movements as creating values. If we accept that proposition we seem to accept also that values seem to be loosely held, and that with every kind of movement or political change, values will change. If this is the case, we should see many groups of people who are anarchic. Fortunately, we can see that people want to go back to conditions of stability, one of the ways for which would be, what Dr. Isaacs called, regression to some beliefs. But beliefs represent values. Values are those things for which we make repeated choices, for which we have preference. So if we do not find the results of political movements or political changes acceptable, certainly we must return to the stability of the old beliefs because they already contain values. This is hardly to be called a regression.

When a reference is made about the democratic system as a hedge against problems in the future, I wonder what kind of democratic system is this that we are talking about. There are many kinds of democratic systems as each grows on its soil, as Montesquieu would say. The American democratic system may be unique for itself, but other kinds of conditions, either in Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand, or in Japan, will produce other kinds of political systems. Therefore, I do not particularly understand which of these democratic systems will be the hedge for the future against future problems.
If we accept that political movements and political changes will create values and institutions that we shall value, then these values, may I suggest, must be viewed as temporary and not really receiving the people's universal commitment. That is what we call "not legitimate" because they do not coincide with the real values of the people in a society wherein they occur.

Professor Hsu: I always believe that the mind can only absorb as much as the bottom can endure. Therefore I will make my remarks very short. There is no question that science, scientists, and technologists can produce instruments for human welfare or for human destruction. But we must remember that it is the politicians (or the military in some societies) who make the decisions one way or the other. For example, Werher Von Braun worked for Hitler first. After the German surrender he worked for Uncle Sam. I am not privy to his inner thoughts and feelings, but find no indication that he was confronted by any agonizing moral dilemma.

However, whether power is in the hands of many or of a few, that power cannot make a majority of the citizens in any society do what they do not want to do in the long run. For example advertising people, with their ultra-modern high-powered, communications technology often boast, "Give us any product, we will educate the public to love it." That has proven to be an empty boast in more than one instance.

Chairman: We have had worthwhile and diversified opinions on the problems of science, technology, and of morality, which should serve as a good starting point for future discussions. As Professor Lin has pointed out, it is somewhat regrettable that not enough young people participated in the present discussions. I would like to close this symposium by asking everyone here to feedback the results of the symposium to their respective fields for further and broader discussions.
I would like to make a few observations on the meaning of “kofuku,” “shiawase” — happiness — from the linguist’s point of view. First of all, the most commonly used word “happy.” The “y” is the suffix to show that it is an adjective. The stem ‘hap’ means opportunity, chance. In other words, anything convenient to you is a “happy” thing. Thus in the archaic use of the word, it signified anything which occurred by chance, and at times it was used regardless of whether it was a good event or a bad one. After the Middle Ages, its use became gradually limited to good occurrences only; and in the 16th century, around the time of the Reformation, it came to be used when you were mentally satisfied, when your inner self was contented, regardless of what went on in the outer world around you. I think this is in harmony with the general trend in Europe of that time, for the Reformation itself was all for the inner mental self rather than the outer form. I believe that under such a tendency the meaning of words also become introspective.

There is also the English word “lucky.” This, of course, is derived from “luck,” and is of the same stem as the German “Glück.” The “G” is a prefix without much meaning, and the central part “luck” means to interlock by bending or knitting together. Thus, if something nicely suits your wishes, you are “glücklich!” (happy!)

Another English word that is often used is “fortunate.” This comes from the Latin “fors” meaning chance, luck. As in the case of the two former words, “fortunate” originally meant something pleasant which happened around you, and later gradually took an inner mental significance.

When we write “kofuku” in the two Chinese characters “ko” and “fuku,” the “ko” signifies freedom from a state of distress. The character for “ko” originally indicated hands which were fettered, and when you were relieved of fetters you felt “ko.” It was in the middle of the 19th century that John Stuart Mill defined happiness as the state free of pain and distress, but the Chinese had already thought of that two to three thousand years earlier! — perhaps this shows just how little our sentiment regarding happiness has changed through the ages. The other Chinese character “fuku” of “kofuku” is made up of two parts: the left half indicating an altar, i.e., god, and the right half, a bottle filled with sake. A bottle filled to the brim with sake is a state of plenitude, thus “tomi” (wealth) and “fuku” are characters of similar origin. I think we may say that the Chinese characters “kofuku” signify the condition free of punishment, blessed with plenty from the gods.

Lastly, to consider the classical Japanese word for happiness “shiawase.” Obviously this is the noun form of the verb “shiawase.” This verb originally meant to make matters seem plausible, to patch up, to make do nicely, and its noun form meant a turn of the fortune’s wheel. And so, until around about the Edo period (1603—1867) the use of the word “shiawase” was not by any means limited to good events only. Indeed, in a translation of Aesop’s fables made during the Muromachi period (1378—1573) or a little later, there is the story of the donkey that meets with a master worse than the former every time it changes owners, and the expression used is “the ‘shiawase’ became gradually worse and the labours increased.” More recently, during the Edo period, we come across the statement “to die of eating the globefish is yet another shiawase.” In these examples, “shiawase” is by no means used to mean happiness, but just fate or luck. With time and use, this word too came to take a more psychological nuance, and to mean happiness as we know it today.

Studying the history of words is rather like psychological archaeology. You can see the changes in their meaning and interpretation with the ages like so many geological strata. From this we learn that at first, man considered himself happy when the exterior conditions were gratified. However gradually he came to feel that exterior standards alone could no longer make him really happy. This phenomenon can be observed right around us too. For example, but twenty or thirty years ago, people considered themselves happy if they had a job and could make ends meet. A short while ago they were asking for free time rather than money or possessions. And now, with more free time than they can cope with, the development of one’s inner self has become necessary. From possessions to time, and from time to the development of the quality of time, such would seem to be the road to happiness, but it is doubtful whether happiness will increase in direct proportion as we go deeper into one’s inner self. Though a little extreme, take for example those who have taken to drugs and inhaling paint thinner. They are from a subjective point of view, at the height of inner happiness, but may this be called “happiness”? Here, for the first time, in my opinion, we come across the question of values.

The person who is happy when taking drugs, the man who wants material possessions, he who cannot feel happy with just having free time only — they all have to do with the problem of values. The meaning of the word happy has indeed evolved from external to internal situations,
but the interpretation would be insufficient unless we add to it the concept of values.

Then what kind of values lead to happiness? I feel that the person who has achieved internal development of himself can no longer feel happy from the heart unless he feels in some way connected with what he considers to be everlasting, of eternal value. In the case of the naïve Japanese, they used to attain happiness from their religion which taught continuation of life and the immortality of the soul. Catholic nuns, celibate, without family or fortune, are able to face death calmly because of the faith in eternal peace after death. In short, at the root of happiness lies a value concept which to you yourself seems everlasting. To him who considers that nothing is eternal, it becomes resignation. You might call that a sort of happiness too, but I feel that this is not what we would term “happy,” but something more with a tinge of mild melancholy. Of course we ordinary humans cannot live from day to day just aiming at our ultimate goal. If you go staring at the North Pole and nothing else, you will fall into a ditch. You must place your star nearer at hand. In other words, I think that by relating yourself to something which goes on beyond yourself, though perhaps not eternally, you achieve a feeling of happiness. It may be said that the Japanese work heart and soul for their firm to have the satisfying feeling of having contributed to a company which will live on after themselves; that the writer writes in the hope that some of his writings might remain after his death.

However here again we should beware of the pitfall. For this sort of happiness is not the ultimate goal but a preliminary, transitory happiness. If we should look upon it as being absolute and give our all and all to it, and then realize that it was but transient! — all the more reason to necessitate the internalization of happiness.

To conclude. My theory of happiness is this: I think the internalization of happiness is correct. However, it has its limits. Thus the necessity to associate yourself with something beyond you. In order to decide where to place your ultimate permanence, you need the time to deliberate and to consider. Also, you should have a nearer, what might be called a semi-ultimate goal in the shape of a job. However, do not be wholly taken up by it or you might find yourself trapped and disillusioned. Therefore, it is necessary to somewhere remain cool and collected. Such I consider to be the way to happiness for the average man. Thank you.
THE STANDARD OF LIVING AND THE VALUE SYSTEM

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The assignment given to me is supposedly an “academic speech.” As I have looked at the program, there are “keynote addresses,” “special address” and “commemorative address” to be followed by my “academic speech.” I have pondered over this differentiation. For those who have so far spoken, no matter how you call their speeches, are all academic people. I am at present a journalist. Perhaps on the part of the host organization, it was intended to remind me that I should steer clear of my present professional interest as much as possible.

I had already prepared my speech in English; so with your forbearance and mindful of the presence of many guests from abroad, may I speak in English the way I had prepared?

The title is “The Standard of Living and the Value System.” The question I ask is: “How can we define the concept of ‘the standard of living’ significantly?” And at the end I come to the conclusion that this problem cannot be discussed independently of the value system which prevails in the society concerned. For example, the Minister of International Trade and Industry, Mr. Rokusuke Tanaka has recently been to Burma. And after visiting Burma he said that in spite of the fact that per capita income of Burma is only 150 dollars a year, there is an atmosphere of unraffled serenity among the people. Mr. Tanaka went to Burma with a somewhat patronizing, paternalistic attitude of trying to impress upon them that Japan was ready to assist the development of Burmese economy. And he could not understand at first why Burma was not so enthusiastic about getting economic aid. But after staying for a few days, he could persuade himself that here was a different type of value system which enabled the nation to feel happy with as low a per capita income as one-hundredth of that of the United States.

Now, it is generally considered axiomatic that a high standard of living such as that of the United States is more desirable than a low standard of living such as that of India, and also, that growth over time of a nation’s standard of living is of positive value. Economists usually represent the standard of living of an individual or a family quantitatively by his or the family’s monetary income and that of a nation in an average sense by per capita income or per capita GNP. And, of course, qualification is needed as regards stocks accumulated or that beneath from the past.

The size of one’s income, no doubt, is a constraint upon what one can spend in order to satisfy one’s needs and fancies. But it is pertinent to ask on what kind of items the expenditure is made or has to be made. Take for example, an item of expenditure called the commuting cost. A commuter to an office located in the central Tokyo typically incurs the cost of about 500 dollars a year, or 9,000 yen in a month, assuming that a commuter travels from Musashi-Koganei on the Chuo Line to central Tokyo. Five hundred dollars a year is more than three times the per capita income of Burma today. But this item surely does not represent a consumption for final satisfaction. It is a type of expense instrumental to commuting to the place of work; it can hardly be said that welfare is enhanced by the higher cost of commuting. We call this type of expenditure “the intermediate consumption” just as we regard the flour purchased by a baker as “an intermediate good.”

The commuting cost is an instrumental expense for the purpose of reaching to, and returning from, the income-earning place of work. But is the earning of income a purpose on its own? Now, there are professions, like university professors, in which work itself is a pleasure in one’s life. But unfortunately these are rather the exceptions. It may be truer to say as economists have done for a century that laboring is “disutility” compensated for by wage income.

Aside from this question, however, it does remain true that the earning of income through work is for the purpose of obtaining wherewithal or the means to purchase concrete items of consumption goods and services either currently or in the future.

What then are the general types of consumption goods and services purchased and how big are the weights for each one of them? We may classify them into the following three types:

(A) Bare subsistence needs.
(B) Instrumental, intermediate goods and services.
(C) Final consumers’ goods and services giving positive satisfaction over and above the bare subsistence needs.

The item (A), bare subsistence needs, is rather small. For example, as for the subsistence need for food, it is estimated that standard requirements of adult nutrition could be bought in 1980 for about 160 dollars per year in the United States. The minimum degree of heating in the cold climate area may also have to be included in this category (A).

Knotty problems arise in connection with the category...
(B) — that is, instrumental, intermediate goods and services. As was mentioned earlier, the commuting cost can be classified here, as is also the case with the eyesight and hearing aids and with the anti-burglar alarms and safe-boxes.

Much more complex is the problem of whether the large part of higher education may or may not be an intermediate service, the value of which has undergone substantial degree of depreciation in the recent years. It used to be the case, in Japan, for example, that a graduate of Tokyo Imperial University was more or less assured of a position in the upper echelon of private firms or government offices. But nowadays, just as for everyone to stand on tiptoe to watch a parade does no good even though one person may gain a better view by so doing, the college graduates of today, which annually number approximately half a million in Japan, cannot presume that college diplomas will qualify them more or less automatically to positions in the upper echelon. After all, such positions are what Fred Hirsch called "positional goods" in the sense that their supply is socially limited. You cannot have two presidents in a private corporation. Of course, you can have a chairman of the board of directors, but again, you cannot have two chairmen of the board of directors. And further, there are limited number of bureau chiefs and section chiefs and so on. Their supply is socially limited.

This means that aspiring youths attempt to enter those colleges that promise to give them better credentials for the elitist jobs and spend far more time and money for out-of-school cramming to enter institutions than it used to be the case. In other words, expenditure for intermediate service in the sphere of education has greatly multiplied in the recent years in Japan.

Similar observation can be made in connection with the cost of medical care. Health care is essentially a repair work in order to maintain our mental and physical conditions for satisfactory functioning; that is, it is a means to an end. The less repair needed, so much the better. But it is a common observation in many of the countries that provider-induced demand (or what is technically called iatrogenic demand) for medical care has increased markedly. Recently we had a case of Fujimi Hospital in Tokorozawa about which most of the Japanese participants here know. And the national cost for health care has risen to almost 10 percent of GNP in the United States, and more than six percent in Japan. From the standpoint of resource use, it is beside the point whether medical expenses are covered by insurance or paid directly out of patients' pocket. The essential point remains that a large chunk of nation's current resources is being syphoned into this type of instrumental, intermediate consumption expenditures. It might be mentioned in this connection that mental or psychiatric ailments appear to occur more frequently in the atmosphere of the present-day urban agglomeration. There are more mental health workers in the United States now than there are policemen. Today, 40 million Americans or one out of five, according to Peter Shrug (Mind Control, 1978), are being treated for various mental illnesses.

We could learn a lesson from the case of Sawauchi village in Japan. Sawauchi is a small town in the northern part of Japan where there was not a single modern medical practitioner in residence until about 15 years ago. In this circumstance, the Welfare Department of the Town Office felt that preventive measures should have the highest priority and went about with all kinds of public health measures and educational work. The result was: the town showed the best health status measurement, though of crude kind, among the towns of comparative size in the country. There were, of course, acute cases of illness occurring in the town, in which case the patients were taken to one of the neighboring towns or cities or a doctor was called from there. Finally, about 15 years ago, a public hospital was built in the town and most cases of illness could be taken care of inside the town. But even now, the incidence of illness is much smaller in the town compared with other places and per capita medical expenditure is among the lowest in Japan. Citizens learned to produce the output of health through the long experience of a lack of a physician in the town.

Now, we have other cases of unavoidable consumption expenditures forced by the circumstances, such as the need for private cars as buslines are discontinued for lack of customers, or the need for private bathrooms as public bathhouses are abolished in the neighborhood. In both cases, erstwhile luxuries have become necessities.

More problematical, perhaps, are the cases of supplier-induced demand in the category of fashion goods and novelties. The acquisition of these goods may give genuine satisfaction to some consumers; but it is sobering to reflect that a Japanese young lady working in urban offices spends singly more money during one year on her hair-do than the entire income which a single man in India earns for his livelihood. It should be mentioned further that among the public goods, the goods provided by public bodies, there are also types of expenditures which are instrumental in character and on which we can say that the less spent the better. The expenditure on armaments, the instruments of death, is a conspicuous example of this kind. After all, the only two things you can do with a missile, use it for destruction or store it until it becomes obsolete and has to be scratched.

Now, the police force may also be an example of this kind. I don't know if any one of you has ever visited a small island south of Kagoshima Prefecture, still included in Kagoshima Prefecture, called Kikai Jima, spelled with the character not of 'devil' but that of 'enjoy.' There are 20 thousand inhabitants on that island; but there is only one police-box with only one police-man usually on duty. If you go to a hotel on that island, they have no key for your room, and the front man would say: "What for?" "If you are suspicious of the co-guests in the same hotel, you may need one, but residents of this island will never steal things from visitors." Almost every family has a car on the island; but there is not a single traffic light on that island. Here, you can see that the instrumental intermediate goods and services are at the minimum through the development of atmosphere and customs on that island.
All the examples cited above for category (B), that is instrumental intermediate goods and services in the sphere of consumption expenditures, have been definitely on the increase in most of the capitalist advanced countries in the recent decades. Although it is not easy to make quantitative estimates of the items to be included in this category (B), it cannot be doubted that the aggregate amount is sufficiently large, to the extent of nullifying the usefulness of taking the per capita income as a measure of the standard of living in a genuine sense.

There is a further thought which reinforces this point when we broaden our view to encompass, into the concept of the standard of living, the availability or the access to value-objects which are normally not purchased by money. No one, I am sure, contovers the statement which appears in the Article III of the Law for Environmental Conservation of the Seto Inland Sea, to wit: "The Seto Inland Sea is not only a natural endowment of incomparable beauty of Japan and the world, but also it has been the treasure house of valuable marine resources for the nation and it shall be the heritage of the present to the future generations." But it is a paradox of the present-day world, or you might say, the present-day Japan, that private industrial firms can "purchase," and have in fact purchased to quite an extent, the right to develop the coastline simply by compensating for the fishing rights in the region, which means that by the amount of 200 billion yen, the entire coastline of the Seto Inland Sea can be in the hands of private firms. "In order to expand the space for the kitchen, the garden is being sacrificed." This is what has been happening in Japan. And the monetary magnitude of the standard of living is simply unable to register this type of welfare considerations which are increasingly of our concern.

Now, the brief survey above makes it quite clear enough that the question of the standard of living cannot be dissociated from the value system which prevails in that society.

For example, we may ask the following questions and try to answer them either affirmatively or negatively:

First, do we still feel it necessary to expand "the kitchen space" by encroaching upon our limited "garden"?

Second, do we consider the fruits of our industrial activities so important that the attendant environmental pollutions are well compensated for?

Third, do we think that technological advance, such for example as the development of supersonic transport plane, is ipso facto something desirable? We've just had a discussion on this problem earlier this afternoon.

Fourth, do we feel that increased defense efforts are essential in face of the presumed strength of potential opponents or enemies?

Fifth, do we consider the high GNP growth to be more important than the task of assisting the Third World countries in putting an end to the vicious circle of poverty?

Sixth, do we continue to regard academic diplomas to be necessary credentials for human excellence fit for elitist jobs?

Seventh, can we take a hedonistic attitude as regards the possible consequences of our squandering of non-renewable resources today and say, "Let's go with a bang" with the sub-theme, "What has posterity ever done for me?"

If your answers to these questions are all in the affirmative, it means that you are in favor of the further enhancement of our standard of living in the conventional sense; but at the same time you are taking at each step one or the other value judgement which is highly debatable. In fact, it is quite possible to answer all the above questions negatively and yet come out with a judgement that we are better off from the standpoint of our real welfare.

I actually take the position that we should answer all the above questions in the negative, and I'm aware that I am exercising certain value judgements in doing so.

It used to be the case that economists could rely on the "Invisible Hand" of free competitive market to bring about both the efficient allocation of society's resources and the socially equitable distribution of fruits of our economic endeavor. But now it is generally agreed that to rely on the prescription of the market is no longer a trustworthy guide for judging our welfare problems, and further, that what is required today is to arrive at a social consensus on normative judgements of various sorts and to apply them deliberately and with planning to relevant spheres of economic and social policies.

There are numerous aspects to this problem of having to bring in explicitly normative considerations for our discussions on the standard of living. But today, I should like to touch upon one particular problem related to the last or the seventh question I raised just a while ago. Namely, can we take a hedonistic attitude as regards the possible consequences of our squandering of non-renewable resources today?

This is the somewhat long-run — but, alas, not too long-run — problem of the depletion of non-renewable resources of this planet earth.

Let me give you a quantitative dimension of the problem involved here. It requires roughly one third of the world's annual production of mineral resources today to support 6% of the world population residing in the United States at the standard of consumption to which it is thought the rest of the world aspires. If this is the case, then, it follows that present resource flows would allow the extension to the U.S. standard to at most 18% of the world's population, with nothing left over for the other 82 percent. Optimists might say that resource flows could be increased in the future to meet the demand which will be forthcoming. It is quite possible that technological progress will solve a part of the problem. But one thing with which experts are increasingly and seriously concerned is the problem of entropy or the second law of thermodynamics, namely, that in the process of utilizing energy in any form energy turns from "available energy" into "unavailable energy" and creates disorders of all kinds. In fact, every technology creates a temporary island of order at the expense of greater disorder to the
surroundings. Only yesterday, a report was released by the Environment Protection Agency of the United States Government — a report by Professor Jackson Davis of University of California, Santa Cruz on the concentration of plutonium, cesium and strontium-90 in various kinds of fish in the ocean areas where the United States have been dumping radioactive wastes during the past thirty years. There are 50 spots in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans where the U.S. government has been disposing the radioactive wastes in the 55 gallon cans. Altogether 85,000 of them. Professor Davis has found, for example in a liver of a kind of cod, that there was a concentration of 35.5 pico-curie of plutonium which is 5071 times the normal value. In the edible part of this type of cod there was a concentration of 8.5 pico-curie, which was 8,500 times the normal value.

It is high time, it seems to me, that we translate the findings and diagnoses by scientists into a moral judgement designed to give us a guide in the social and economic organization of our societies both at present and in the future.

This international symposium has in the process of preparation done some research work which we are able to see, but I also would like to recall the findings of a Harris poll in May 1977, about three years ago. By a margin of 79 percent to 17 percent, the American public placed greater emphasis on teaching people how to live more with basic essentials than on reaching a higher standard of living. By a margin of 76 percent to 17 percent, a sizeable majority of Americans opted for learning to get more pleasures out of non-material experiences rather than satisfying our needs for more goods and services. By a margin of 77 percent to 17 percent, Americans would prefer spending more time getting to know each other better as human beings, on a person to person basis, instead of improving and speeding up our ability to communicate through better technology.

I recall what Professor Matsuda said earlier this afternoon on the need for restraint in our desires, the restraint which may actually contribute more towards creating spiritual, cultural things. It may well be that we economists, in particular, are behind general public and other scientists in assessing what is to be valued in our daily lives. Thank you.
First of all, may I say that it is a great honor for me to be allowed to give this recapitulatory address to you. However, I seem to have lost the zeal to do so after listening to Prof. Tsug-yi Lin’s observation in the last symposium: namely that “people advanced in years as are gathered here should not be able to comment on the values of the 21st Century!” Now, I would say that the sponsors of the Conference are having a laugh at my expense to have me, of all the members here the very representative, so to speak, of the “advanced in years,” to talk up here. However, we have done with the academic recapitulation, and being a bit of a scholar myself, I do feel tempted to voice some opposition when given a chance to speak. Yet I am fully aware that we must all avoid any jarring notes at the final stage. And so, I hope you will just allow me to pass with some harmonious general observations.

The main theme of the symposium “Collage 21” was “Technology and Man” — I suppose this is supposed to include woman as well! — anyway, the relationship between technology and humankind. Discussion on what the link between the two was, may not have been quite sufficient, but the suggestion was made that it was communication and information. Indeed in this so called “Age of Information,” we seem to be deluged with it, but I feel that therein lies the problem.

I happened to be turning the pages of a magazine before dropping off to sleep the other day, when I came across an article about salesmen. It said that salesmen were extremely good at talking, listening and selling; and that they went to the doors of housewives, exchanged views on various subjects, and finally succeeded in selling whatever it was that they wished to sell. So far so good. But what will happen when a salesman’s words become the main, perhaps the only, source of information? It certainly would not be a very well balanced state of affairs and is sure to raise serious social problems.

Though highly unacademic, to say so, I learned for the first time that the people who commanded the information which reached the women at home were the salesmen. There’s no knowing when salesmen might not turn into politicians. Then who will be directing the information of this Age of Information? I realized that without ample deliberation on this point there can be no sense or meaning in talking of an Age of Information.

Of the merit of the meetings of the past five days, each and every one of you gathered here is the best judge, but I rather feel that the party who enjoyed it most is in fact the organizers. Many people from various foreign countries kindly came over to take part in this International Conference. Furthermore, they were academic people. And so, all in line with the aim of the United Nations University, I’m sure the Rector is feeling very happy indeed. The Leisure Development Center is another sponsor. Now, “leisure” is a game; and a game is something where you divide everything into two situations and compete for victory. The discussions here were all hold from the standpoint of opposing factors, such as man and woman, aged people — i.e., ones like me, my goodness! — and young people, etc. And so again, I feel that the President of the Leisure Development Center, Mr. Sahashi, must be the most pleased of them all!

Then what was the outcome of this theory of opposition? It was that the general public will no doubt be playing an important part in the formation of future values, regardless of structural and systematic differences; that the 21st Century will be committed to the will and preference of the society at large. I shall always remember the observation that if there should be some common factor upon which they should base their choice it would be “Love.” Love for humankind is the most universal kind of love common to everything. As Prof. Kuwabara noted, it is the fraternity that links the opposing factors of freedom and equality. This idea of “Love,” I feel, is a theme which we need to consider once again.

We did hear of voices among our foreign guests reproving the Japanese for seemingly economy-only ways; that Japan advanced its technology, then sold cars in the world market, and then etc., etc. However, in the same cars driven by the Japanese, you will find various talismen hanging inside. Putting aside for the time being the more lofty question of “Love,” there is in the Japanese life a great host of gods and deities. They are mostly very popular, highly everyday sort of gods, as expressed by the popular saying: “With faith, even the head of a sardine is a god.” I feel that if there were anything that the Japanese could contribute to the future world, to the 21st Century, I think it would be the reconsideration of such “spiritual feelings” which were apt to be forgotten during these past thirty post-war years.

Finally, I would like to use this opportunity to express what many here I’m sure also have in mind. That is that...
this meeting, held with great good will and bearing much fruit which is now about to close, would indeed be quite futile if it were to be really the end. I sincerely hope that with the confidence and ardent wishes of each and every one of us gathered here, we shall be able to meet again at Tsukuba to continue discussions on this most interesting theme. Thank you very much.
The discussions at this Conference have been unusually rich and broad-ranging. Yet I feel compelled to note that there have also been some omissions and lack of adequate emphasis—at least to someone who comes from a developing country.

Much of the discussion on science and technology has centered on the problematica of the industrialized countries—and certainly the problems that these nations face are immense, deep-rooted, and consequential to all our lives on this interdependent planet. Yet listening to the discussions from a Third World perspective, I was struck by how little they dealt with problems that are equally grave and disquieting in the developing countries.

By the year 2000, an estimated 700 to 800 million people, virtually all of them in the developing world, will be living below the poverty line. The combination of this endemic, large-scale poverty with increasing density is likely to force upon the Third World a different trajectory in its process of industrialization and modernization. This process will likely be accompanied by a different perception of the values by which any society, civilization, or culture justifies itself and its existence.

Culture, of course, is defined by the answers it gives to the eternal human questions: about death, life, loyalty, love, fear, and so on. Culture also creates the climate in which science and technology develop—and thus the cultures of the Third World may provide some very different answers than those which governed the development and modernization process in the present industrialized countries.

When it comes to the future, moreover, both the industrialized and developing countries seem, in different ways, equally unprepared to deal with it. None of us is prepared to deal effectively, in humane and tolerant fashion, with many different aspects of the historical transition in which we are now involved.

Humankind so far has only a very limited capacity for understanding the ways in which different cultures and environmental settings provide different answers to problems. Yet if the human society is to move into the 21st century with a measure of dignity and justice, it will have to develop that understanding, based on the recognition that there are many different sets of responses that might be made to problems of survival and hunger and to the yearning among hundreds of millions of people for freedom and equality. This understanding will have to be nurtured in a spirit of far greater international co-operation. But our knowledge base for developing such a capacity for understanding is severely lacking and the institutional framework required to generate the sort of knowledge needed is seriously inadequate.

Those institutions which once taught us how to tolerate, accept, and love people who are different from ourselves have largely lost their credibility. They were essentially religious institutions and in the process of growing secularization they have been bypassed and are now withering. We have thus far been unable to create new institutions to perform their function of helping us identify with those who are different in race, color, religion, or ideological perception and consider them part of ourselves, all as a single human species.

The crux of the problem really—that which will in all probability determine our capacity to survive—is whether we can come to learn, to respect, and love each other with all our differences. As Barbara Ward has said, either we learn to love each other or we will perish.

As social change seems to escape our capacity to manage it, and uncertainty and anxiety begin to take over, the inclination to respond out of fear will grow ever greater. The desire for clear-cut answers to complex problems of an unprecedented scale will become more insistent. The institution that we will have to develop to enable us to live in this culturally, ideologically, and religiously pluralistic world must be able to withstand stresses of that sort.

The pluralistic world into which we are now moving will become even more difficult to sustain in an orderly and harmonious fashion due to increasing population pressures. There will be an increasing and deepening sense of limits that was largely absent from the ideological and social forces that dominated and shaped our lives in the first part of this century. Humanity now faces the future with a great deal less certainty about its ability to cope with life than it did in the past.

There are, of course, and particularly in certain of the affluent nations, those who continue to believe in the technological “fix”—the view that there is a technological answer to all our problems. But I think that kind of optimism is increasingly turning out to be very fragile. The technological optimism that exists in Japan, to take just one example, turns out to be seriously questionable when it is weighed against, for instance, the problem of resource supply and security—a consideration far beyond the control of any one nation.

It is very easy to imagine that countries which have previously felt a virtually full sense of confidence and superiority might come to feel threatened and strike out
irrationally at real or imagined threats to their existence. In the kind of world we live in now, which is undergoing considerable shifts in the configuration of power, we have seen these responses take various forms. Some, for example, are religious responses. Others can be military in nature. But whatever their form, they frequently tend to raise the level of fear. We will simply have to learn to live with our fears — and not let fear command or guide us. To accomplish this, we will need to develop institutions that can enhance our capacity to cope with an uncertain future replete with an array of seemingly threatening responses. The role of such institutions will be to find ways to reduce the danger of violence and the inclination toward violence in an uncertain and perilous world.

Thus as we move toward the 21st century, it is clear that we are faced with a myriad of problems of social transformation — in both industrialized and developing societies. We must find ways to structure this transformation in order that it can come about at as low a human cost as possible.

One thing is clear. The world of the 21st century will not be determined by any economic or technological projections that we make, but by moral choices. In the area of energy or communications, for example, the morality we bring to technological choices will decide whether the future will be a totalitarian one or one in which technology will serve to enhance human freedom, decentralize power, and humanize anew those large structures which have so de-personalized and de-humanized our existence.

The problems that we are going to face cannot be dealt with only in the context of a single culture or only in the context of the anxieties, interests, and needs of the industrialized world as it moves into an uncertain post-industrial phase. Nor can they be answered only by the Third World countries, whatever their impatience and anger over the unjust distribution of resources and power in the world. We will have to develop new concepts which enhance our capacity to work together and to restrain our own needs out of respect for the needs of others.

As all our societies attempt to grapple with the problems of entering the next century, and as we seek to evolve technological responses to those problems, we must ensure that those responses are not threatening our collective capacity for international co-operation and for understanding the legitimate needs and interests of other countries. This will require that we develop greater empathy, individually and collectively, with other cultures and civilizations.

The solutions to problems of global survival cannot be valid to only that one culture or society which happens to develop a given response. They will be valid only in so far as they have significance, at the same time, for other cultures. This pluralistic validity will need to be tested in new kinds of institutions, capable of weighing and evaluating ideas and responses within the context of different cultural and ideological paradigms. This will only be possible through dialogue and the exchange of information at far greater rate and intensity than has been the case in the past.

What these institutions will have to nurture is a sense of cultural relativity, free of moral paralysis. It would be the height of intellectual or moral hubris to think that we could look far ahead into the 21st century and establish in normative or a priori fashion the set of values that will enable a future global society to live in relatively happy and collective harmony. We have to move into the future step by step, restricted only by the dictates of moral reasoning, as we test possible responses in a multicultural setting and adjust those responses to the legitimate needs or others.

Here, I believe, is where the United Nations University could have a function. It obviously cannot take on this immense and far-reaching task alone, and it would be exceedingly presumptuous to think it is going to have all the answers. I see the UN University rather as simply one of the first institutions committed to fulfilling this need. We will need a great number of institutions capable of addressing these global problems in a culturally and ideologically pluralistic setting.

The United Nations University would also very much like to address one other problem which was emphasized only once or twice in this Conference. That is the need to reach out to the young — young scholars, young workers, the youth of all parts of society everywhere in the world. For the future is not ours, it is theirs. The greatest contribution we could make to the 21st century and the future of humankind would be to help the young realize that they still have the freedom, however limited, and therefore the responsibility to create the future.

It is the young ultimately who will make the choice in developing alternatives to a mode of living that is now seen not just as non-viable but plainly immoral to hundreds of millions of people. We must hope it is in the capacity of the young to make the right choices, because, for the time being, I don't see that the major powers of the world are capable of responding adequately to the problems we face. The answers must be found by those not suffering from notions of great power who can learn the humility of smallness and the limits to man's power. It is only out of that kind of humility that we will develop the capacity to respond in ways that are valid for a plurality of cultures and social situations.

This Conference, I believe, has been a very important step toward the kind of dialogue that this pluralistic and interdependent world so badly needs. I congratulate Tsukuba University and the organizers of this Conference for the initiative they have taken and for the opportunity they have given the United Nations University to be a co-sponsor. I hope that this will inspire other efforts to ask new questions and seek new directions. There is in the world today much innovative and fresh thinking going on below the surface of the dominant ideologies and schools of thought. I think it is important for us to uncover this thinking and nurture it. It just might contain the seeds of a brighter future for all humankind.
1. “Search for the Limit of Man’s Desires”
We are to study theoretically and in a positive manner man’s desires supporting the industrial society in relation with the data of the international comparative survey (I.C.S.) and the theory: “Value to have” and “Value to be,” pointed out by Gabriel Marcel, Balthas Staehelin, Erich Fromm, etc.

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2. “Structure of Culture Consciousness in the East and the West”
We will analyze I.C.S. data from 13 countries, categorized into the five zones of North America, Asia, Europe, South America and Australia. Considering the results of the above analysis, we will evaluate the impact of industrialization upon the structure of culture consciousness and help clarify related problems.

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3. "Dynamism of Conservatives and Radicals"
What do people think about their present social system in the 13 countries where the survey was carried out? First, their opinions will be divided into three categories: 1. those in favor of it, 2. those wishing to make an improvement, and 3. those wishing to make a radical reform. Following this, we will clarify the relations among the people in each category and religion, ethics, human relations, desires for consumption, labor and leisure, the good life, and self-fulfillment.

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4. "Structure of a Man's Good Life and a Woman's Good Life"
Some have termed 20th century, "The Age of Women's Revolution." In considering existing circumstances, though, the conclusion is unavoidable that substantial discrimination against women still abounds. We shall positively evaluate how men and women currently conceive of their own good lives as seen in the I.C.S. data collected from 13 countries. On the basis of these results, the structure of the good life for both sexes shall be sought in the years leading toward the 21st century.

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5. “Opposition of Values between Youth and the Aged”
In the past we have seen the conflicts of traditional culture, the collapse of existing value systems, and culture dominated by youth. Such movements have seemed to blanket social systems. Against these new movements paradoxically, the impact of the aged is gradually increasing as their number increase in the population structure.
We will analyze relations between youth and the aged from the I.C.S. data collected in 13 countries, and seek the means for more desirable relations toward the 21st century.

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6. “Humanization of Labor”
In advanced industrial countries, labor-related problems are on the increase. On the basis of research into the “Quality of Life” and “Work Humanization,” we will search for ways to improve working environments in an effort to provide a more worthwhile life for laborers.

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As labor time decreases substantially within our life time and free time increases, the needs for leisure and culture are on the rise. However, the gap is widening on adequate fulfillment of these needs in the leisure environment because of the present tendency toward mass leisure. Thus, we will search for suitable leisure concepts, leisure programs, leisure learning, recurrent education and new leisure environments for the post industrial society.

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8. “Problems of Mental Health and Religion in Modern Society”

The 20th century is said to be one of scientific and technological development. However, illogical senses of value and religion precepts still strongly dominate our human society. Comprehending these circumstances in a positive way from reviewing the I.C.S. data, we will seek how best to smoothly organize harmonious human relations in an international context.

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In advanced industrial countries, there has been an increase in juvenile delinquency, an increase in divorce and rising social morbidity. Opposite tendencies are evident in many developing countries where we find increased population and a shortage of every day needs. A search shall be undertaken in a positive way for answers to how these different peoples confront the problems in their family and social systems in both the advanced industrial countries and developing nations.

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10. “Economy/Social Development and North/South Nations Problem”
During the past quarter of a century — an era of high economic growth — the significant differences in economic power between highly industrialized nations of the Northern Hemisphere and developing agricultural countries in the Southern Hemisphere have become even more pronounced. Rich nations have become even richer, and poor nations have become poorer. And this confrontation is a matter of growing concern. The future harmonious existence of these peoples depend on finding a solution to the problem of the differences between these Hemispheres, with emphasis on the control of resources and energy savings. We shall deepen our recognition of these problems and shall simultaneously search for ways to solve them.

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11. "Advances in Science and Technology in Relation to Environmental Problems"

Today, approximately 200 years after the start of the industrial revolution, mankind stands at a turning point. In industrial advancement and growth is the basic reason for this because, having achieved a significant level of scientific technology, we are now facing serious environmental problems. The views of many are changing to concern over the problems and recognition is growing that, unless steps are taken, the prospect for the future of the earth's environment is deplorable. This workshop will discuss possible measures to overcome the problems.

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12. "Methodical Approach to the Study of Human Values"

At present, research fields that are difficult to deal with through the conventional cultural sciences, social science and natural science are on the increase. The study of human values is one of these fields. The I.C.S. data developed to support study of the workshop themes represent no more than a basic approach to the study of human values. Therefore, we will consider how best to carry out the future study of human values.

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Workshop Report

The following is an excerpt of the summary of the Workshop Report made by Prof. N. Yosida of the Tokyo Institute of Technology on the last day of the Conference.

(1) Search for the Limit of Man’s Desires — Materialism vs. Extra-Materialism —

The Study analysis that “advanced industrial nations are moving away from materialism” is misleading. It is reasonable to conclude that the higher the national income, the lower the desire for an increase in earnings, but it is hazardous to forthwith connect the trend in the ownership of goods and services with the renunciation of materialism. Indeed, it was agreed that there are limits to materialistic desires (private and public possessions) and non-materialistic desires, and 2. private desires and social desires (group desires and national desires); each to be considered on a separate basis. From such a viewpoint, the present state of desires may be interpreted as an age of coexistence of several types of desires, rather than the birth of a new desire. The difficulty is that the value concept which is the precondition of this coexistence, i.e., Peace, is presently at a crisis.

(2) Structure of Culture Consciousness in the East and the West — East vs. West —

In considering the culture of the East and the West, the observation, advocated by the Survey, made by Mr. S. Yamashiro of the Yamashiro Group, that “Eastern culture respects blood ties and tradition, and adapts itself to a genetic rule, whereas Western culture resists it,” was taken up, and a heated discussion ensued. While acknowledging such differences on the one hand, the observation was made that the emphasis ought to be laid rather on the similarities and universality of the cultures, and the set-up of the theory itself in a East vs. West sort of way was censured.

(3) Dynamism of Conservatives and Radicals — Conservative vs. Reformist —

With reference to the Survey, Associate Prof. H. Akuto of Tokyo University reported that there was no correlation between ‘conservative and reformist’ and ‘liberty and equality’. Discussion was held on what made people conservative or reformist in today’s society. Age, life stage, and social factors were considered, and it was inferred that conservative vs. reformist dichotomy was becoming internationally a confrontation, a collision, of differing cultures rather than that of ideologies.

(4) Structure of a Man’s Good Life and a Woman’s Good Life — Man vs. Woman —

The Survey data shows that the difference in value concepts between man and woman is diminishing, and that the increasing friction is due, not to confrontation, but to similarity of their value concepts. This occurs because the actual society is built on a male-centered basis, and indeed, Ms. Betty Friedan’s Women’s Libera-

tion movement was an attack on discrimination arising from it. However this movement has now reached a turning point and the various problems between the sexes should not be considered in a man vs. woman sort of way, but solved through the cooperation of man and woman, as a Human Liberation movement.

(5) Opposition of Values between Youth and the Aged — Youth vs. the Aged —

The Survey data reported that no marked difference in the values of the Young and of the Aged was observed, but it was pointed out during the discussions that from various experiences in daily life, opposition and friction did seem to exist between the age groups. At the same time it was argued that while this sort of conflict of values needed to be reconciled on the one hand, perhaps on the other hand, such differences were necessary at times in the course of growing up.

(6) Humanization of Labor — Recurrent Education — Work vs. Leisure —

At a time of low economic growth, the system of work-sharing, with its shorter working hours and increase in free time, should be adopted to solve the problem of unemployment. As a means of utilizing the additional free time, a system of life education, of recurrent education, where a person would be guaranteed an opportunity to learn and to receive education throughout life should be organized. Such a conception is currently being considered by UNESCO and OECD-CERI, and discussion was held on how labor and management should establish this system within their organizations. As regards the introduction of recurrent education, the opinion was that, on the whole, it was a desirable thing though it had its problems.


From the analysis of the Survey, it was first of all observed that the leisure activities of the Japanese were passive and lacking in initiative. Thus one needed to bear this fact in mind when discussing leisure programs and lifetime education. The subjects of discussion ranged from the basic ideas and definition of leisure, to the various steps in the development of leisure desires, to the consumption of leisure and the alienation of man in a mass, leisure environment, to the necessity of a lifetime education system in order to overcome such a situation.

(8) Problems of Mental Health and Religion in Modern Society — Spiritual vs. Secular —

The problem of mental health in modern society was considered from the viewpoint of psychological medicine and of religion. The Survey data showed that, whereas the former was a scientific analysis of the individual, the effects of religion reached beyond that of psychological medicine and offered a cosmic notion unattained by science. Discussion was held on the fact that, although modern man looks as though severed from religion, he, in fact, is hoping that there is life after death and that
God does exist. Ways to encourage cooperative activity between psychological medicine and religion were debated.

(9) Current Problems Surrounding the Family System
   — Family vs. Individual —
   The family system is from a long-term point of view a most steady system and, though various unstable phenomena such as juvenile delinquency and divorce can be observed, no other order to replace this unwavering system is likely to appear in the future. The family system with its various obstacles will no doubt continue seeking a new relationship for man and wife, parent and child.

(10) Economic/Social Development and Northern/Southern-Nations Problem — North vs. South —
   This problem between the nations of the northern hemisphere and those of the southern hemisphere should not be regarded as a conflict between two cultural circles having different value concepts, but rather as a question of the method and strategy of corresponding science and technology. The attitude of subordinating the South to the North in the process of spreading scientific knowledge must be reformed.

(11) Advances in Science and Technology in Relation to Environmental Problems
   Concerning the application of science and technology in human society, discussion was held from both an optimistic standpoint and a pessimistic one. In the process of such application, however, a system wherein the specialist and the ordinary citizen can both take part should be adopted in order to realize the constructive employment of scientific technique.

(12) Methodical Approach to the Study of Human Values
   In spite of severe criticism of the sampling method and data treatment of the International Comparative Study on Human Values in 13 Countries, it was acknowledged that as a first attempt it could be considered a success. Various comments and suggestions were made toward the future second and third such surveys.
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The Periods and Methodology of the Survey Conducted in 13 Countries — A Summary

Planning and analysis of survey — The Leisure Development Center

Survey conducted by — Gallup International Research Institutes Inc.

<table>
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<th>Period of survey</th>
<th>Area surveyed</th>
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The following abbreviations have been employed

1. U.K. — United Kingdom
2. FRA — France
3. GER — West Germany
4. ITA — Italy
5. KOR — South Korea
6. JPN — Japan
7. IND — India
8. SIN — Singapore
9. PHI — Philippines
10. AUS — Australia
11. CAN — Canada
12. USA — United States of America
13. BRA — Brazil

NOTES
The superscript numerals in the charts, tables, headlines and footnotes refer to notes at the end of the book.
Notes

Distribution of Income Aspiration Level

- Low
  0 ~ 20% increase
- Middle
  30 ~ 50% increase
- High
  100% or over

Relation of Income Aspiration Level by Actual Level

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1 ~ 5—income actual level (see P.137)
Life Style Aspiration Level by Actual Income Level

Life Style Aspiration Level by Ages

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NOTE: The numerals of the forgoing chart refer to the following countries.

1—U.K. 2—FRA 3—GER 4—ITA 5—KOR 6—JPN 7—IND 8—SIN 9—PHI 10—AUS 11—CAN 12—USA 13—BRA
## Life Style Aspiration Level and Religious Values

### Emphasis on Religion

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### Religious Belief

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1—Respondent who feel happy 2—Respondent who do not feel happy

---

**NOTE**—The numerals of the forgoing chart refer to the following countries.

1—U.K. 2—FRA 3—GER 4—ITA 5—KOR 6—JPN 7—IND 8—SIN 9—PHI 10—AUS 11—CAN 12—USA 13—BRA

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**Scale:** 1.0—1.5 times

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**Religious Values**

- **a—Food**
- **b—Clothing**
- **c—Housing**
- **d—Durable**
- **e—Health**
- **f—Education and culture**
- **g—Recreation**

- **□—Religion important**
- **□—Not important**

---

**NOTE**—The numerals of the forgoing chart refer to the following countries.
Life Style Aspiration Level
Conservatives and Radicals

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<th>Food</th>
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<th>Housing</th>
<th>Durable</th>
<th>Health</th>
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- Conservatives
- Moderates
- Radicals
scale: 1.0 ~ 1.5 times

View of Predisposition to Society—Liberalist and Equalitarian

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1—Liberalist 2—Equalitarian
# Good Life of a Man and of a Woman

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<th>Enjoyment of life</th>
<th>Satisfaction with life</th>
<th>Feeling of self-fulfilment</th>
<th>Hope for future</th>
<th>Hierarchy consciousness&lt;sup&gt;(7)&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
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- Men [ ] — Women [ ]

### Good Life by Income Aspiration Level

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L—Low (<20% increase) H—High (100% or over)
Hierarchy Consciousness and Happiness

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<th>3. Lower middle-Low class</th>
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NOTE—The numerals of the forgoing chart refer to the following countries:

Good Life and Religious Values

NOTE—The numerals of the foregoing chart refer to the following countries.
1—UK. 2—FRA 3—GER 4—ITA 5—KOR 6—JPN 7—IND
8—SIN 9—PHI 10—AUS 11—CAN 12—USA 13—BRA

- Feeling of happiness
- Enjoyment of life
- Satisfaction with life
- Feeling of self-fulfillment
- Hope for future
- Hierarchy consciousness
- Hollowness

- Religion important
- Not important
Good Life of Conservatives and of Radicals

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0 = Conservatives, 1 = Moderates, 2 = Radicals

Satisfaction with Daily Life

- Family life
- Work
- Spending free time
Satisfaction with Daily Life

1. U.K.  
2. FRA  
3. GER  
4. ITA  
5. KOR  
6. JPN  
7. IND  
8. SIN  
9. PHI  
10. AUS  
11. CAN  
12. USA  
13. BRA

Family life  
Men  
Women  

Free time  
Men  
Women  

Work  
Men  
Women

1—Respondent who feel happy  
2—Respondent who do not feel happy

Satisfaction with Daily Life by Ages

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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1—24 years or under</td>
<td>75.6</td>
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<td>55.7</td>
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<td>34.5</td>
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<td>71.9</td>
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<td>74.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>72.5</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>89.5</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>84.7</td>
<td>85.8</td>
<td>84.3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1—24 years or under</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>71.3</td>
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<td>34.3</td>
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<td>80.5</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>68.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2—40—54 years</td>
<td>83.1</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>28.1</td>
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<td>81.1</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>70.8</td>
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</table>
### Satisfaction with Daily Life and Religious Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1—Religion—important</th>
<th>2—Not important</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Family life</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>FRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 U.K.</td>
<td>93.9</td>
<td>80.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 FRA</td>
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<td>79.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 GER</td>
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<td>63.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 ITA</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>63.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 KOR</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>65.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 JPN</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>67.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 IND</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>61.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 SIN</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>57.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 PHI</td>
<td>94.8</td>
<td>73.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 AUS</td>
<td>79.0</td>
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<td>11 CAN</td>
<td>89.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 USA</td>
<td>93.6</td>
<td>84.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 BRA</td>
<td>91.8</td>
<td>83.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Conservatives
- Moderates
- Radicals
Satisfaction with Work by Occupations


Good fellow workers

Tolerable pace of work

Satisfaction with earnings

NOTE—The numerals of the foregoing chart refer to the following countries.

1–29 years or under  2–30–39 years  3–40–49 years
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs by Sex

NOTE—The numerals of the foregoing chart refer to the following countries.
1—U.K. 2—FRA 3—GER 4—ITA 5—KOR 6—JPN 7—IND
8—SIN 9—PHI 10—AUS 11—CAN 12—USA 13—BRA

a—Clothing
b—Food
c—Housing
d—Prepare for future
e—Family relations
f—Relations at the job
g—Life with pride
h—Chances to use abilities

■—Men
□—Women
Weekly Holiday

1—3 days
2—2 days
3—Combination of 2 and 1
4—1 day
5—Shift or irregular
6—No weekly holidays

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Working Hours per Week</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hours or under</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 hours or over</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Obstruction Factors in Leisure Environment

1. Not enough holiday
2. No long vacations
3. Little free time on weekdays
4. High cost of leisure activities
5. Not enough income
6. No or very limited facilities
7. Babies and children to take care of
### Present Leisure Activities by Household Incomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Households</th>
<th>One day trips</th>
<th>Socializing</th>
<th>Getting relaxed at home</th>
<th>Going out</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRA</td>
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<td>48.6</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GER</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>64.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITA</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>73.9</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPN</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>69.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOR</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>45.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IND</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>42.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIN</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>47.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHI</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>65.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUS</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>57.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAN</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>63.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>66.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRA</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>65.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Households</th>
<th>One day trips</th>
<th>Socializing</th>
<th>Getting relaxed at home</th>
<th>Going out</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>200,000</td>
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<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>59.5</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>40.3</td>
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<td>FRA</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>48.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>GER</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>64.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITA</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>70.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPN</td>
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<td>61.4</td>
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<td>69.6</td>
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<td>35.0</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>45.3</td>
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<td>IND</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>19.4</td>
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<td>PHI</td>
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<td>53.8</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>66.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRA</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>65.3</td>
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</table>

**NOTE:** For an explanation of the abbreviations, refer to P. 129.
NOTE—For an explanation of the abbreviations, refer to P.129.
NOTE—For an explanation of the abbreviations, refer to P. 129.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Activity Type</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>CREAT Creative activities</td>
<td>Creative activities or taking lessons such as writing novels and poems,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>painting, taking photographs, singing, playing musical instruments,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>taking lessons in tea ceremony, flower arrangement, folk or classical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>dancing, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>PRACT Practically oriented</td>
<td>Practically oriented creative activities such as knitting, stitching,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>creative activities</td>
<td>dressmaking, cooking, handicrafting, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>DO-IT &quot;Do-it-yourself&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Do-it-yourself&quot; activities such as model building, gardening, farming,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>activities</td>
<td>carpentry, repair work, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>LEARN Learning activities</td>
<td>Learning activities such as reading, research, studying references,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>going to lecture or school, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>WATCH Watching sports</td>
<td>Watching sports (except on TV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>ART Art appreciation</td>
<td>Art appreciation such as going to concerts, movie shows, dramas, art</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>exhibitions, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>GAME Playing games</td>
<td>Playing games such as go, chess, cards, mah-jong, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>GAMBL Gambling</td>
<td>Gambling such as horse race, bicycle race, motorcycle race, motorboat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>race, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>TRIP1 One day trip</td>
<td>One day trips to or for a beach, playground, picnicking, hiking, fishing,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>TRIP 2 Overnight or longer</td>
<td>Overnight or longer trip to hot springs, temples and shrines, home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>trip</td>
<td>town, villa, etc. within your country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>TRIP 3 Trip abroad</td>
<td>Trip abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>SOCIA Social sports</td>
<td>Social sports such as golf, horse riding, skiing, tennis, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>HOBBY Hobby sports</td>
<td>Hobby sports such as beauty athletics, ping pong, cycling, bowling, ice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>skating, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>INDIV Individual competition</td>
<td>Individual competition sports such as judo, boxing, track and field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sports</td>
<td>sports, marathon, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>GROUP Group competition</td>
<td>Group competition sports such as baseball, soccer, rugby, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>MOUNT Mountain sports</td>
<td>Mountain sports such as hunting, camping, hiking, rock climbing, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>MARIN Marine sports</td>
<td>Marine sports such as sea swimming, motorboating, skin diving.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>SKY Aerial sports</td>
<td>Aerial sports such as sky diving, flying a glider or a plane, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>PET Keeping pets</td>
<td>Keeping pets such as birds, small animals, fish, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>PARTY Socializing</td>
<td>Socializing such as having home parties and dinner parties, visiting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>friends and relatives, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>ATHOM Getting relaxed at</td>
<td>Getting relaxed at home such as TV-watching, listening to radio or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>home</td>
<td>records, just doing nothing, playing with children, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>GOCUT Going out</td>
<td>Going out such as taking a walk, eating out, window shopping, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>CLECT Collecting stamps</td>
<td>Collecting stamps, old coins, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>VOLUN Group activities</td>
<td>Group activities or volunteer activities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PERSONAL VALUE SYSTEMS

The objective was to provide a basis for interpreting the characteristics of the different value systems of the respondents that was independent of their cultural/economic environment such as East/West cultures and advanced/developing national economies. The questionnaire used for this survey asked 23 questions; the questions related to 4 basic value groups, plus questions were asked to measure the respondents levels of happiness, satisfaction, and fulfillment. Demographic information was also collected.

The initial sample was 13,000 respondents in 13 countries. Through the major component analysis a set of 16 value variables were derived. A synthetic measure of happiness was also determined.

A random sample of 200 from each of the 13 countries (2600 total) was then subjected to a cluster analysis based upon the 16 value variables, nationality, the happiness measure, and demographic information.

Ultimately, 8 general value clusters were quantitatively mapped with measures of ways of thought, life style, level of happiness, and demographic data.

2. MEASURES OF VALUE SYSTEMS RESULTING FROM PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS (THE DERIVATION OF MAJOR AXES)

Within the value domain of the questionnaire the questions were directed at the following 4 basic value foci:

(1) Values concerned with the individual ethical values such as religion, life goals and quality of life.
(2) Values concerned with the attitudinal values toward other persons such as relations with family, other individuals, society and politics.
(3) Values concerned with the individual and his general environment, such as aspirled level of income, life style, and ratio of material goods needed to those not desired.
(4) Values concerned with budgeting of time such as current and future preference for use of leisure time, and satisfaction derived from family, work, and leisure activities.

Value variables, required for a numerical analysis, were obtained from the questions concerning the above 4 basic value foci. Through a major component analysis, 16 value variables, which describe and measure the 4 basic foci from various angles, were derived. These are listed below:

(1) ETHICAL VALUES
I. The axis representing the height of the aspiration level of life style.
II. The axis representing the degree of satisfaction of desires.
III. The axis representing the influence of religion.
IV. The axis representing the satisfaction of Maslow's hierarchy of needs.
V. The axis representing the tendency towards individualism.

(2) ATTITUDINAL VALUES
I. The axis representing concern with the societal environment.
II. The axis representing the parents' trend toward alienation from children.
III. The axis representing the trend toward home training and education.
IV. The axis representing the trend toward egalitarianism.

(3) ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES
I. The axis representing the trend toward postmaterialism.
II. The axis representing the degree of aspiration to enhance life style.

(4) TIME BUDGET
I. The axis representing the aspiration for leisure activities.
II. The axis representing alternatives to explicit leisure activities.
III. The axis representing explicit engagement in leisure activities.
IV. The axis representing the geographical aspects of leisure activities.
V. The axis representing the pragmatic aspects of leisure activities.

The significance of each axis is assessed by the height (high/low) of the category score of each category. The possibility of these evaluations being influenced by the analyst's subjective interpretation is great. We have a table was prepared giving the category score for each of the major categories of each axis. (See P. 132)

Also, a synthetic measure of the degree of happiness was created by employing the principal component analysis of the seven indexes on human happiness—feeling of happiness, satisfaction with life, enjoyment of life, feeling of self-fulfillment, hope for the future, hierarchy consciousness and sense of hollow-ness.

3. CLUSTER ANALYSIS OF VALUE SYSTEMS

Next the 16 value variables derived from the majorcomponents analysis were used to perform a cluster analysis for the purpose of categorizing respondents of the 13 countries into separate groups. However, due to the technical difficulty entailed in using all 13,000 samples for the cluster analysis, 200 samples from each country—a total of 2,600—were randomly selected and were used to derive the clusters (value groups). Subsequently, the distance between the total of samples and the center of gravity of each cluster was calculated, and all samples were assigned to appropriate clusters (the foci closest in distance).

As a result, respondents of the 13 countries were classified into eight value groups. (See P. 132)

First, respondents of the 13 countries were classified into those opting for postmaterialism and materialism. Respondents in group 7 and 8 are strongly biased towards alienation from materialistic goods; they are of the opinion that traditional luxury items as status symbols, such as fur coats, jewelry, villa and second car, have no place in their future plans. They are adherents of the Western individualistic family system, where parents and offsprings are considered to be independent entities. Most of the respondents of this group are from Anglo-Saxon countries—Australia, Great Britain, United States, Canada, who enjoy a high sense of happiness. A relatively large number of them are characterized by high education, high income and are in their 30s. This is still a minority group, constituting only 15% of the 13 countries.

In contrast, members of Group 6—containing many Anglo-Saxons—opt for materialism. Many are in their 50s and 60s, married parents with children grown up and living separately, or childless, married couples—typical of the old-aged in the advanced countries of the West. Their sense of happiness is maximum among the all eight groups, which, perhaps, accounts for the group's low motivation to aggressively enhance its life style and its low concern for improving societal relations. The group is second largest; its respondents are typical people of the advanced countries of the West, satisfied both materially and spiritually.

Though respondents of Group 5 are mostly from economically
advanced countries, they also come from countries which had accomplished rapid economic growth, such as Singapore, West Germany, Japan. This fact perhaps accounts for the fact that they strongly opt for materialism and their satisfaction level with their current life style is low. Also, this group’s sense of happiness is lower than that of the value groups 8, 7, and 6. Group 5 is the largest among all eight groups, and when this group is combined with Group 6, the two clusters comprise over half of the combined respondents of the 13 countries. The features common to all these value groups of advanced countries are their low aspiration level on life style and motivation for enhancing their standard of living. In other words, they seemed to have lost their materialistic goals.

More people from the economically advanced countries are contained in the foregoing value groups. In contrast, members of the four remaining groups are from the developing countries, whose sense of happiness is relatively low. A feature common to these groups is their high aspiration level on life style—reflecting the low level of their current standard of living. Among the latter four groups, many members of Group 3 are in the low-income segment, three-fourths of them are from developing countries of Asia—excepting Singapore—and Brazil. Their dissatisfaction with their life style is high. Consequently, they are aggressively motivated to better their standard of living.

Though Group 2 does contain many in the low-income segment, they are not aggressively motivated to enhance their life style. Their action is negatively oriented in that they seek a compensatory outlet to their dissatisfaction by opting for alternatives to leisure activities, such as “relaxing at home” and “going out for a walk.” There are more of this type in Japan, Korea and Italy. Among all eight groups, this group’s sense of happiness is minimum.

Group 4 is composed of youths strongly oriented towards leisure activities. Their preference is active sports, rather than the negatively-oriented alternative leisure activities. Many are students in the teens and 20s from Brazil and Korea. Activist youths comprise this group, whose aspiration for enhanced life style is strong.

Though Group 1 is also composed mainly of youths, their satisfaction with their current life style is great and their concern for improving societal relations is high. Nonetheless, they are not realistically oriented towards any definite goal. Their motivation for enhancing their life style or engaging actively in sports is weak. This value group is apathetic. Many of respondents come from India, the Philippines, Japan and Korea—the Asiatic countries.
### Cluster Analysis of Value Systems of 13 Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Values Score</th>
<th>Major Countries Included</th>
<th>Major Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GROUP 1</strong></td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>India, Philippines</td>
<td>• Teenagers and generation in 20s students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>Japan, Brazil, Korea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>Japan, (11.8%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GROUP 2</strong></td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>Japan, Korea</td>
<td>• Female low income married couples living with parents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>Japan, (12.7%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GROUP 3</strong></td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>Japan, India</td>
<td>• Low income the generation in the 40s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>Japan, (8.0%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>India</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>India</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GROUP 4</strong></td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>Brazil, Philippines</td>
<td>• Male the generation in the 20s and 30s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>Japan, (3.6%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GROUP 5</strong></td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>Singapore, West Germany</td>
<td>• Low education level generation in the 60s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>Japan, (26.4%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GROUP 6</strong></td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>Australia, United States</td>
<td>• Generations in the 50s &amp; 60s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GROUP 7</strong></td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>Australia, United States</td>
<td>• Professionals and whitecollar employees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>Great Britain, France</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GROUP 8</strong></td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>• Male selfemployed or management class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Value Variables:**
1. Aspiration level of life style
2. Satisfaction of needs
3. Environmental concern
4. Alienation from children
5. Trend towards postmaterialism
6. Desire for enhancing standard of living
7. Aspiration for leisure activities
8. Trend towards seeking alternatives to leisure activities

**Scores of Value Variables**
- Aspiration level of life style
- Satisfaction of needs
- Environmental concern
- Alienation from children
- Trend towards postmaterialism
- Desire for enhancing standard of living
- Aspiration for leisure activities
- Trend towards seeking alternatives to leisure activities

**Cluster Characteristics:**
- Group 1: This group is fairly satisfied with clothing, food, and housing, as well as with human relations. Its life goals are "To live meaningfully fulfilled" and "To make efforts to correct social inequality and injustice." The group's concern is strong but its practical orientation is ambivalent. For lack of actions, it tends to be apathetic.
- Group 2: This group is characterized by chronic dissatisfaction because its basic needs for clothing, food, and housing are not fulfilled.
- Group 3: This group also is dissatisfied with its life style, largely due to its low income level. Consequently, it is strongly motivated to enhance its standard of living.
- Group 4: This cluster is typified of countries with attained high economic growth. As a result, it tends to have no definite life style goal. Consequently, materialism still remains important for the group.
- Group 5: This cluster is representative of advanced countries, whose sense of happiness and material satisfaction quantitatively as well as qualitatively have peaked. Consequently, the group is characterized by a tendency towards diminishing interest in enhancing its life style and remoteness in human relations. Hence, it tends to have no definite life goal.
- Group 6: This group is the smallest among the cluster groups.
This chart figuratively represents the numerical relations between the eight groups, expressed in terms of two variables—degree of trend towards post-materialism (abscissa) and degree of happiness (ordinate)—derived from an principal component analysis of values. The circles of varying sizes representing each of the groups indicate the relative numbers of persons comprising them. The figures in the following table give the relative composition of each group by region, age and sex.
Regional Distribution of Eight Groups

- Asia — 5.KOR 6.JPN 7.IND 8.SIN 9.PHI
- Australia — 10.AUS
- North America — 11.CAN 12.USA
- South America — 13.BRA
- 13 countries

- TREND TOWARDS POSTMATERIALISM
The percentage composition of the eight groups in the five regions — Asia, Europe, North America, South America and Australia — are represented in the above charts.
## RESULTS OF PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS

### ETHICAL VALUES'

#### I. ASPIRATION LEVEL OF LIFE STYLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Factor Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To live religiously</td>
<td>0.261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To live mentally fulfilled</td>
<td>0.248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To make efforts to correct social inequality and injustice</td>
<td>0.246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To be concerned about future of country</td>
<td>0.238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To live with friendship beyond ethnic origins and nationality</td>
<td>0.226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To live in a beautiful environment</td>
<td>0.235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To be concerned about world peace</td>
<td>0.233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To create a pleasant community</td>
<td>0.232</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### II. DEGREE OF SATISFACTION OF DESIRES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High-scoring Items</th>
<th>Factor Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>0.318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>0.306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social significance of job and pride in life</td>
<td>0.301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation for future life</td>
<td>0.300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chance to use or show abilities</td>
<td>0.285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human relations at job</td>
<td>0.276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>0.271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with neighbors</td>
<td>0.266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with family</td>
<td>0.243</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### III. INFLUENCE OF RELIGION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High-scoring Items</th>
<th>Factor Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily life should be governed by religious commandments</td>
<td>0.349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euthanasia is not permissible</td>
<td>0.280</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low-scoring Items</th>
<th>Factor Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No soul separate from the body</td>
<td>-0.284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No life after death</td>
<td>-0.419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No gods exist</td>
<td>-0.433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion is not important in life</td>
<td>-0.463</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### IV. MASLOW'S HIERARCHY OF NEEDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High-scoring Items</th>
<th>Factor Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social significance of job and pride in life</td>
<td>0.364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chance to use or show abilities</td>
<td>0.368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human relations at job</td>
<td>0.336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To live without financial worries</td>
<td>0.231</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low-scoring Items</th>
<th>Factor Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No soul separate from the body</td>
<td>-0.384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No life after death</td>
<td>-0.254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No gods exist</td>
<td>-0.294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion is not important in life</td>
<td>-0.293</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### V. TENDENCY TOWARDS INDIVIDUALISM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High-scoring Items</th>
<th>Factor Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To be considerate to others</td>
<td>0.376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To improve my character</td>
<td>0.269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To live sincerely and seriously</td>
<td>0.212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To be attentive to daily human relations</td>
<td>0.198</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low-scoring Items</th>
<th>Factor Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To make efforts to correct social inequality and injustice</td>
<td>-0.218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No life after death</td>
<td>-0.254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No soul separate from the body</td>
<td>-0.294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To be concerned about future of country</td>
<td>-0.281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To be concerned about world peace</td>
<td>-0.293</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### ATTITUINAL VALUES'

#### I. SOCIETAL RELATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Factor Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relation with friends</td>
<td>0.437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation with family</td>
<td>0.424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation with neighbors</td>
<td>0.421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human relations at job</td>
<td>0.379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal life</td>
<td>0.368</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### II. ALIENATION FROM CHILDREN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High-scoring Items</th>
<th>Factor Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A married couple considering divorce should give priority to own happiness</td>
<td>0.472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children not obligated to parents for raising them</td>
<td>0.441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents should not sacrifice own happiness for sake of children</td>
<td>0.383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents have no rights to have children look after their old age</td>
<td>0.381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents should never live with married son/daughter</td>
<td>0.376</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low-scoring Items</th>
<th>Factor Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I would like children to achieve what I couldn’t</td>
<td>-0.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents should teach children traditional values</td>
<td>-0.130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The more children, the better</td>
<td>-0.132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strict discipline is the best training</td>
<td>-0.140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### III. TRAINING/EDUCATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High-scoring Items</th>
<th>Factor Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advanced education not necessary for girls</td>
<td>0.440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would like children to achieve what I couldn’t</td>
<td>0.362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strict discipline is the best training</td>
<td>0.347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents have no rights to have children look after their old age</td>
<td>0.344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boys and girls should be raised differently</td>
<td>0.297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married females should rear children and avoid outside work</td>
<td>0.282</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low-scoring Items</th>
<th>Factor Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parents should not sacrifice own happiness for sake of children</td>
<td>-0.166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### IV. EQUALITY/LIBERALISM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High-scoring Items</th>
<th>Factor Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To make efforts to correct social inequality and injustice</td>
<td>0.599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completely reject present society</td>
<td>0.520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boys and girls should be raised differently</td>
<td>0.351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents should not sacrifice own happiness for sake of children</td>
<td>0.188</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low-scoring Items</th>
<th>Factor Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The more children, the better</td>
<td>-0.123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married females should rear children and avoid outside work</td>
<td>-0.170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents should never live with married son/daughter</td>
<td>-0.325</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES

#### I. TREND TOWARDS POSTMATERIALISM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electric washing machine</td>
<td>0.186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Color TV set</td>
<td>0.183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stereo set</td>
<td>0.183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacuum cleaner</td>
<td>0.183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central heating</td>
<td>0.176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family dinner at top restaurant</td>
<td>0.173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bath tub</td>
<td>0.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air conditioner</td>
<td>0.164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separate rooms for each family member</td>
<td>0.102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Items not required for enhancing lifestyle:
- Clothing
- Electric washing machine
- Color TV set
- Stereo set
- Vacuum cleaner
- Central heating
- Family dinner at top restaurant
- Bath tub
- Air conditioner
- Separate rooms for each family member

All other items were regarded as unnecessary.

#### II. NEEDED FOR ENHANCING LIFE STYLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>0.389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durable consumer good</td>
<td>0.372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>0.306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education &amp; culture</td>
<td>0.268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>0.267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation</td>
<td>0.241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health &amp; medical care</td>
<td>0.235</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.264</td>
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</table>

### TIME BUDGET

#### I. ASPIRATION FOR LEISURE ACTIVITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual competition sport</td>
<td>0.276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambling</td>
<td>0.266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain sports</td>
<td>0.266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social sports</td>
<td>0.259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine sports</td>
<td>0.256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group sports</td>
<td>0.251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collecting stamps, etc.</td>
<td>0.239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hobby sports</td>
<td>0.237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial sports</td>
<td>0.206</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All other items are those respondents would like to engage in the future.

#### II. ALTERNATIVE TO LEISURE ACTIVITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One-day trips</td>
<td>0.181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Going out, such as taking a walk</td>
<td>0.180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overnight or longer trip</td>
<td>0.168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socializing</td>
<td>0.138</td>
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</table>

#### III. ASPIRATION FOR AGGRESSIVE KINDS OF LEISURE ACTIVITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Score</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aerial sports</td>
<td>0.283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual competition sports</td>
<td>0.262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social sports</td>
<td>0.266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine sports</td>
<td>0.194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group sports</td>
<td>0.192</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Going out, such as taking a walk</td>
<td>-0.300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art appreciation</td>
<td>-0.301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working or doing household work</td>
<td>-0.306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socializing</td>
<td>-0.312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-day trips</td>
<td>-0.320</td>
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#### IV. ASPIRATION FOR GEOGRAPHICAL LEISURE ACTIVITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Score</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trip abroad</td>
<td>0.317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overnight or longer trip</td>
<td>0.348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art appreciation</td>
<td>0.211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creative activities or taking lessons</td>
<td>0.185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social sports</td>
<td>0.167</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual competition sports</td>
<td>-0.186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collecting stamps, etc.</td>
<td>-0.273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Going out, such as taking a walk</td>
<td>-0.257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relaxing at home</td>
<td>-0.431</td>
</tr>
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</table>

#### V. ASPIRATION FOR PRACTICAL LEISURE ACTIVITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Practically oriented creative activities</td>
<td>0.456</td>
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<tr>
<td>Creative activities or taking lessons</td>
<td>0.334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group activities or volunteer activities</td>
<td>0.206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do-it-yourself activities</td>
<td>0.187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning activities</td>
<td>0.167</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gambling</td>
<td>-0.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-day trip</td>
<td>-0.171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art appreciation</td>
<td>-0.211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group sports</td>
<td>-0.243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watching sports</td>
<td>-0.415</td>
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<tr>
<td>Playing games</td>
<td>-0.424</td>
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</table>

(Note: The figures represent the category score of each of the values in terms of their variables (axis).)

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Reference Data for Workshops of International Conference on Human Values

<table>
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<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a—1000km²</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>3288</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>7686</td>
<td>9976</td>
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<td>b—million</td>
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<td>53</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>638</td>
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<td>387.1</td>
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<td>29.4</td>
<td>993.8</td>
<td>97.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>20.1</td>
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<td>40.2</td>
<td>26.7</td>
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<td>68.7</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>—</td>
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<td>e—%</td>
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<td>35.0</td>
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<td>3.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>g—1000</td>
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<td>12377</td>
<td>2300</td>
<td>26545</td>
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<td>294</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>4785</td>
<td>9895</td>
<td>121100</td>
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<tr>
<td>h—%</td>
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<td>1.27</td>
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<td>—</td>
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<td>i—</td>
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<td>259</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>127</td>
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</table>

a—Area b—Population c—GNP b—National Income per capita d—Proportion of expenditures food and drink e—Proportion of religious books among all books produced f—Proportion of illiterate population to total g—Number of television receivers h—Divorce rate i—Number of industrial disputes j—Consumer price index number All data from UN Statistical Yearbook 1978

Household Income Level and Its Proportion

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<tr>
<td>a</td>
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<td>8.5</td>
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<td>18.5</td>
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<td>17.4</td>
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<td>16.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
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<td>274</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
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<td>b</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>183</td>
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<td>237</td>
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<td>174</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a—Household income level b—Household income, unit—ten thousand yen c—Proportion of expenditures below in total household expenditures d—Proportion of expenditures for food and drink e—Proportion of religious books among all books produced f—Proportion of illiterate population to total g—Number of television receivers h—Divorce rate i—Number of industrial disputes j—Consumer price index number (all items) All data from UN Statistical Yearbook 1978
NOTES

<1> Income aspiration levels refer to how much the respondents want to increase their earnings compared with actual earnings in the future.

<2> Singapore: 44.2% is N.A.

<3> U.K.: 37.8% is N.A.

<4> Income level: low (category 1 & 2) ; middle (category 3 & 4) ; high (category 5) (see p.127)

<5> Life style aspiration levels refer to how much the respondents want to increase their basic living expenditures compared with actual expenses in the future.

<6> Figures refer to the percentages of the respondents who are satisfied (“very” or “fairly” satisfied) with each of the items.

<7> Figures of hierarchy consciousness refer to the percentages of the respondents who regard the standard of their own living as higher than the middle.

U.K.: On the questionnaire of hierarchy consciousness the term “working class” is used instead of “low”.

<8> The item positions in each cell stand in order of the item number in the list.

<9> Figures refer to the percentages of the respondents who are satisfied with each of the items.

<10> Figures refer to the percentages of the respondents who regard each of the items quite seriously.

<11> Respondents who feel happy: “very happy” or “fairly happy”.

Respondents who do not feel happy: “neither happy nor unhappy”, “fairly unhappy” or “very unhappy”.

<12> Figures refer to the proportion among the respondents who have job including part time.

<13> U.K.: There are not included any professionals and engineers, and any sales and service workers.

<14> Figures refer to the proportion among the respondents who are not satisfied with how to spend their free time.